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Electric end-use efficiency is attracting more and more attention from energy users as 
well as utility companies and policy-makers. In theransition to a more energy efficient economy, 
states continue playing a leading role in saving energy while spurring economic growth and 
benefiting the environment. However, it remains unclear what factors are driving state policy 
innovation to improve energy efficiency (EE). Controversy exists over the effectiveness of 
energy efficiency programs and skeptics question whether state policies have significant impact 
in reducing energy use. Researchers tend to agree that there is potential in future energy 
efficiency improvement, but they disagree on the magnitude of the efficiency potential and what 
are the best approaches to harness America’s untapped energy efficiency opportunities. 
Understanding the dynamics between state policies and energy efficiency is important to utility 
planning and policy decision-making when faced with the challenges of climate mitigation. 
Several critical problems are facing U.S. policymakers: state differences in energy efficiency 
performance, estimating the impacts of energy effici n y policies, explaining the state 
differences in policy adoption, and exploring potential that can be achieved with energy 
efficiency policies.  
This dissertation investigates the relationship betwe n policy and the energy efficiency 
by answering the following research questions: 
• What factors drive the states taking distinct strategies in policy innovation? 
• What are the impacts of policy innovation on states’ electricity efficiency performance?  
• What is the achievable potential in electric end-use efficiency driven by efficiency 




It first explores the factors that influence the adoption of energy efficiency policies using 
Internal Determinants models. State decisions of policy adoption is quantified as policy 
innovations, and state socioeconomic factors, statefiscal capacity, ideology, and constituent 
pressure are assumed to affect policy innovation. The impact of policy innovation on energy 
efficiency is evaluated using historical data on state level electricity productivity. The relevance 
of policy innovation on future efficiency improvement is also examined with the estimation of 
policy-driven potential in energy efficiency. Figure ES.1 summarizes the conceptual framework 
of this dissertation.    
 
Figure ES.1 Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Relationship between Policy 
Innovation and Electricity Efficiency 
The internal state characteristics are used to explain olicy adoption.  The Internal 
Determinants model with fixed effects was used to examine an array of internal factors: state 





























among the energy efficiency policies and programs. The variables of problem seriousness 
measure constituent pressure in dealing with problems of high electricity price, excessive 
electricity consumption, high unemployment rate, and CO2 emissions. Chapter 4 tests for the first 
hypotheses related to the factors of policy innovati n: 
H1. Constituent pressure is related to policy innovation.  
The findings suggest that financial incentives are significantly related to electricity 
consumption and state unemployment rates. States wih high unemployment rates also invest 
large amount of money in energy efficiency programs. States with high electricity consumption 
invest less in energy efficiency programs and are less ikely to adopt building energy codes.  
Other constituent interests in electricity price and CO2 emissions have no significant 
impact on policy innovation. In addition, the adopti n of EERS, Decoupling and the Lead by 
Example program is not influenced by any of the constituent pressures. Rather, the policies are 
affected by other internal state determinants, such as GSP, state fiscal capacity, environmental 
awareness, and state government ideology.    
Policy innovations are found to be correlated with each other. State spending/budget on 
energy efficiency programs are positively related to EERS targets and building codes.  In 
addition, EERS is also positively correlated with the stringency of building energy codes.  
However, EERS targets are negatively related to the adoption of Lead by Example programs. 
The adoption of Decoupling is not significantly related to any other energy efficiency policies, 




This dissertation evaluates the impact of policy innovation on energy efficiency by 
decomposing electricity productivity on the state level. Chapter 5 tests for the significance of 
policy impact on energy efficiency. 
H2. Three types of policy innovations increase state electricity productivity: regulation, 
financial incentives, and information programs. 
The underlying efficiency component of electricity productivity was separated from the 
activity and the structure effect. The effects of energy efficiency programs and policies are 
examined using fixed effect models to account for the unobserved effects fixed to the states. The 
time-lagged effects of the policies are tested to explain the impacts of regulations. Results from 
the one-way fixed effect models are compared with results from two-way fixed effect models 
and a feasible generalized least squares model. The findings suggest that financial incentives and 
building energy codes have significant impacts on state electricity productivity, controlling for 
the activity and structure factors. Other regulations tend to have mixed effects. Adopting 
decoupling mechanisms helps improve electricity productivity, while high annualized targets 
tend to have time-lagged effects of the Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS). 
This dissertation also provides a sophisticated assessment of the achievable potential for 
improving electric end-use efficiency in the U.S. The cost-effective potential of electricity 
savings that can be achieved with policy efforts is as essed through modeling of the energy 
efficiency policies with the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). Cost estimations, policy 
impacts on the electricity market and CO2 emissions were analyzed following the potential 
assessment. This approach is applied in Chapter 6 to test for the relevance of policy innovation to 




H3. The potential of electric end-use efficiency is achievable with financial, regulatory, 
and information policies.   
The results suggest significant energy savings can be achieved with policy effort. The 
estimation of levelized cost of electricity from each policy scenario also suggests this achievable 
potential is cost-effective. More specifically, the information and regulatory policies are highly 
cost-effective, while the levelized cost for financial incentives are higher than the other selected 
policies (Table ES.1).  
Table ES.1 The LCOE and Electricity Savings by Policy Type 
Policy Type LCOE  
 in cents/kWha 
Electricity Savings 
in 2020 (TWh) 
Electricity Savings 
in 2035 (TWh) 
Financing 6.2-6.4 93.8 (3.3%) 190.8 (5.9%) 
Regulation 1.3-1.8 69.9 (2.4%) 168.8 (5.3%) 
Information  2.1-3.0 188.8 (6.6%) 292.8 (9.1%) 
a. The lower bound is calculated based on the 3% discount rate for public and private costs. 
The upper bound is calculated based on the 7% discount rate for private costs and 3% 
discount rate for public costs. 
 
Overall, this dissertation offers an in-depth diagnosis of energy efficiency related issues 
in the U.S. It explains why states take distinct strategies in improving energy efficiency with 
constituent pressure and other political, economic and social factors. It provides a rigorous 
statistical analysis covering the most important energy efficiency policies. It represents the first 
attempt to evaluate policy impact by decomposing electricity productivity. However, the 
statistical models and energy models are subject to limitations and future research is needed to 








Demand-side management (DSM), especially end-use energy efficiency, has long been 
treated as one of the most effective way to conserve non-renewable resources, such as coal, 
natural gas and other fossil fuels. The potential for electric end-use efficiency has drawn broad 
attention and has continuously evoked great interest for the past few decades because “the 
cheapest megawatt hour of electricity is the one that is not produced” (Croucher, 2011).  In 2005, 
electricity accounted for 57% of total energy consumption from non-transportation end-use 
sectors. Electricity generation is also the biggest s c or responsible for energy-related carbon 
dioxide emissions (39.8%) in the country (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2014).  
Reducing electricity demand through energy efficieny measures not only helps conserve fossil 
fuel, but also helps cut down carbon dioxide emission .   
Energy efficiency is also seen as an important demand-side resource to utility companies 
for capacity planning. Utilities have been encouraged to conduct Integrated Resource Planning 
(IRP) since the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992. IRP is usually defined as the multiple-
purpose process of planning to meet the consumers’ n ed for energy. Minimizing the 
environmental impacts of electricity generation andconsumption is always one of the IRP 
objectives. IRP takes energy efficiency, along with demand response, as one important 
mechanism for ensuring reliable and secure electricity supply (Nadel, Yang, & Shi, 1995; 




Even with IRPs, energy efficiency programs are still not very attractive to utilities 
because electricity sales are typically bundled with revenue and profit. Now with decoupling 
policies that separate sales from revenue, energy efficiency programs are gaining more and more 
popularity since utilities are granted the opportunity to earn money by promoting end-use 
efficiency (Eto, Stoft, & Belden, 1997; Lesh, 2009; Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
2012). With decoupling policies, utility companies are able to work with their consumers to 
explore end-use efficiency opportunities, which reward both the consumers and the suppliers. 
Decoupling enables utility companies to actively work n programs that can cut down end-use 
service demands, which in return keep them from building up new generation capacities, reduce 
reserve margins (redundant capacities) and thus significantly cut down the marginal generation 
cost. 
Meanwhile, possible national climate regulations make utility companies pay closer 
attention to energy-related carbon emissions. In order to avoid the disadvantages and risks in 
case of possible future rigorous climate and enviromental regulations, some of the utility 
companies take strategic actions to exploit energy fficiency potentials that were previously 
ignored. Utilities favor energy efficiency and demand-side options because of the low cost.  
Currently, the lowest cost of power production in the U.S. is around 5 cent/kWh, which is 
primarily driven by power plants using natural gas combined cycle (Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, 2014). Other conventional supply side technologies, such as coal and nuclear, generally 
have slightly higher levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). Renewable energy, such as solar, wind 
and geothermal, have much higher LCOEs than fossil fuels in electricity generation.  Comparing 




relatively low cost in providing environmental benefits (Figure 1.1). In fact, energy efficiency is 
usually seen as the least cost solution to climate itigation. 
 
Figure 1.1 Levelized Cost of Electricity by Resource Type1 
 
Over the past three decades, energy efficiency has been serving as the most important 
fuel of the U.S. economy, although often ignored (Figure 1.2). The domestic energy supply falls 
far below the actual level of energy demand, requiring large amount of energy being imported 
from other countries. Thanks to the improvement in energy efficiency, the U.S. economy is able 
to avoid significant amount of energy usage, leading to a much lower level of energy import. 
Energy efficiency is considered as the “hidden fuel” easing the burden of energy import for our 
society, while some advocates claim it as the “first uel” which helps power up our economy and 
alleviates the burden of our environment (Steven Nadel, Shipley, & Elliott, 2004). 
                                                      



























Figure 1.2 Total Energy Supply and Demand, 1980-201 
 
The great potential in energy savings and other social benefits have started to draw policy 
makers’ attention to energy efficiency as well. State governments have devoted great efforts to 
improving energy efficiency with a broad set of programs and policies. States have adopted 
various levels of building energy codes with shell efficiency requirements for new residential 
and commercial buildings. Many states have imposed appliance standards on end-use equipment 
manufactures to require minimum efficiency for their products. Currently, over 20 states have 
adopted energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) and goals aiming at end-use electricity 
savings from end-uses (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), 
2014). There are a broad set of financial incentives targeting efficient appliances and equipment 
provided by state and local governments.  Many state  run educational and demonstration 
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Utilities also started to play an important role in promoting energy efficiency. To engage 
their customers, utility companies provide a variety of financial incentives to reduce the cost of 
energy efficiency measures, including rebate programs, low-interest loans, and other financial 
programs. These programs usually target high-efficincy appliances and equipment in residential 
and commercial buildings, building envelope improvements, lighting improvements, combined 
heat and power systems, high-efficiency electric motors, drives, and controls, solar water heaters, 
and distributed generation, etc. Most of the financi l resources currently available to consumers 
for efficiency improvements are offered by local uti ity programs, including over 1,000 rebates 
and over 100 loan program (DSIRE, 2012).  
Complementary to state and local efforts, federal government and agencies have enacted 
policies and run diverse programs to promote energy fficiency. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPA 2005) requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to set appliance efficiency standards 
for residential and commercial products. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA) established new standards for general servic lighting in buildings and sets minimum 
efficiency requirement for motors that are used for various industrial systems. Financial 
incentives are also available where federal funds are provided for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency through the nationwide Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing program 
(Coley & Hess, 2012).  
No doubt that energy efficiency is attracting more and more attention and getting greatly 
boosted with support from both the private and the public sectors. Also, state governments are 
getting attracted to adopting policies to promote en rgy efficiency. However, it remains unclear 
whether the policies do lead to energy efficiency improvements and what are the factors 




efficiency and what are the potentials?  Are current policies effective and sufficient in improving 
electric end-use efficiency? This dissertation tries to do cross-state comparisons in efficiency 
performance and assess the electric end-use efficiency potential. It aims at capturing the actual 
policy impacts on promoting energy efficiency and explaining why states take different 
approaches in policy innovation. It also estimates th  achievable potential driven by a set of well-
designed policies for the nation as a whole.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. The second chapter summarizes the relevant 
studies in the literature to lay out the background of the state-level study on policy innovation. 
Chapter 3 explains the methodology, the conceptual framework, and the selected policies being 
involved in the assessment.  Chapter 4 explains the differences in state strategies with constituent 
pressure and other internal factors. Chapter 5 presents the findings from the fixed effect model 
estimating the impact of policy innovation on state el ctricity productivity. Chapter 6 presents 
the assessment of the achievable potential in energy efficiency with energy modeling. Although 
the study will be largely U.S. focused, the findings can be generalized and applied to other 
regions of the world.  For instance, the relationship  between policy, energy price and energy 
efficiency, and the policy impact in an energy crisis scenario may hold true in other countries 





LITERATURE REVIEW AND PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
There exists a growing body of literature studying e ergy efficiency and state energy 
policies. This chapter summarizes the most important theories and studies relevant to the models 
and concepts used in this dissertation. The first sec ion introduces the energy efficiency gap and 
the market barriers causing this gap. The second section summarizes the decomposition theory 
for energy efficiency indicator, followed by the studies assessing the potentials in future energy 
efficiency improvements. The next part introduces the concept of policy innovation and policy 
diffusion theories.  
The demand for electricity is derived demand since dividuals and businesses do not 
generally demand electricity directly. We consume electricity as an intermediate energy form 
because the goods and service (output) we desire generally require electricity as an input in their 
production. Electric end-use efficiency is different from energy conservation which focuses on 
reducing energy input by adjusting the overall output decision. The concept of energy efficiency 
refers to reducing energy input required for a given output by improving the energy conversion 
and utilization process of energy-using durables. Energy efficiency is improved by reducing the 
energy-intensity of the production process when highly efficient equipment is used to perform 
the required output functions with relatively low energy input.  
In order to reduce energy expenditures, energy users have the incentive to purchase 
affordable efficiency technologies to reduce energy consumption. But energy efficient 




rate is much lower than theoretical penetration rate for efficiency equipment even when the cost 
is in the affordable range for average customers. An energy efficiency gap exists when the 
penetration rate is low for cost-effective energy effici ncy measures. 
2.1 The efficiency gap and barriers to efficiency 
The term of efficiency gap was first mentioned by Eric Hirst and Marilyn Brown in a 
paper entitled "Closing the Efficiency Gap: Barriers to the Efficient Use of Energy" in 1990. 
Hirst and Brown argue that a large untapped potential exists between real world efficiency and 
the cost-effective efficiency given government policies and programs (Hirst and Brown, 1990). 
This article briefly summarizes the structural barriers and behavioral barriers to energy efficiency. 
Then, four years later, Jaffe and Stavins (1994) published a paper ‘The energy Efficiency Gap, 
What does It Mean?’, defining the efficiency gap as the difference between the actual and 
optimal energy use for given outputs. The article marks the existence of an “energy paradox” that 
energy efficiency is not widely adopted, and tries to explain the energy efficiency gap by market 
failures (lack of information and the principal-agent problem) and non-market failures (high 
discount rate, cost of adoption, population heterogneity, and behavior inertia). Grounded in 
economic theory, the hypothetical optimal efficiency can be achieved by removing the 
uncertainties, market failures, cost barriers and environmental externalities. The paper is 
frequently cited and generally recognized as the study which inspires a broad set of subsequent 
studies. 
Realizing the existence of an energy efficiency gap, many studies focus on its explanation 
by identifying barriers to energy efficiency. There is a cluster of studies investigating the 
technical, market, and behavioral barriers. Energy fficiency measures generally bear high initial 




looking at the net present value (NPV), many energy fficient technologies are cost-effective 
with net savings based on life-cycle cost analysis. In economics, a rational consumer would 
adopt energy efficiency technologies when they are cost-effective. But in practice, adoption 
usually happens in the replacement stage, that is, when households and businesses have to 
replace their broken or ill-functioning equipment. If individuals are not at the replacement stage 
and want to adopt the energy efficiency technologies, they have to bear additional cost by 
foregoing some years of lifetime of the current equipment (Croucher, 2011). Given that many 
energy-using appliances and equipment are durable goods, this ‘broken then fix/replace’ 
phenomenon helps explain the limited penetration rate of energy efficiency technologies. 
The impact of high discount rate - as one of the major barriers to energy efficiency - is 
also broadly discussed (Hausman, 1979; Howarth, 2004; Koopmans & te Velde, 2001).  By 
studying household behavior in purchase of energy efficient appliances, Hausman (1979) 
estimates the discount rate to be about 20% in the trad -off between capital cost and operating 
costs associated with energy durables. High discount rates largely diminish the impact of future 
energy savings and make efficient technologies not cost-effective in the NPV sense. Households 
and businesses apply high discount rate in energy efficiency investments due to two reasons. 
First is the uncertainty about future energy prices and savings in energy expenditure. The second 
reason is the irreversibility (or high sunk cost) of efficiency investment (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994).  
Croucher (2011) suggests that offering financial incentives is an effective way of improving the 
rate of return of efficiency investments.  
To make an investment in energy efficiency measures, a consumer must be aware of the 
available efficiency options, possess enough capital, motivation and know-how, and be able to 




because sometimes the consumers are not aware of thir existence, while search cost is usually 
high for new technologies. Even with the awareness of new technologies, consumers may not 
have the knowledge of installing, using and maintaining new equipment. Lack of information 
and expertise is a general barrier to energy efficincy (Howarth & Andersson, 1993).   
Another general barrier is that consumers do not have the capital to invest in energy 
efficiency equipment that is relatively expensive. A significant percentage of consumers may not 
be able to afford efficient technologies due to the high up-front costs (Nagesha & Balachandra, 
2006). Even when loans are available, a relatively high borrowing interest rate may prevent 
consumers from adopting these technologies (Wang, et al 2008). 
Many consumers lack adoption motivation either because they are indifferent to 
efficiency improvement or because of the loss aversion behavior. For consumers who can afford 
efficiency improvement but take no action, purchasing energy efficiency equipment may only be 
a small part of their consumption decision and they do not care about potential energy savings.  
Loss aversion behavior can also explain the inertia of capable consumers where they place a 
greater emphasis on adoption costs than the future savings in energy expenditure. They are more 
satisfied by avoiding the adoption costs than taking the risk and make an efficiency investment 
(Brown, Chandler, & Lapsa, 2010). 
In many occasions, energy users do not have the capacity to make the adoption decision 
because of the principal-agent problem, where the individual who make the investment decision 
is not the individual who benefits from future energy savings (Vernon & Meier, 2012). For 
instance, the landlord makes the decision of whether or not adopt energy efficiency appliances 
and equipment, while the tenant who pays the energy bills benefit from the energy expenditure 




usually ones who make installation decisions about uilding envelope and large equipment for 
space heating, air-conditioning and ventilation (HVAC) in a new house. Although home buyers 
are the one who will live in the house and pay energy bills, they generally have no option of 
choosing building shell and HVAC equipment at the point of sale (Brown & Sovacool, 2011).  
Other than the barriers facing energy consumers, bariers also exist in other segments of 
the market preventing the adoption of energy efficien y. Efficiency improvement usually 
decreases sales of end-use equipment due to high first costs of new technologies. End-use 
equipment manufacturers and retailers response to the first cost sensitivity by mainly supplying 
low cost (usually low efficiency) equipment in the marketplace, leaving consumers few choice of 
high-efficiency products (Reddy, 1991).  For most utility suppliers and distributors who have no 
decoupling policies, more electricity / energy sale means more revenue and more profit. Thus 
utility companies have little motivation to promote end-use efficiency either (Eto et al., 1997; 
Lesh, 2009). 
Although there are many policies specifically designed for promoting energy efficiency, 
there exist policies creating complexities and difficulties to efficiency improvements. In fact, the 
U.S. energy market is the victim of multiple-level, heavy regulations, which make the efficiency 
measures hard to stand out in the marketplace. There is a pretty chaotic regulatory body on the 
energy flow chain from suppliers and distributors to consumers. Energy regulations are 
composed of rules from federal agencies, such as Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) and Federal Power Marketing Administrations (FPMA), state and local regulations, 
policies of utility companies and balancing authorities, as well as non-government statutory 
organizations such as North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Multi-level 




studies suggest deregulation in the U.S. electricity market (Goto & Tsutsui, 2008; Horowitz, 
2006; Sueyoshi & Goto, 2011). 
Generally speaking, there are numerous potential barriers to energy efficiency which can 
explain the slow adoption of efficiency measures. Some of the barriers can be overcome by 
policy interventions, while others may remain insurmountable due to their inertial nature. The 
study of energy efficiency gap and barriers are valuable in guiding policy-makers to creative 
policy instruments that can help shrink the efficien y gap.  
 
2.2 Energy consumption patterns and energy efficiency indicators 
In order to construct an appropriate index for electricity efficiency, one must understand 
the pattern of electricity consumption in individual end-use sectors. Many studies characterize 
the energy uses in residential and commercial buildings and industry. For commercial buildings, 
energy consumption is usually affected by weather/climate factors, building characteristics (for 
example, HVAC system design and indoor temperature setting), and many other socio-economic 
factors, such as occupancy pattern and building use (Carvalho, et al, 2010; Escrivá-Escrivá, et al, 
2012; Kua & Wong, 2012; Monts & Blissett, 1982). For residential buildings, household income, 
family composition and other household demographics are common explanatory factors for 
residential energy consumption other than building characteristics (Brounen, et al, 2012; Cayla, 
et al, 2011; Joyeux & Ripple, 2007; Yun & Steemers, 2011). For instance, Poyer, et al (1997) 
demonstrated that Latino households consume significa tly more energy than households of 




On the aggregated level, energy consumption in the building sector is affected by many 
socio-economic factors. A cross-sector study on state energy intensities shows that residential 
consumption efficiency (energy per capita) is signif cantly affected by disposable income, 
employment per capita, electricity and gas prices and climate. In the commercial sector, energy 
efficiency (energy per gross state production) is largely influenced by business structure (e.g., 
retail trade/health/financing industries as the share of commercial activities), energy price and 
climate (Bernstein, et al, 2003).  Other studies find building equipment, floor space and lifestyle 
as significant explanatory factors for energy consumption in the building sector (Murakami et al., 
2009; Zhang, et al, 2010).  
Energy consumption pattern is much more complex in the industry sector, the most 
diversified economic sector, than that in the building sector. The U.S. industrial sector, which 
encompasses diverse manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities, has energy requirements 
for all kinds of fuel types. Manufacturing industries dominate the energy demand in this sector, 
while the top energy consuming industries do not necessarily generate top values of production 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009; Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey, 2006). 
Industrial electricity consumption is always tied with specific industrial processes 
(National Research Council, 2009). In the iron and steel industry, energy consumption mainly 
goes to iron making systems, including blast furnace, coking, balling and for sintering (Guo & 
Fu, 2010). In the meat industry, the main use of electricity is cooling, compressed air, lighting 
and machines (Ramirez, Patel, & Blok, 2006). In the cement industry, electric power is mainly 
used for cement grinding, raw material grinding, and clinker burning and cooling (Schneider, et 
al, 2011).  The industrial process is so diversified and complex that energy consumption usually 




Ang, Mu, & Zhou, 2010). There are also several cross-cutting industrial technologies that are key 
to improving electricity efficiency, especially motors and combined heat and power (Brown, et 
al., 2014). 
It is reasonable to assume that policies also have the capability to influence end-use 
energy consumption. In fact, there is continuous attention paid to the policy issues of improving 
energy efficiency in end-use sectors (Beerepoot & Beerepoot, 2007; Iwaro & Mwasha, 2010; Liu, 
et al, 2009; Uihlein & Eder, 2010). Some of the studies have been focusing on the regulations 
and policies in the U.S. (Lee & Yik, 2004; McClelland & Cook, 1983). But few studies have 
evaluated the policy impacts on the pure efficiency effect. Rather, most of the estimated policy 
impacts are based on indicators of energy efficiency. The policy impact needs further 
investigation on the true underlying efficiency effect. 
Generally speaking, end-use electricity usage is affected by a broad set of socio-
economic factors, making the indicator of energy effici ncy take various forms in application. 
Energy efficiency indicators are indices representing he level of efficiency by measuring the 
energy input for a given output. An intensity index is usually used to reflect the efficiency level. 
Energy intensities normally used are ratios of energy per physical or monetary values (Bor, 
2008). For example, energy intensity in the residential sector usually means energy per capita or 
energy per household, while energy intensity in commercial buildings is usually measured in 
energy per unit floor space. In the industrial sector, energy intensity is typically measured by 
energy per industrial GDP, while its inverse form, GDP per energy, is called energy productivity.  
Users of energy efficiency indicators must be aware of two problems: the rebound effect 
and the efficiency versus comfort problem. Rebound effect in the energy efficiency field refers to 




& Dimitropoulos, 2008). A simple economic explanation is that consumers tend to increase the 
amount of energy usage when the marginal cost of energy goes down with efficiency 
improvements. Although studies find rebound effects to be small, it is likely that energy savings 
from efficiency programs are compromised to some ext nt by this takeback phenomenon 
(Greening, et al, 2000; Bentzen, 2004; Sorrell, et al, 2009). 
The second problem is related to the general assumption of efficiency that providing the 
same service using less energy input. One may argue that in some cases efficiency measures 
compromise human comfort to save energy. For instance, Pitts & Saleh’s study (2007) suggests 
that energy efficiency improvements can be achieved by allowing a modest relaxation of the 
comfort standards in building transition spaces. Similarly, energy efficient lighting creates higher 
illumination with the same energy but may lead to increased risk of discomfort glare (Linhart & 
Scartezzini, 2011).   
But there is evidence pointing to the opposite direct on that energy efficiency 
improvements generate energy savings as well as increased health and comfort (Boardmand, 
1994; Clinch & Healy, 2001).  One simple example is homes with improved insulation which 
can generate savings in heating bills with reduced energy use. Or, the occupants can increase 
their comfort level by allowing indoor temperature to rise and forgoing part of the potential 
energy savings. It is possible that improved insulation benefits the homeowner with both low 
heating bills and increased comfort (relative high indoor temperature) in the winter. With proper 
building and plant operation, energy efficiency canbe achieved without lowering thermal 
comfort level (Clinch & Healy, 2001; Tham, 1993).  
Studies also find visual comfort not compromised by efficiency improvements. 




the issues of unpleasant visual comfort associated with early compact fluorescent bulbs. The 
Linhart & Scartezzini (2011) study finds that efficient lighting increases lighting power density 
without jeopardizing visual comfort and performance. Other energy efficiency improvements, 
such as glass windows using solar film coating, are found to be able to reduce energy 
consumption in both cooling and lighting, while sustaining thermal and visual comfort for 
occupants (Li, et al, 2008). Moreover, good building facade design improves energy efficiency 
by utilizing natural daylight instead of artificial lighting (Pitts & Saleh, 2007). In general, energy 
users do not need to make trade-offs between efficiency and comfort. But rather, efficiency can 
be achieved without compromising comfort (Linhart & Scartezzini, 2011; Tham, 1993).  
Energy efficiency indices can be applied on different geographic levels: regional, national 
and supranational level, and applied on different aggregation levels: the whole economy, end-use 
sectors, and subsectors (Bor, 2008).  One trend of the energy efficiency indicator studies is to 
decompose the index to a deeper disaggregation level. Th  other trend of this field of study, on 
the opposite direction, is to construct an efficieny index for the whole economy to do cross-
country, and/or cross-region comparisons.   
Decomposing energy consumption into subsectors or end-uses provides great insights for 
studying the changes in energy efficiency over time and conducting cross-region comparisons 
(Ang, Mu, & Zhou, 2010; Filippini & Hunt, 2012; Haas, 1997).  Structural decomposition 
analysis (SDA) based on input-output models and index decomposition analysis (IDA) are the 
two popular ways of understanding energy efficiency changes (Choi & Ang, 2012; Weber, 2009). 
For IDA, Laspeyres index and Dividia index are widely used for decomposition calculations, 
while many advanced indices are developed based on their multiplicative or additive forms, such 




Arithmetic mean Divisia index (AMDI), Fisher Index, etc (Ang, 2004; Ang et al., 2010; Ang & 
Liu, 2007).  
By decomposition, changes in energy consumption or ene gy efficiency can be explained 
by factors such as structural effect, activity effect and intensity effect. Table 2 illustrates some of 
the recent studies investigating energy efficiency changes and trends using decomposition 
methods.  Many recent studies decompose energy consumption and efficiency in the residential 
and industrial sectors, using the LMDI method (Ang et al., 2010; Choi & Ang, 2012). In 
reviewing these decomposition studies, this dissertation does not focus on the calculation 
methods. But rather, the purpose is to identify the underpinning factors on energy consumption 










Area Period End-use sector Method Factors 








Energy prices, structure effects (energy expenditure share 
on household products, energy share of total living 
expenditure), per capita living expenditure, and population 
Hojjati & 





Activity (# households), structure(the mix of housing types, 
the regional distribution of households, and the floor area 
per household), intensity (energy/square foot), and weather 








value added LMDI 
Activity (value added of each industry sector), struc ure 
(industry subsectors), and intensity (energy/value dded) 
Filippini & 








Income, energy price, household size, heating and cooling 
degree-days, the share of detached houses, and 'underlyi g 
energy efficiency' 










AMDI, Fisher & 
VALDEX Structure, intensity, and activity effects 
Dong, et al 
(2011) China 
1985-
2007 Economy wide 
Standard coal / 
GDP Laspeyres indexes 
Industry structure adjustment, technological advancement 
and openness, and household energy consumption 
Weber (2009) U.S. 
1997-
2002 Economy wide 
The ratio of 
energy use to 
economic 
output SDA and LMDI I 
Energy intensity, production structure, consumption 
structure, aggregate consumption volume (GDP), population 
and household consumption, trade deficit in manufact ring 
goods, etc. 
Wachsmann, et 







Affluence, population, inter-sectorial dependencies, energy 







consumption LMDI I 
Structure effect (share of sectorial output), labor 
productivity, equipment rate, substitution effect, and 











Industrial structure effect (structural evolution), sectorial 










Energy per unit 
output Laspeyres indexes 
Manufacturing outputs (value added), industrial mix, and 




The decomposition studies have tested the impacts of a broad set of factors on energy 
consumption changes. For residential buildings, energy fficiency is affected by affluence, 
energy prices, population, the number of households, household size, weather, energy mix, 
housing type mix and other structural factors (Filippini & Hunt, 2012; Hojjati & Wade, 2012; 
Wachsmann, et al, 2009; Zhao, et al, 2012). For service, manufacturing and other industries, 
energy consumption is affected by sector output (physical or monetary outputs), industrial 
structure, energy mix, labor productivity, equipment or technology advancement, energy 
intensity, etc. (Cahill & Ó Gallachóir, 2010; Hasanbeigi, et al, 2012; Lescaroux, 2008; Mairet & 
Decellas, 2009; Unander, 2007). The decomposition sudies are able to provide great information 
to identify underlying factors driving energy consumption and efficiency changes in the building 
and industrial sectors. 
On the other hand, economy-wide energy efficiency idices generate a cluster of studies 
using a non-parametric method, data envelopment analysis (DEA). Unlike the energy intensity or 
productivity indicators which use single metrics for calculation, DEA is capable of handling 
multiple inputs and multiple outputs. For given GDP and other outputs, the DEA method 
calculates the optimal level of energy requirements by fixing the level of non-energy inputs, such 
as labor and capital. The ratio of estimated optimal level of energy input and the real energy 
consumption is the indicator of energy efficiency (Hu & Wang, 2006; Mukherjee, 2008; Zhang, 
et al, 2011).  Energy efficiency indices computed using the DEA method allows researchers to 






2.3 Assessment of energy efficiency potential and cost estimation 
The potential for energy efficiency can be defined in multiple ways. Assessment studies 
on energy efficiency potential generally exercise thr e different definitions for their estimation: 
technical, economic and achievable potentials (Figure 2.1). The technical potential refers to the 
energy saving potential by all technically feasible improvement without considering economics. 
Technical potentials are sometimes referred to as engin ering estimates (McKane & Hasanbeigi, 
2011). Economic potential, sometimes called as cost-effective potential, is usually defined as the 
potential from economically profitable investments. Economic potentials are reached by 
technologies that pass a cost test, for example, a positive net present value with benefits 
exceeding costs (Granade et al., 2009; McKane & Hasanbeigi, 2011).  
The achievable potential estimates the efficiency potential from cost-effective measures 
with policy efforts. The maximum achievable potential is associated with cost-effective 
improvements that can be reasonably achieved throug policy efforts. Sometimes the maximum 
achievable potential goes beyond the economic potential when some non-profitable measures are 
adopted under aggressive policies, for instance, inntives that cover over 50% of incremental 
costs.  The moderate achievable potentials are estimates of ‘reasonable’ potential with policy 
incentives no more than 30% of the incremental costs (Tonn & Peretz, 2007; Brown, Gumerman, 
et al., 2010).   
In spite of the three major efficiency potential types, the naturally occurring potential is 
the estimated potential savings with energy efficien y improvements that are adopted in 
business-as-usual scenarios.  Naturally occurring potential is referred to as the efficiency level 




baseline forecast of energy consumption usually takes into account naturally occurring efficiency 
improvement and thus excluding it from potential assessments.  
 
Figure 2.1 Energy Efficiency Potentials 
 
The definition of energy efficiency potential varies from study to study. For example, 
technical potential generally represents the theoretically maximum potential, while some 
assessments add the condition of cost-effectiveness to technical potential. Economic and 
achievable potentials can also be defined otherwise. Some assessments even do not define their 
potential explicitly (Nadel, Shipley, & Elliott, 2004; Koopmans & te Velde, 2001). Clarifying the 
potential definition is critical when doing comparisons of assessment studies. 
The assessments of energy efficiency potential, especially assessment studies with cost 
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generation capacity. By studying a broad set of energy fficiency measures, these assessments 
also offer great value to policy-makers with insight into the most cost-effective options. With the 
valuable information from these studies, policy-makers are better equipped to design energy 
efficiency programs and policies based on the costs estimates of a variety of energy efficiency 
technologies and programs.  
However, many of the assessment studies focus on the cost-effective potentials based on 
a portfolio of energy efficiency measures, without taking into account policy context (Table 2.2). 
Only a few studies investigate the saving potential achieved by energy efficiency programs. One 
of the recent studies explores policy options promoting energy efficiency (Brown, Gumerman, et 
al., 2010). Two of the recent studies estimate the achievable potential driven by efficiency 
programs (Scott, et al, 2008; Tonn & Peretz, 2007). Potential assessment and cost estimation by 





Table 2. 2 Energy Efficiency Potential Assessments 
Publication 
  
Application Potential Assessment Cost Estimate Policy Relevance 
Area End-use sector Type Estimation 
Azevedo, et al. 







Industry Achievable  9% in 2030 b  





2013a) U.S. All Sectors Economic 9.3% in 2040   
Laitner, et al. (2012) U.S. All Sectors Technical 42-59% by 2050   
Sadineni, et al. 
(2011) U.S. Residential Economic 42.5%   
Saygin, et al. (2011) U.S. 
Chemical and 
petrochemical 
industry  Economic 10.9-24%     




9-12% in 2020; 
13-18% in 2035 
Levelized cost of 
electricity: 0.9-15 
cent/kWh 
Explores 8 policy options 
promoting efficiency 
Kneifel (2010) 
16 cities in the 
U.S. Commercial Economic 
20-30% for new 
buildings      
EPRI (2009) U.S. 
Building and 
Industry Achievable 8-11% in 2030  Utility DSM programs 
McKinsey & Co. 
(2009) U.S. 
Building and 
Industry Economic 23% by 2020 
Average annualized 
cost: $4.4/MMBtu   
Scott, et al. (2008) U.S. 
Residential and 
Commercial Achievable 
27% of expected 
growth by 2030   
Impacts of the 2005 
Building Technology 
program  
a. All assessments are for total energy savings, except for the EPRI (2009) study which estimates the potential for electricity savings. 




The assessment of energy efficiency potential is derived from both 
theories/simulation models and real world practices. A tudy by the American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) did a meta-review on assessments in both 
approaches in the U.S. (Nadel et al., 2004). A summary of electricity efficiency potential 
from this ACEEE study indicates that the median technical potential is 33%, median 
ecomic potential is 20%, and the median achievable pot ntial is 24%.  The median 
achievable potential is 1.2% savings per year, withsimilar savings from each  end-use 
sector. The number of years estimated and the type of otential estimated vary largely 
from study to study, making the median numbers relativ ly unreliable estimations. This 
study also summarizes the electriciity savings actualy achieved by utilities in some of the 
leading states based on historical data. The leading ut lities were estimated to achieve 
0.5-2.0% of electricity savings annually. 
A state-level study estimates the achievable potential driven by standard 
residential and industrial energy efficiency programs to be 20-30% over a 20-year period.  
The programs studied in the article are generally cost-effective with benefit to cost ratios 
exceeding 3:1(Tonn & Peretz, 2007).  In a McKinsey tudy of energy efficiency 
programs in non-transportation sectors, the economic potential, defined by net present 
value positive options, is estimated to be 9.1 quadrillion Btu (23% of projected energy 
consumption) in 2020 (McKinsey & Co., 2009).  A report focusing on the southeast part 
of the U.S. estimates the potential energy savings to be 9-12% in 2020 and 13-18% in 
2035. The estimated potential can be achieved by cost-effective policies and programs 




There are also many potential assessments based on specific economic subsectors 
in the literature. A study on pulp and paper industry estimated the savings due to 17 
process technologies for improving energy efficiency up to 2035. The economic potential 
assessed is 16% for electricity and 21% for all fuels (Fleiter, et al, 2012). An assessment 
based on Best Practice Technology in the chemical and petrochemical industries estimate 
the potential energy savings for the U.S. to be about 24% using a top-down approach and 
about 10.9% using a bottom-up approach (Saygin, et al, 2011).  The energy efficiency for 
industrial motor systems is estimated for both cost-effective and technical potential in 
McKane and Hasanbeigi’s study (2011). The assessment is 14-49% as the cost-effective 
potential, and 27-57% as the technical potential.   These assessments are relatively 
aggressive compared with an earlier work, which estimated the policy driven potential for 
industry to be 7-17% by 2020 from different policy scenarios (Worrell & Price, 2001).  A 
review of assessments on the U.S. industry sector shows a wide range of estimates of 
energy efficiency potential within and across industrie  in 2020: 3% – 18% savings for 
chemical industry, 5% - 23% for petroleum refining dustry, and 6% - 37% for pulp and 
paper industry (Brown, Cox, & Cortes, 2010).   
In addition to the industry sector, energy efficieny measures applied to 
residential and commercial buildings are also studied by many researchers. A recent 
study on energy efficiency in residential buildings estimates the cost-effective potential to 
be 42.5%, with encouraging benefit/cost ratios (Sadineni et al., 2011).  A simulation of 
12 prototypical buildings in 16 cities provides thebasis for assessing the energy 
efficiency potential in commercial buildings, with e cost-effective estimation of 20-30% 




(Kneifel, 2010).  DOE estimated the impacts of its energy efficiency programs and found 
that the 2005 Building Technology program could save bout 27% of energy in 
residential and commercial buildings by 2030. These savings were evaluated to have the 
potential of increasing employment and reducing the ne d for capital stock in the energy 
sector (Scott, et al, 2008).  
  Energy efficiency potential assessments are usually coupled with cost estimations, 
especially in studies investigating the cost-effective potential. Cost estimations for energy 
efficiency measures vary widely due to the different cost accounting methods applied in 
different studies.  By reviewing several studies, Gellings, Wikler, & Ghosh (2006) found 
that efficiency cost estimates from different studies range from 0.8 -22.9 cents/kWh. In 
the McKinsey report (McKinsey & Co., 2009), the average annualized cost for energy 
efficiency measures ranges from $0.4-16 /MMBtu, aver ging at $4.4 per MMBtu end-use 
energy saved (McKinsey & Co., 2009). An achievable potential study conducted by the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) found the potential energy saving achieved by 
energy efficiency programs to be 398-566 billion kWh (8-11%) in 2030, with estimated 
levelized cost from $0.022-0.032/kWh (Electric Power R search Institute (EPRI), 2009). 
With cost estimates, many studies are able to draw an energy conservation supply curve, 
also called energy efficiency supply curve to identify the most cost-effective options for 
the ‘low hanging fruit’ - energy efficiency (Gellings et al., 2006; Koopmans & te Velde, 
2001; McKinsey & Co., 2009). 
In case of rapid fuel price increase or electricity shortage, the need for energy 
conservation and efficiency improvements is usually high (Archibald & Reece, 1977; 




recommended to improve market penetration for emerging technologies and promote 
energy efficiency adoptions (Bachrach, 2003; Rosa & Lomardo, 2004; E Vine, 2002).  
This dissertation is interested to study the role of policy for promoting energy efficiency 
in the case of energy crisis. 
2.4 Policy Innovation and Diffusion Theories 
 One critical question in policy study is related to the factors influencing the 
decision-making process of policy adoption. The policy diffusion theory is a popular 
school of thoughts studying the adoption behavior of policies. Many studies in policy 
diffusion investigate the policy adoption on the state level. The American states are 
usually seen as the laboratory of policy experiments (Brandeis, 1932). However, policy 
treatment is seldom seen as natural experiment due to th  dynamics among state 
governments and the interactions among state officials. State policies are often treated as 
quasi-experiments in policy analysis.  
Grounded in the quasi-experiment assumption, the policy diffusion theory studies 
the diffusion of policy innovations. Policy innovation is defined as the adoption of a 
policy which is new to the state adopting it (Berry & Berry, 2007). It is different from 
policy invention – the creation and design of a policy new to all states. Policy innovation 
characterizes the behavior of policy adoption. 
The policy diffusion theory argues that policy innovation is affected by state 
actions and interactions with other states and the fed ral government, as well as internal 
state characteristics. Researchers set up several diffusion models and the Internal 
Determinants model to explain policy innovation. The application of these models to 




The Internal Determinants model is one of the powerful models that can be used 
to explain the adoption of energy policies (Matisoff, 2008). This model is developed 
based on the theory of organizational innovation. L. Mohr (1969)argues that 
organizational innovation is determined by three major factors: the motivations to 
innovation, the obstacles to innovation, and the resources to overcome the obstacles. The 
Internal Determinants model assumes that internal state characteristics determine policy 
innovation. Political events, constituent pressure, internal economics and social 
characteristics are the key to policy decisions.  
More specifically, bigger states that are more economically advanced, have better 
resources, and have more political/institutional structure will be more likely to enact 
policies. Constituent pressure – the pressure of constituent interest – is an important 
measurement of the motives or obstacles to policy innovation. The concept of constituent 
pressure is used to quantify the relevant constituent interests for a given policy issue 
during a given period.  
In the Internal Determinants model, states are considered to be independent from 
outside forces. Outside actors or the interactions among states have no effect on policy 
within a state. The limitation of this model is ignoring the possibility that state policies 






HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
It is not unusual to hear people say that we are inefficient because we don’t have 
good policies to promote energy efficiency. Whether it is true or not, this statement 
renders four related questions about energy efficiency: how efficient or inefficient are we? 
What are the potentials for energy efficiency? Can policies make a real difference in 
promoting energy efficiency? And how do policies affect efficiency? It is clear that 
energy efficiency is not only important to energy users, but also an essential part of 
integrated resource planning for utilities. Given the continuous attention on electric end-
use efficiency, this study tries to investigate the efficiency problem from the policy 
perspective for the U.S. states. The purpose is to a sess electricity efficiency potential and 
explore the policy impact on states’ efficiency performance.  This dissertation focuses on 
the policy – efficiency dynamics by asking the following questions: 
• What factors drive the states taking distinct strategies in policy innovation? 
• What are the impacts of policy innovation on states’ electricity efficiency 
performance?  
• What is the achievable potential in electric end-use efficiency driven by efficiency 
programs and policies? 
In order to understand state performance and policy impacts on efficiency, a set of 
hypotheses was designed to be tested with the methods developed in this study. The main 




• H1. Constituent pressure is related to policy innovation.  
Literature on policy diffusion uses Internal Determinants model to explain policy 
adoption on the state level. Theory suggest that policy innovation is affected by 
multiple internal state characteristics including political, economic, and social 
factors, and constituent pressure (Berry & Berry, 2007). 
• H2. Three types of policy innovations increase state electricity productivity: 
regulation, financial incentives, and information programs. 
Many policies are found to be able to generate great energy savings, including 
appliance standards, building energy codes, EERS, financial incentives, and green 
labeling (Cappers & Goldman, 2010; Chirarattananon, et al., 2010; Fayaz & Kari, 
2009; Gillingham, Newell, & Palmer, 2006; Heinzle, 2012; Meier, 1997; Wang & 
Brown, 2014).   
• H3. The potential of electric end-use efficiency is achievable with financial, 
regulatory, and information policies.   
The achievable potential of energy efficiency is driven by policy efforts where 
financial, regulatory and information instruments are used to change consumer 
behavior in energy efficiency adoption (Brown, et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2011). 
More specifically, this hypothesis can be tested in three hypotheses due to the 
differences in policy mechanisms.  
o H3.1 financial incentives improve energy efficiency by providing financing 




o H3.2 information programs improve energy efficiency by offering 
information/training to invoke awareness, educate consumers, and assist 
adoption (Newell & Siikamäki, 2013); 
o H3.3 regulations improve energy efficiency by mandati g efficiency 
requirements to accelerate market penetration (Kelly, 2012) 
The first hypothesis is related to the explanation of the differences in state 
strategies of adopting policies to promote energy effici ncy. Internal Determinants 
models with fixed effects are used to examine the factors influencing the adoption of 
selected policies, including state socioeconomic characteristics, state fiscal capacity, 
ideology, problem seriousness, and the interactions among the policies. Problem 
seriousness is the measurement of constituent pressure on the general problems related to 
energy efficiency. Hypothesis 1 assumes that states choose to adopt different energy 
efficiency policies and programs because their governm nts put emphases on different 
constituent interests.    
To test the second hypothesis, state level electricity productivity is evaluated 
against a selected set of energy efficiency policies by controlling for the activity and 
structure factors of the residential, commercial and industrial sectors. The impacts of the 
selected policies are examined with fixed-effect models which deal with the unobserved 
state fixed effects and time fixed effects.  Hypothesis 2 will be rejected if none of the 
coefficients of the energy efficiency policies are significant in the state fixed effect 
models. Otherwise, the second hypothesis will be acc pted and the policies do have 
significant impacts on improving energy efficiency. The models also provide estimations 




As for the third hypothesis, the assessment of achievable potential will be 
conducted using energy modeling. A portfolio of efficiency policies will be modeled with 
the National Energy Modeling Systems (NEMS) to estima e the long-term achievable 
potential. Three type of policies, financial, regulatory, and information policies, are 
modeled separately and test the three sub-hypotheses. Th n, all selected policies are 
modeled in an integrated policy scenario to examine the policy dynamics and the 
combined effects on energy efficiency.  
3.2 Theoretical Approach 
According to the decomposition studies, the change i  energy consumption (or 
efficiency) can be explained by activity effect, structure effect and intensity effect, while 
activity factors are usually affected by environmental factors. Based on the multiplicative 
Divisia index (Ang et al., 2010), energy consumption at a certain time t can be 
disaggregated into end-uses, or industrial subsector j: 
Et = Fact |Fenv × S t  × I t = Fact |Fenv  × 
j
∑s j,t i j, t                                                                  (1) 
Where, Fact is the activity factor, such as population, number of households, number of 
buildings, building floor space, and industrial outp ts (monetary or physical outputs);  
Fenv is the environmental factor, such as weather factor (e.g., number of heating 
degree-days and cooling degree-days), income, energy price, household demographics, 




S t is the inert structural factor not affected by environmental factors at time t, 
such as building characteristics, housing type, age of infrastructure, industry mix, energy 
mix, etc;  
I t is the indicator of energy efficiency at time t; I t is affected by energy efficiency 
policies. 
And, s j,t is the normalized quantity of structural service demand for end-use j at 
time t; i j,t is energy intensity (energy per unit of service) for end-use j at time t.  
For example, electricity consumption in residential buildings can be decomposed 
by population, structural service demand (m2/capita), and intensity (kWh/m2). 
According to classic economic theory, individual consumption behavior is usually 
a function of income, price and preference. By expanding the defining factors to include 
energy efficiency policies, we have:  
E = f (I, D, Price, Policy, X)                                                                                    (2) 
Where, E is energy use; I is income; D is service demand; Price is electricity retail price; 
Policy is energy-related policy promoting energy efficiency; and X represents a set of 
other explanatory factors (see Table 2.1 for examples). 
A fixed effect model can be easily derived based on Equation (2) to examine 
policy impacts on energy productivity.  Energy productivity, an indicator of energy 
efficiency, is regressed with explanatory factors with panel data. The treatment group 
consists of states that have adopted new policies or updated their energy policies in the 




change during the two time periods. Energy productivity can be expressed by the 
following equation: 
EPj,t = β1Xj,t + β2Pj,t + sj +yt + εj,t,   t =1, 2,                                                                (3) 
Where, EPj,t is electricity intensity indicator in state j and year t; Xj,t is a vector of 
measured variables (e.g., energy prices, population, climate factors, household income, 
and other factors) affecting state-level electric end-use efficiencies; Pj,t is a vector of 
selected energy efficiency policies in state j and year t.  
The construction of the factor Pj,t needs prudence since there are enormous policy 
options for energy efficiency due to variations in program design. The selection of energy 
efficiency policies should be simple for the sake of calculation, while representative 
enough to cover the most popular and long-lasting policies.  One possible way of 
selection is the ‘best practice’ by looking at the policy choices in best performing states 
based on the electric efficiency indicators. To capture full policy impact, the policy 
vector should be weighted by state compliance effort and number of implementation 
years. Thus, the treatment group is the group of state  that observe a change in the policy 
vector, while the control group exhibits no change in the policy vector. 
The time-varying residual, also called idiosyncratic error, consists of three 
components: 
• Sj is the unobserved variable that capture fixed differences in energy efficiency 
across states (“state fixed effect”);  
• yt is the unobserved variable that capture year effect common to all states (“year 




• εj,t is the unobserved random disturbance.  
By taking the difference between two years, we have: 
For treatment group: ∆EPj = β1 ∆Xj + β2 ∆Pj +∆yt + ∆εj,                                                (4) 
Similarly, for control group: ∆EPj = β1 ∆Xj +∆yt + ∆εj,                                                  (5) 
The year fixed effect can be estimated based on the control group data: 
∆yt = ∆ !"# $ - &'( ∆) !"# $                                                                                                                                     (6) 
By plugging equation (6) to equation (4), we can easily get the estimate of policy 
effect &'* from the following regression result: 
∆+ = &'( ∆Xj + &'* ∆Pj + ∆ !"# $ - &'( ∆) !"# $                                                             (7)  
The fixed effect model will provide unbiased estimation of the impacts of the 
selected policies by taking the “first difference” and explaining the within group variance 
using the policies, electricity price, and a set of activity and structure factors. 
3.3 Conceptual framework  
State-level data on electricity consumption, population, climate data, economic 
activities and other related data will be used to construct the panel data to measure state 
performance on electric end-use efficiency for the 50 states and Washington D.C, from 
2005-2011. Fixed-effect model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions will be 
used to analyze the policy impacts on state performance on electric end-use efficiency, by 




Policy innovation is defined as the behavior of adopting a policy which is 
previously new to a state. Policy innovation is different from policy invention which is 
the process of creating a new policy or program that is new to all states. Policy 
innovation only looks at the adoption of policies, while policy diffusion examines the 
diffusive behavior of policy adoption among states. This dissertation focuses on policy 
innovation, that is, the adoption of energy efficiency policies, and examines the impacts 
and factors of policy innovation. 
 
Figure 3. 1 Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Relationship between Policy 
Innovation and Electricity Efficiency 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the conceptual framework of the dissertation. State level data 
is used to construct the Internal Determinants models to explain the adoption of selected 





























analysis with state electricity productivity from 2005-2011 is used to study the impact of 
policy innovation on energy efficiency, where Hypothesis 2 is tested.  Ex ante analysis 
was conducted with energy modeling to estimate the pot ntial in energy efficiency that 
can be achieved with policies, while the third hypothesis is tested. 
3.4 Data sources  
The activity factors influencing electricity productivity include population, gross 
state product (GSP), and climate (heating degree days and cooling degree days). This 
data is available from the U.S. census survey, the Bur au of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
and the National Climate Data Center (NCDC). The structural factors in buildings and 
industries include household sizes, home age, the percent of electric heating equipment, 
the proportion of financial services, food and health services, and the proportion of 
electricity intensive industries. This data is available from the U.S. census survey, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the American Housing Survey, and the State 
Energy Data System (SEDS).  
The State Energy Data System (SEDS) is a very useful data set on state-level 
energy consumption. SEDS data provides detailed information about state energy 
consumption by sector and by source, with reliable data on electricity sales and prices, 
and energy intensity estimates.  
Energy policies data on the federal, state, local and utility levels can be found in 
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), which is 
available online. For some of the energy policies, measures of state compliance effort can 




ACEEE from 2006-2013 (Eldridge et al., 2008, 2009; Foster,et al., 2012; Molina et al., 
2010;Eldridge, Prindle, & York, 2007; Sciortino et al., 2011).   
ACEEE’s scorecard studies evaluate state performance o  energy efficiency by 
ranking their policies and programs, as well as their enforcement efforts. The overall state 
ranking is the combination of scores in six categories: utility and public benefits fund 
efficiency prorgams and policies, transportation, building energy code, combined heat 
and power, state government initiatives, and appliance efficiency standards. This series of 
studies not only focuses on the top-down effort on improving efficiency in buildings, but 
also the overall effort in all efficiency categories, which is a reflection of state attitude 
toward efficiency.  
3.5 Selected Policies  
Three major categories of policy instruments are avail ble to promote energy 
efficiency in end-use sectors: regulatory, financial and information policies. A brief 
summary is provided for the financial, regulatory, and information policies and programs 
on energy efficiency.  
3.5.1 Financial Policies 
Financial incentive is the most popular policy instrument for energy efficiency. 
Currently, there are over 1,000 incentives offered by federal, state, and local governments 
and utilities, usually taking the form of rebates, loans, grants, personal tax, property tax, 
corporate tax, sales tax, etc. These financial incentiv s are usually offered for building 




(such as heat pumps, lighting, solar water heaters, and so on), and combined heat and 
power (CHP) systems. 
This dissertation looks at the state spending/ budget on energy efficiency 
programs. The ratepayer programs can be delivered either by utilities or by “public 
benefit” funds. From 2004 to 2012, the state investm nt in energy efficiency has grown 
more than four times, from around $1.4 Billion to $5.9 Billion (Downs et al., 2013; 
Eldridge et al., 2007).    
3.5.2 Regulatory policies 
Popular regulatory instruments promoting energy effici ncy include 
appliance/equipment standards, building energy codes, energy efficiency resource 
standards, and energy standards for public buildings. The number of standards for 
appliances varies significantly by state, and it isextremely hard to quantify the impact of 
appliance standards. At the same time, when the standards on certain products get 
popular among states, the federal government will set up national rulings for them, which 
automatically overrules state appliance standards. Because of these reasons, appliance 
standard is excluded from this analysis.   
Building Energy Codes generally impose efficiency requirements on building 
shell and HVAC and lighting equipment for new buildings. For residential buildings, 
states tend to adopt the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC), a prototypical 
code developed and updated periodically by the Interna ional Code Council. Most of the 
states have adopted the IECC 2003 codes (or equivalent) or more stringent codes, with 




For commercial buildings, states tend to adopt the codes developed and updated 
periodically by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning 
Engineers (ASHRAE). Most of the states have adopted th  ASHRAE 90.1 (or equivalent) 
or more stringent codes, with the same 9 states having no statewide code for commercial 
buildings. Maryland is only state that has adopted th  most recent codes for both 
residential and building buildings. 
Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) and goals are state targets for 
electricity and natural gas savings (or, reductions in sales). The state goals or targets vary 
by state and vary by utility, with different efficiency requirements ranging from 
cumulative to annual savings and from base load to perk demand savings.  Currently, 20 
states have EERS and 7 states have goals. Out of the 27 state adopters, 12 of them have 
requirements and goals for both electricity and natural gas. The rest of them have 
efficiency goals only for end-use electricity (Figure 3.2). 
The EERS targets include a large variety of forms. The energy saving 
requirements differ by annual percentage, annual quntity, or cumulative percent/quantity. 
The amount of energy savings is quantified and verified based on utility assessment, 
while the quantifying basis can be a fixed based year, or can be rolling period of multiple 
years. The EERS requirements may cover all utilities in the states, or cover only the 
investor-owned utilities. In this dissertation, only states with binding targets mandating 
savings in electricity sales are considered in the analysis.  The EERS targets are 





Figure 3.2 Adoption Status of Energy Efficiency Resource Standards as of February, 
20132  
 
Table 3.1 Annualized EERS Target by State 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Alaska 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Arizona 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.25% 
Arkansas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 
California 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 1.00% 0.90% 1.00% 1.00% 
Colorado 0.00% 0.18% 0.18% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.80% 
Connecticut 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Delaware 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
District of 
Columbia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Florida 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 
Georgia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Hawaii 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.50% 
Idaho 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 
                                                      




Table 3.1 Annualized EERS Target by State (Continued) 
Illinois 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Indiana 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 0.80% 
Iowa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.50% 
Kansas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Kentucky 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Louisiana 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Maine 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 
Maryland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.80% 1.80% 1.80% 1.80% 
Massachusetts 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.40% 1.40% 2.00% 
Michigan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.50% 0.75% 
Minnesota 0.00% 1.00% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 
Mississippi 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Missouri 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Montana 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Nebraska 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Nevada 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 
New Hampshire 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
New Jersey 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
New Mexico 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 
New York 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 
North Carolina 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.75% 0.75% 0.25% 0.25% 
North Dakota 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Ohio 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.50% 0.70% 
Oklahoma 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Oregon 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.80% 0.87% 
Pennsylvania 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 
Rhode Island 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 
South Carolina 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
South Dakota 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Tennessee 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Texas 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.30% 0.40% 0.40% 
Utah 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Vermont 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.80% 2.00% 2.25% 2.25% 
Virginia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Washington 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 
West Virginia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wisconsin 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 





Decoupling is another significant regulatory instrument that enables utility 
companies to take an active part in energy efficiency improvement. The traditional 
business model for utilities ties profit with energy sales and revenue. In this case, utilities 
have disincentives to promote energy efficiency because they will lose profit due to 
reduced electricity and natural gas demand. States adopt decoupling mechanisms to 
remove the disincentives and encourage utility companies to play a role in efficiency 
improvement. The attributes of decoupling include thr e major parts (usually called the 
“three legged stool”) (York & Kushler, 2011): 
• recovery of administrative and program cost; 
• decoupling profit from sales and recovery of lost revenues 
• performance incentives 
The recovery of administrative and program costs is usually achieved through 
adjustments to rate cases and customer bills. The administrative and program costs can be 
authorized to be recovered within a year or in longer time periods.  Decoupling 
mechanism separates profit from sales so that utiliies are indifferent to any impacts on 
their revenue stream. The lost revenue can be recovered through adjustment mechanism 
and Straight Fixed Variable Rates (SFVR).   The lost revenue is estimated through 
Evaluation, Monitoring and Verification (EM&V) so that it can be recovered through the 
adjustment to rate cases or fixed surcharge on costumer bill.  
In addition to eliminating the disincentives through recovery mechanisms, 
incentives are created through various performance incentives. Some states allow utilities 
to share the net benefits with their customers. Some f the states provide rewards and 




additional rate of return on the capitalized efficiency investment if they have achieved or 
exceeded the state target. 
3.5.3 Information Policies 
The Lead by Example program is the efficiency policies targeting energy usage 
in public buildings.  Up to now, all states except for Alaska, Mississippi, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, and Vermont have adopted this policy. Many local governments also 
established their energy standards for public buildings (DSIRE, 2014).   
In addition to the efficiency requirements, the Lead by Example also contains an 
informational component which requires the state owned facilities to conduct rating and 
benchmarking efforts. Some of the states require their public buildings be rated with the 
Energy Star or LEED program. Some states have benchmarking requirement using EPA’s 
Portfolio Manager. This program aims at reducing energy consumption of public 
buildings, as well as providing information through the exemplary projects to encourage 






CONSTITUENT PRESSURE AND POLICY INNOVATION 
 
States take varied approaches in improving energy efficiency (EE). Some states 
rely on the market to decide the natural rate of adption for energy efficiency measures. 
Other states take proactive strategies of enforcing policy interventions to promote energy 
efficiency. Several policy instruments are available: regulations mandating adoption 
behavior and correcting market failures, financing incentives overcoming cost barriers, 
and information programs encouraging customer participation by offering information 
and technical support.  
Each state is faced with specific needs for promoting energy efficiency, and the 
problems they face with promoting energy efficiency are embedded in a large variety of 
socioeconomic conditions. The decision of policy innovation always takes different 
forms and happens in different time scales. For instance, Texas and Vermont are the 
states making the first moves of setting up EERS targe s to achieve electricity savings. In 
addition to the targets, Texas provides large amount f funding to run energy efficiency 
programs, while Vermont sets up decoupling mechanisms to enable utilities to play a 
significant role in improving energy efficiency.  California, Connecticut and Nevada are 
among the early followers in adopting EERS targets. O her early adopters of regulatory 
approaches in EERS and decoupling include Vermont, Arizona, Indiana, New Hampshire, 




Some states emphasize on providing financial incentiv s to promote energy 
efficiency, and have large budgets for their energy efficiency programs. New York, New 
Jersey, Oregon, Florida and Washington make significant amount of investment in 
energy efficiency. Idaho and Rhode Island are also leaders in efficiency investment with 
regard to the high portion of EE program budgets as percent of utility revenues.  
Massachusetts also pushes hard on the role of utilities by adopting decoupling 
mechanisms and providing a large budget for energy fficiency programs. 
In contract to the approach of engaging utilities with regulations and incentives, 
some states focus on reducing electricity usage in buildings. These states adopt building 
energy codes for residential and commercial buildings, as well as efficiency requirements 
for state owned facilities. Some of the southern state , such as Florida, Georgia, Kansas, 
and Maryland, are among the early adopters of building codes, as well as Iowa and 
Montana. Maine, Michigan, Delaware, and Arkansas, on the other hand, made the first 
moves in reducing energy use in public owned buildings by requiring efficiency 
performances, rating and benchmarking.    
California, Connecticut, Colorado, and Minnesota are the early leaders who 
adopted combined approaches of regulation, financial incentives and information 
programs to promote energy efficiency. Figure 4.1 illustrated the early state leaders 
taking regulatory, financial, information and combined approached for efficiency 
improvement. Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington are the 





Figure 4.1 State Approaches in Energy Efficiency, 2005 
 
An interesting policy question is why states take such different approaches to 
promote energy efficiency? Literature in policy diffusion suggests that the diffusion of 
policy innovation can be affected by inter-state behavioral factors, such as learning from 
the leaders and federal government, emulation from states within the same region, and 
competition with their neighbors. At the same time, state-specific socioeconomic 
characteristics also serve as important explanatory factors for policy innovation, such as 
population, GSP, and other economic, and political factors. This chapter argues that the 
differences in constituent pressure, measured by problem seriousness, can explain the 
differences in state strategies in improving energy efficiency. 
 
Red:  Regulation 
Violet:  Financial Incentive 
Blue:  Information Program 




4.1 Internal Determinants Model and Constituent Interest 
Internal Determinants models explain policy innovation using internal 
characteristics of state development. The models postulate that internal factors are the 
key to policy decision of whether or not policy will be implemented and when a policy 
will be put in place. The internal factors causing a state to adopt a new policy or program 
are political, economic, social characteristics, as well as constituent pressure. States are 
considered to be unique and independent from outside forces.  
L. Mohr (1969) proposed that the possibility of organizational innovation is 
inversely related to the obstacles to innovation, and is directly related to the motivations 
to innovate and the available resources to overcome the obstacles. With the internal 
determinants model, the motivations to innovate are related to the constituent pressure on 
policy innovation. This dissertation measures constituent pressure by problem seriousness, 
that is, how salient and urgent the problems are.  
Policy rationales summarize the problems leading to the adoption of a certain 
energy policy. For instance, rationales for Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) 
are environmental benefits, reduced electricity usage, market failure correction in energy 
efficiency investment, economic development and green jobs, and energy security 
(Brennan & Palmer, 2013). Generally, the constituen interests relevant to energy 
efficiency programs and policies include environmental benefits, reduced fossil fuel 
consumption, economic development, and affordable and reliable energy supply. States 
adopt energy efficiency policies aiming at solving problems of environmental 




prices. Measurements of problem seriousness can be used to characterize the constituent 
pressure for policy innovation.  
This Internal Determinants model is developed to explain the different factors 
influencing the three types of policy innovations: financial incentives, regulations, and 
information programs. It assumes that policy innovation is affected by internal state 
factors. Differences in constituent pressure are used to explain the differences in state 
strategies of policy innovation, by controlling for ther internal factors.  
Hypothesis 1. Constituent pressure is related to policy innovation. 
The Internal Determinants model uses population, per capita income, and gross 
state product (GSP) to characterize the socio-economic factors of the states.  It uses the 
state expenditure on natural resources, parks and recreation as the estimation of the 
state’s fiscal capacity for policy innovation. The state expenditure is measured in total 
spending and percentage spending.  
It measures state political ideology with SIERRA club membership. The Sierra 
Club is the nation's largest and most influential non-for-profit organization focusing on 
environmental issues. It has over 2.4 million members and supporters since 1892 when it 
was founded by John Muir. The club missions recently focus on reducing the use of fossil 
fuels toward a clean energy economy. Memberships of the Sierra Club can be used as an 
indicator of the environmental awareness of the state .  In 2011, club membership of each 
state ranges from 556 to 35,793, with median of 5,198 memberships. California is the 





Figure 4.2 Total Sierra Club Memberships by State, 2011 
 
The NOMINATE indicator of state government ideology developed by Berry et al. 
(2010) is the other measurement for state ideology. This indicator identifies state party 
ideology using “common-space” congressional ideology scores. A score of zero 
represents the most conservative position, and 100 representing the most liberal value.  
The nominate ideology indicator ranges from 0 to 91 in 2011, with median value of 55. 































Figure 4.3 Nominate State Government Ideology, 2011 
 
The dimension of constituent pressure is measured by problem seriousness in 
electricity price, electricity consumption, unemployment, and CO2 emissions (Table 4.1). 
Electricity-related environmental benefits include avoided CO2 emissions, avoided air 
pollution, and avoided water use for power production, and other environmental and 
public health benefits. The model chooses CO2 emissions as the measurement of the 
environmental problem due to data availability3. Electricity price, grid reliability, peak 
demand and other factors influence grid stability. This model uses electricity price as the 
indicator of the security problem due to data limitations.   
Two related models are developed for each energy efficiency policy: a restricted 
model and a full model. The restricted model tests the impacts of socioeconomic factors, 
state fiscal capacity, ideology, and problem seriousness. The adoption of other energy 
                                                      
3 The non-energy benefits of energy efficiency include environmental and public health benefits from 
avoided CO2 emissions and avoided air pollutions. However, the benefits of avoided air pollutions are hard 









































efficiency policies is also considered as an important political factor. The full model 
considers this political dimension, the impact of other energy efficiency policies, in 
addition to the factors in the restricted model.  
Table 4.1 Constituent Interest and the Measurement of Problem Seriousness 
Constituent Interest Problem Measurement of Problem 
Seriousness 
Environmental benefits Reducing environmental 
damages 






Economic development Unemployment and creating 
green jobs 
Unemployment rate 




The matrix of energy efficiency policies being considered are (1) financial 
incentives: the total budget of energy efficiency programs, and program budget as percent 
of utility revenue; (2) regulations: EERS, decoupling mechanisms, and building energy 
codes; (3) information programs: the Lead by Example program. The data of state 
investment in energy efficiency programs, the total budget/spending and the budget as % 
of utility revenue, can be found in Appendix A, Table A.1 &A.2. 
EERS is an energy savings target that state imposes on utility companies, aiming 
at promoting energy efficiency by involving the most significant player of the energy 
market. State EERS targets vary greatly in design and duration. For instance, the energy 
savings targets can be annual percentage, annual quantity, or cumulative percent/quantity. 
The basis of quantifying the amount of energy savings can be a fixed based year, or can 




states, or cover only the investor-owned utilities. Based on the analysis of state EERS, the 
efficiency requirements are normalized in annualized saving goal which takes into 
account both the total saving requirements and timelength of the binding targets. Only 
states with binding targets mandating savings in electricity sales are considered in the 
analysis.  Information about the annualized energy saving targets for EERS can be found 
in Appendix A, Table A.3. 
States adopting decoupling policies aim to remove the disincentives of utility 
companies from implementing energy efficiency programs. State policies help decouple 
utility profits from sales. Decoupling mechanism comprises three parts: cost recovery 
which allows utilities to recover direct program costs, decoupling policy and lost revenue 
recovery which allows utilities to recover their fixed costs, and performance incentives 
which reward utilities in achieving efficiency gains.  State decoupling policies are 
quantified by scoring the three components of decoupling mechanisms. The details of 
state scores on Decoupling can be found in Appendix A, Table A.4. 
Building energy codes impose performance requirement on building envelope, 
and the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems for new buildings, and 
for some states, retrofitted buildings. Many states choose to adopt model codes developed 
by third party organizations, for instance, the Inter ational Energy Conservation Code 
(IECC) for residential buildings, and the ASHREA codes for commercial buildings. 
Some states choose to develop and update periodically their own building energy codes.  
The adoption of building energy codes concentrated in 2009 when the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act required states to adopt building energy codes to get 




scoring based on code stringency (Table 4.2). Scores of code stringency of residential 
buildings are summed up with the scores of commercial buildings. State scores range 
from 1-12, and the Building Codes policy is treated as ordinal variable in the model. The 
state scores on the stringency of building codes is illustrated in Appendix A, Table A.5. 
 
Table 4.2 Scoring Method for Building Energy Codes 
Residential Buildings Commercial Buildings 
Score Level of Stringency Score Level of Stringency 
0 No mandatory state energy code 0 No mandatory state energy code 
1 Precedes 1998 MEC/ICEE code  1 Precedes ASHREA 90.1-1999 code 
2 1998-2001 IECC code 2 ASHREA 90.1-1999 code or 
equivalent  
3 Meets 2003 IECC or equivalent 3 Meets ASHREA 90.1 2001 or 
equivalent  
4 Meets 2006 IECC or equivalent 4 Meets ASHREA 90.1 2004 or 
equivalent 
5 Meets 2009 IECC or equivalent 5 Meets ASHREA 90.1 2007 or 
equivalent 
6 Exceeds 2009 IECC  6 Exceeds ASHREA 90.1 2007  
 
State energy efficiency programs are administrated nd delivered through two 
types of ratepayer-funded programs: utility programs and “public benefits” energy 
programs. State spending or budget of these programs is used to quantify the financial 
incentives on energy efficiency. From 2004 – 2012, the U.S. investment in energy 
efficiency programs has grown by more than four times:  the total state spending/budget 





In 2011, California, New York, Massachusetts, Washington, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Florida, Oregon, and Maryland were the top ten states having 
efficiency program budgets over $150 Million. In terms of energy efficiency program 
budget as a percent of utility revenues, Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island, New 
York, Oregon, Washington, California, Minnesota, Utah, Connecticut were the 2011 top 
states having efficiency program budgets over 2.8% of utility revenues. See appendix 
(Table A4.1 and Table A4.2) for more information on the actual spending and budgets of 
state efficiency programs. 
State governments take opportunities to be leaders in energy efficiency by 
incorporating performance requirements and targets into their own facilities and 
operations. State Lead by Example programs set up efficiency requirement and/or targets 
of energy savings, and label and benchmark building performance data of state owned 
buildings. The Lead by Example program is taken as a representation of information 
policies which promote energy efficiency. The measurement of policy innovation is 0-2 
scale scores based on whether or not states have energy efficiency requirements for state 
buildings, and whether or not states have taken benchmarking efforts for state buildings. 
Details of state scores is shown in Appendix A, Table A.6.  
The decoupling policy, building codes and the Lead by Example program are 
coded as ordinal variables. Extra scrutiny is need when Internal Determinant models are 
used to explain the adoption of these three policies because they are not interval level 
dependent variables. Usually, recoding the ordinal variable into binary variable is 




variables. However, a simplified fixed effect model is used to deal with decoupling, 
building codes and Lead by Example in this dissertation.  
Riedl and Geishecker (2012) uses Monte Carlo simulation to compare the 
effectiveness of several sophisticated models dealing w th ordinal dependent variables. 
The findings suggest that simple binary recoding schemes can deliver unbiased and 
efficient estimates of the parameters. And the simple linear fixed effect model can 
provide the relative effect size of the variables.  Given the information, this chapter 
applies linear fixed effect model to explain policy nnovation in decoupling, building 
codes and the Lead by Example program, and discusses only the relative effect sizes.  
Table 4.3 summarizes the variables used in the Internal Determinants models in 
this chapter. The correlation among the dependent variable, the policy variables, and the 





Table 4.3 Summary of the Policy Variables and Internal Determinants 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Total EE Program Budget 357 61.2 144.4 0 1162.5 
%EE Budget of Utility 
Revenue 
357 0.90% 1.05% 0 5.77% 
Lead by Example Program 357 0.93 0.70 0 2 
EERS 357 0.28% 0.54% 0 2.50% 
Decoupling 357 1.39 1.24 0 3 
Building Codes 357 5.73 3.09 0 12 
Population 357 5,957,746 6,652,279 514,157 37,700,000 
Per capita Income ($) 357 38,526.4 7,048.9 26,442.6 73,783.4 
GSP (Million $) 357 272,240.9 327,877.0 22,743 1,958,904 
Total State Expenditure on 
Natural Resources, Park and 
Recreation($) 
350 544,654.1 696,907.3 46,960 5,368,779 
% State Expenditure 
Natural Resources, Park and 
Recreation($) 
350 1.98% 1.15% 0.56% 7.75% 
Sierra Club Membership 
per capita 
357 0.0034 0.0069 0.0002 0.0545 
State Government Ideology 300 51.1 23.7 0 91 
Electricity Price ($/MBtu) 357 27.93 10.50 14.43 92.78 
Electricity Consumption 
(GWh) 
357 72,632.0 68,279.1 5,497 376,065 
Unemployment Rate (%) 357 7.6 2.4 3.1 15.1 
CO2 Emission per capita 
(tonne/capita) 
306 24.5 19.5 5.4 123.7 
 
4.2 Constituent Pressure and Financial Incentives 
The Internal Determinants model was used to test whether constituent pressure 
has impact on state investment in energy efficiency programs. The restricted model 
controls for state socioeconomic characteristics, state fiscal capacity and ideology. The 
full model also looks into the impacts of other energy efficiency programs and policies. 
Table 4.4 illustrates how the state budgets on energy fficiency programs are affected by 




Table 4.4 Internal Determinants for Energy Efficiency Program Budget 




















State Expenditure on 

































































Number of observations 300 300 
R2-within 0.4705 0.4822 
R2-between 0.8121 0.7904 
R2-overall 0.7054 0.6845 
aRobust standard error presented in parentheses. 





A joint test of the year dummies suggests that no time fixed effect is needed. The 
restricted model and the full model are both one-way fixed effect models, which can 
explain 47-48% of the within group variance. Both models suggest GSP, electricity 
consumption and unemployment rate have significant impacts on state budgets for energy 
efficiency programs.  Other internal state characteristics, such state fiscal capacity and 
ideology, are not significantly correlated with the investment in EE programs. The full 
model also predicts significant positive correlation between state investment in EE 
programs and building energy codes. 
In both models, problem seriousness in electricity consumption is negatively 
related with EE program budget. It is possible thatst es are more interested in investing 
in energy efficiency when they are faced with the ne d of meeting excessive electricity 
demand. Meanwhile, unemployment rate is positively r lated with EE program budget. 
The higher the unemployment rate, the higher the portion of investment in energy 
efficiency. Scholars suggest the rationale is that st tes tend to invest more in energy 
efficiency with the purpose of creating green jobs, when constituent pressure on 
economic development is high. However, it is also possible the causality is on the 
opposite direction, that more investment in energy efficiency leading to higher 
unemployment rate. 
 The measurement of EE program budget as a percent of utility revenue reveals 
the financial efforts of state utilities take to improve energy efficiency. Table 4.5 
demonstrates the results from the internal determinant model for this measure. Similar to 
the total EE program budget, the budget as percent of utility revenue is also positively 




Table 4.5 Internal Determinants for Energy Efficiency Program Budget as a Percent 
of Utility Revenuea 




















State Expenditure on 
Natural Resources, 




































































Number of observations 300 300 
R2-winthin 0.4911 0.5221 
R2-between 0.0975 0.1367 
R2-overall 0.1324 0.1762 
aRobust standard error presented in parentheses.  




The difference of using the percentage budget as the dependent variables is that 
GSP and electricity consumption are not significantly affecting the portion of state 
utilities spending in energy efficiency program. However, this percentage EE budget is 
positively related with the annualized EERS target, as demonstrated by the full model. A 
high annualized EERS target within a state leads to a high portion of investment on 
energy efficiency program. It is understandable that when states set up energy saving 
goals for utilities, the pressure of achieving the targets drives up the portion of utility 
investment in EE programs.  
Overall, the constituent interests in electricity consumption and economic 
development are related with state decision of investing in energy efficiency. The total 
EE program budget is related with the stringency of building codes, while the budget as 
percent of utility revenue is related with EERS targets of the states. 
 
4.3 Constituent Pressure and Regulations 
State decisions to adopt EERS targets are explained by internal determinants. 
Note that EERS targets are in a variety of different forms. When state energy savings 
targets are normalized in annual electricity saving percentages, the measurement loses 
track of some of the effects associated with the specific forms of the EERS targets. 
However, the models have the power of explaining the state decisions in setting the 
requirements of percent energy savings when the policy variable is quantified with 
annualized targets. The full Internal Determinant model can explain 41% of the within 




Table 4.6 Internal Determinants for EERS a 




















State Expenditure on 
Natural Resources, 




















































EE Program Budget  
-7.08E-06 
(6.38E-06) 






Building Codes  
7.22E-04*** 
(2.56E-04) 
Lead by Example  
-9.83E-04** 
(5.19E-04) 
Number of observations 300 300 
R2-winthin 0.2975 0.4111 
R2-between 0.0076 0.1461 
R2-overall 0.0018 0.1302 
aRobust standard error presented in parentheses.  




The restricted model and the full model are both two-way fixed effect models 
because the time fixed effect is need according to the joint test of the year dummies.  
Results from the models reveal the insignificance of constituent pressure, while Sierra 
club membership per capita is negatively related with EERS target in both models. The 
full model also suggests state government ideology have positive impact on the 
annualized EERS targets.  
The within group variance being explained increases by 11% when other EE 
programs and policies are included in the full model, indicating significant impacts of 
other policies on the adoption of EERS targets. States spending high portion of utility 
revenues on energy efficiency programs have probabilities to adopt high annualized 
EERS targets. Similarly, states with stringent building codes are more likely to adopt 
high annualized EERS targets. However, the Lead by Example program is negatively 
related with EERS.  
Generally speaking, the dynamics of EERS with other energy efficiency policies 
have impacts on the adoption of high EERS targets, while constituent pressure has no 
significant impact on EERS. 
Decoupling is the regulation closely related to EERS target and state energy 
efficiency programs. Decoupling policy removes the disincentive of utilities for not 
investing in energy efficiency because their profit is tied with revenue and sales. 
Decoupling mechanisms may also include performance incentives enabling utilities to be 
rewarded by being progressive in energy efficiency. The Internal Determinants model 
reveals the significant internal factors affecting state decisions in setting up decoupling 




Table 4.7 Internal Determinants for Decoupling a 
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EE Budget  
-2.70E-05 
(9.90E-04) 






Building Codes  
0.0149 
(0.0571) 
Lead by Example  
0.1010 
(0.1166) 
Number of observations 300 300 
R2-winthin 0.4632 0.4741 
R2-between 0.0150 0.0200 
R2-overall 0.0417 0.0411 
aRobust standard error presented in parentheses.  




Similar to the EERS models, the models for Decoupling are two-way fixed effect 
models due to the significance of time fixed effects. The model can explain more than 40% 
of the within group variation. The results suggest tha state fiscal capacity and state 
government ideology are significant internal characteristics influencing the adoption of 
decoupling mechanisms. More liberal state governments are more likely to adopt 
decoupling mechanisms.   
Interestingly, the two measurements of state fiscal capacity affect Decoupling in 
different directions. The total state expenditure on natural resources, parks and recreation 
is positively related with decoupling mechanism. However, the % expenditure is 
negatively related with Decoupling. If two states spend the same portion of expenditure 
on natural resources, parks and recreation, the higher the total expenditure, the more 
likely to adopt decoupling mechanisms. If states have the same total expenditure on 
natural resources, parks and recreation, the higher portion of this expenditure, the less 
likely to adopt Decoupling. Given the fact that the% expenditure is coded in decimals 
and its effect size is larger than the effect of total expenditure, the % expenditure has 
more significant impact than the total expenditure.  
Moreover, both the restricted model and the full model suggest no constituent 
interest is significantly correlated with Decoupling. The full model also indicates that the 
decoupling policy is not correlated with other energy efficiency policies.  
Unlike EERS and decoupling policies aiming at encouraging participation of 
utility companies, building energy codes are regulations states can adopt to impose 
performance requirements for energy usage in buildings. Table 4.8 illustrates the results 




Table 4.8 Internal Determinants for Building Energy Codes a 
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Natural Resources, 




















































EE Budget  
0.0046*** 
(0.0013) 









Lead by Example  
0.0739 
(0.1872) 
Number of observations 300 300 
R2-winthin 0.4143 0.4746 
R2-between 0.0525 0.0575 
R2-overall 0.0291 0.0317 
aRobust standard error presented in parentheses.  




Two-way fixed effect models were applied to account for the significant time 
fixed effect in the Internal Determinants models for building codes. The models can 
explain over 40% of the within group variable (Table 4.8).  
Electricity usage in buildings is closely related to the building stock and 
occupancy. Both the restricted model and full model suggest significant impacts of 
population and GSP, while state fiscal capacity measured by the portion of state 
expenditure on natural resources, parks and recreation is also predicted to be significant 
in the restricted model. Large population leads to low building code stringency, while 
high GSP leads to stringent building codes. On the o r hand, higher portion of state 
spending on natural resources, parks and recreation leads to lower level of building codes. 
However, the coefficient of this % expenditure becomes insignificant when other energy 
efficiency policies are included in the full model. 
Interestingly, the constituent pressure in electricity onsumption is negatively 
related with the stringency of building codes, as predicted by both the restricted model 
and the full model. A possible explanation is that, in states with low constituent pressure 
in reducing electricity consumption, state governmets are less likely to adopt stringent 
building codes. 
Moreover, the full model suggests that the adoption of building codes is related to 
state investment in EE programs and the adoption of EERS. If state utilities spend the 
same portion of revenue on EE program, the higher the total budget, the more likely to 
adopt stringent building codes. If states have the same investment in EE programs, the 
higher the percent of utility revenue, the less likely to adopt building codes. The adoption 




4.4 Constituent Pressure and Information Programs 
Some states have efficiency requirements, and rating nd/or benchmarking 
requirements for state-owned facilities when states run Lead by Example programs. The 
Lead by Example program does not just aim at reducing energy consumption of public 
buildings, but also aims at providing information through the exemplary projects to 
reduce energy usage of private buildings. The Lead by Example program has two 
components: the efficiency requirement of energy performance, and the 
rating/benchmarking systems. Table 4.9 illustrates th  results from the Internal 
Determinants model for the Lead by Example program.  
The restricted model and the full model both suggest state wealth (measure by per 
capita income and GSP), and environmental awareness (Sierra club membership per 
capita) can significantly influence the adoption of Lead by Example programs. High per 
capita income lead to low probability of policy innovation, but high GSP lead to high 
probability of adopting the Lead by Example program. If states have high per capita 
Sierra club membership, they are more likely to adopt the Lead by Example program. 
State fiscal capacity has mixed effect on the Lead by Example program. If state 
have the same percentage expenditure on natural resourc s, parks and recreation, states 
spending large amount of money tend to have high probabilities of policy innovation. But 
the % of state expenditure has the opposite effect. This indicates both scale (total 
expenditure) and portion (% expenditure) matter to policy innovation. When state spend 
same amount of money, states with high portions of expenditures are less likely to invest 
their capacity in the Lead by Example program, indicating states take the Lead by 




Table 4.9 Internal Determinants for Lead by Example a 
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Natural Resources, 




















































EE Budget  
-6.83E-06 
(4.38E-04) 









Building Codes  
0.0067 
(0.0175) 
Number of observations 300 300 
R2-winthin 0.4075 0.4250 
R2-between 0.2356 0.1626 
R2-overall 0.2307 0.1835 
aRobust standard error presented in parentheses.  




Interestingly, states with high annualized EERS targets are less likely to adopt the 
Lead by Example programs, which also indicates a substit tion relationship of the two 
policies. This suggest that states putting more emphasis on regulations like EERS won’t 
take significant effort on developing information programs to promote energy efficiency 
The restricted model and the full model both indicate no significant impact of 
constituent pressure on the state level policy decisions of adopting Lead by Example 
programs. 
The goodness of fit was checked for every Internal Determinants model. All 
models report the robust standard errors to control fo  heterskedasticity. Hausman tests 
were conducted to test whether random effect models would be better fits than fixed 
effect model for the panels. Results from the Hausman tests reject the null hypothesis at 
the 0.1 significance level suggesting that fixed effect models are a good fit.  
The panel used in the Internal Determinants models is micro panel containing 51 
groups and 7 years. Autocorrelation is generally not a problem for this type of panels. A 
Lagram-Multiplier test, the Drukker test, can be usd to test for the serial correlation. 
However, results from the Drukker tests suggest strong autocorrelations for all fixed 
effect models, indicating the existence of biases due to serial correlations. It the quite 
possible that the standard errors are under-estimated and the R-squared is over-estimated 








The Internal Determinants models suggest that constituen  pressure is relevant to 
the adoption of all selected energy efficiency programs and policies (Table 4.10).  
Financial incentives offered by state EE programs are related to electricity consumption 
and unemployment rate. State unemployment rate is positively related to the investment 
in energy efficiency programs. The adoption decision of building codes is also negatively 
related to electricity consumption. The impact of cnstituent interests in electricity 
consumption is negative on state investment in EE programs and the stringency of 
building codes. This indicates that states with less constituent pressure in the reduction of 
electricity consumption tend to invest less in energy efficiency and be slow in building 
code adoption.   
 Constituent pressure in electricity price and CO2 emission has no significant 
impact on policy innovation. Also, the adoption of EERS, Decoupling, and the Lead by 
Example program, has no significant correlation with any of the constituent pressure, as 
measured by problem seriousness in the Internal Determinants models. However, other 
state characteristics, such as GSP, state fiscal cap city, environmental awareness 
(measured by Sierra club membership per capita), and state government ideology have 
some impacts on policy innovation.  
Logarithm transformations of the independent variables were applied to the 
Internal Determinant models to deal with the outliers and simplify the estimation of 
coefficients. Table 4.11 illustrates the summary of results from the Internal Determinant 
models with explanatory variables in their log forms. Similar to the models in Table 4.10, 




Table 4.10 Summary of State Internal Determinants 
Dimensions Variables EE 
Program 
Budget 






Population    -  
Per Capita Income     - 
GSP +   + + 
State Fiscal 
Capacity 
State Expenditure on Natural 
Resources, Parks & Recreation 
    
 
Total Expenditure   +  + 
% Expenditure   -  - 
Ideology 





State Government Ideology  + +   
Problem 
Seriousness 
Electricity Price      
Electricity Consumption -   -  
Unemployment Rate +     
CO2 Emissions per capita      
_Iyear Significant year dummies 










The comparison of Table 4.11 with Table 4.11 reveals that many of the internal 
determinants lose significance after the logarithm ransformation in explaining policy 
innovation. For the EE program budget as percent of u ility revenue, the log of 
unemployment rate is correlated with state investmen  in EE programs. All other factors, 
except for the adoption of EERS and the time fixed effect in 2008, have no significant 
correlation with the dependent variable.  
The adoption of EERS is correlated with the state inv stment in EE programs and 
the adoption of building codes and the Lead by Example program. The log forms of all 




targets. Similarly, the adoption of the Lead by Example program is not correlated with 
any of the log forms of the internal determinants or other policies. However, time fixed 
effects (i.e., the year dummies) are significant fac ors affecting the adoption of this 
program. 
Table 4.11 Summary of State Internal Determinants with Logarithm 
Transformation 
Dimensions Variables EE 
Program 
Budget 






Log_Population      
Log_Per Capita Income    +  
Log_GSP      
State Fiscal 
Capacity 
State Expenditure on Natural 
Resources, Parks & Recreation 
    
 
Log_Total Expenditure   + -  
Log_% Expenditure   -   
Ideology 
Log_SIERRA Club Membership 
per capita 
 
   
 
Log_State Government Ideology   +   
Problem 
Seriousness 
Log_Electricity Price    -  
Log_Electricity Consumption    -  
Log_Unemployment Rate +     
Log_CO2 Emissions per capita    -  















The adoption of decoupling mechanisms and building e ergy codes are correlated 
with the logs of some of the internal determinants. The logarithm of state total 
expenditure on natural resources, parks and recreation is positively related with 




For the adoption of building energy codes, the log of per capita income is 
positively correlated with code stringency. The logof state total expenditure is negatively 
correlated with code stringency, while the log of percentage expenditure is significant. 
The logs of electricity price, electricity consumption and CO2 emission per capita are all 
negatively correlated with the stringency of building codes.   
Meanwhile, policy innovation affects each other. Table 4.12 summarizes the 
significant impacts of energy efficiency policies on the adoption of each individual policy. 
State investment in EE programs is positively related with both EERS and Building 
Codes. States with high annualized EERS targets have igh probabilities of adopting 
building energy codes. However, the correlation betwe n EERS and the Lead by 
Example program is significantly negative, indicating a substitution relationship between 
these two policies. States adopted high annualized EERS targets may choose not to run 
Lead by Example programs, vice versa. This indicates that state tend to choose only one 
policy from EERS targets and the Lead by Example program, rather than adopting a 
combination of both, to promote energy efficiency. 
Table 4.12 Interaction of Energy Efficiency Policies 
 EE Program 
Budget 




EE Program % Budget      
EERS +     
Decoupling      
Building Codes + +    





In addition, the adoption of decoupling mechanisms is not affected by the 
adoption of other energy efficiency policies. Rather, it is influenced by some of internal 
state factors as demonstrated in Table 4.10.  
In general, the differences in constituent interests, as measured by problem 
seriousness, can help in explaining why states take district strategies in improving energy 
efficiency. States faced with high electricity prices are more likely to adopt information 
programs such as the Lead by Example program. States with significant CO2 emissions 
are less likely to adopt regulations such as EERS and building energy codes. States facing 
high unemployment rates are more likely to take a combined approach of financial 
incentives, regulations and information programs, because all these policies are 
considered to have the ability of generating green jobs.  
The fixed effect models explaining policy innovation with internal state 
characteristics are good fits for the panels. However, the data suffers from the problems 
of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Biases exi t in the estimations of coefficients 
and standard errors. Some of the models have dependnt variables in ordinal format, and 
linear fixed effect models are quite limited in dealing with this type of dependent 
variables. It is appropriate to just discuss the significance and direction of the effects and 






POLICY INNOVATION AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 
Sustainability is a salient long-term goal for most f he city planners in U.S. 
metropolitan areas. An important aspect of sustainable development is to maintain a 
resilient energy-economic system, providing reliable and sustainable energy supply for 
the economy. Our electricity market is faced with many urgent challenges in 
sustainability, such as clean energy deployment, demand-side management, grid 
reliability, environmental protection and energy security. The challenges are escalated 
with population growth and extreme weather. 
State and local governments undertake a variety of approaches to promote energy 
efficiency, aiming at constraining energy consumption while maintaining economic 
growth. Regulations are issued to mandate improvement in energy efficiency. Financial 
supports are provided to incentive market penetration and consumer adoption of high 
efficiency products. Information programs are designed to encourage participation in the 
energy efficiency market.  
Policy innovation, defined as the adoption of a new policy by a certain state, is the 
behavior accounting for state efforts in the public policy to solve their energy issues and 
problems. The heterogeneity in state socioeconomic conditions and political contexts 
drives states to take different approaches to improve energy efficiency. In fact, the 50 
American states, and Washington D.C, are often seenas the natural laboratory of policy 




it is also true that states undertake various policy interventions to accelerate the adoption 
of highly efficient products and clean energy technologies. 
From 2005 to 2011, the U.S. has successfully reduced its overall energy intensity 
by 15%, while reducing its per capita energy usage by 7%. The achievement is as 
prominent in electricity productivity as in energy efficiency (Fig 5.1). Average states, like 
Maryland, Oregon and Virginia, keep steady paces in increasing their electricity 
productivity. Leading states, such as Washington D.C., New York, California and 
Massachusetts, are generally more productive in terms of gross state product (GSP) per 
electricity consumption. These states also tend to have faster paces of improving their 
electricity productivities. Other states, like Wyoming and Kentucky, have relatively low 
electricity productivities with slow improvements. The general trend is that the American 
states have been improving their electricity productivity over the past few years. 
 
















































Despite the national trend of productivity enhancement, states went through 
different trajectories in improving energy efficiency. Many states keep quite steady 
speeds, while some state experienced fluctuations during the 2007-2009 period of 
economic recess. States like Wyoming slowed down in eff ciency improvement after 
2009, while states like Oregon move faster in enhancing their electricity productivities.    
There exist several different theories trying to explain the increased efficiency and 
inter-state differences. A large body of literature tests the relevance of state policies 
through two distinct approaches: (1) ex post analysis evaluating the effects and impacts 
of regulations and EE programs (Geller, 1997; Vine, du Pont, & Waide, 2001); and, (2) 
ex ante studies modeling energy policies and predict potential savings  (Gellings et al., 
2006; Wang & Brown, 2014; Worrell & Price, 2001). At the same time, scholars apply 
neoclassical economic theories of market failure and barriers to explain the rationale of 
policy intervention for energy efficiency improvement (Gillingham, Newell, & Palmer, 
2009). 
On the other hand, economists question the rigor of empirical studies in 
estimating the impacts of energy efficiency programs. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) 
urge researchers to utilize randomized controls and quasi-experimental techniques to 
produce generalizable conclusion of the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs. 
Levinson (2014) questions the relevance of policy in California’s energy efficiency gains. 
Rather than crediting standards, Levinson attributes California’s achievement to 
population migration, California’s climate conditions and demographics.  
However, both advocates and skeptics have ignored the fact that energy efficiency 




consumption per capita. In fact, improvements on these metrics are caused by the 
underlining efficiency/intensity effect, as well the activity and structural effects. It is 
important to estimate the relevance and impact of policies based on the true underpinning 
efficiency effect rather than a simple energy efficien y indicator. 
5.1 Decomposition of Electricity Productivity 
Similar to the decomposition of energy efficiency indicators, electricity 
productivity, measured by gross state product (GSP) per electricity consumption, can also 
be decomposed into three factors: activity, structure, and efficiency effects. The activity 
effect measures the economic and social/physical activities which influence the demand 
for energy services. The activity effect is affected by various socioeconomic factors: 
population, climate, state demographics, and GSP. The structure effect is the embedded 
home, business, and industry structure which influece the demand for energy services. 
For residential buildings, the structure effect is considered to be affected by occupancy 
characteristics, building age, and the consumer choice of heating equipment. Bernstein et 
al. (2003) found that energy consumption in the commercial sector is affected by the 
business mix-up of financing services and other servic s. This dissertation uses the % 
GSP of financing services, % GSP of energy intensive businesses, and % GSP of 
electricity intensive manufacturing industries to characterize the structural effect of 
businesses and industries.   
Energy consumption in commercial buildings depends on occupancy pattern, that 
is, the types of businesses running in buildings (Table 5.1). Food sales and service, 
hospitals and other inpatient health care facilities are highly energy intensive in terms of 




services are low in energy consumption. The structue effect which influence commercial 
building energy efficiency should account for the en rgy-intensive and capital-intensive 
businesses.  The percentages of GSP generated by food and health services, and financial 
services can be used to control for the structure effect of the commercial sector. 




% of Total 
Consumption 
Health Care   
Inpatient 438.8 6% 
Outpatient 205.9 2% 
Food Sales 535.5 5% 
Lodging 193.1 7% 
Office 211.7 19% 
Mercantile   
Retail (Non-Malls) 172.6 5% 
Enclosed & Strip 
Malls 255.6 13% 
Education 159.0 11% 
Service 151.6 4% 
Food Service 522.4 6% 
Religious Worship 77.0 2% 
Public Order and Safety 221.1 2% 
Warehouse and Storage 94.3 7% 
Public Assembly 180.0 5% 
Vacant 33.1 1% 
Other 318.8 4% 
 
The industry sector is a complex mix of various manuf cturing process and fuel 
demand. Electricity consumption of manufacturing industries varies from each other 
significantly. Table 5.2 illustrates the total electricity consumption and electricity 
                                                      
4 Data taken from the 2012 Building Energy Databook, based on the 2003 Commercial Building Energy 
Consumption Survey (CBECS). All numbers are national average consumption of all fuels combined. The 
second column is the total energy consumption per floo space by building type. The third column is the




intensity, measured by electricity usage per dollar f value added, by industry in 2011. 
Primary metals, textile, paper, wood products, nonmetallic mineral products, plastics and 
rubber products, and chemicals, are highly electricity ntensive industries. These 
electricity-intensive industries consume 61% of total electricity in the industrial sector, 
while generating only 31% of industrial GDP. The industrial structure effect can be 
characterized by the share of electricity intensive industries of each state.  
Table 5.2 Electricity Intensity for Manufacturing I ndustries 







      331        Primary Metals 458 7.57 
      313        Textile Mills  & 314     Textile Product Mills 86 5.48 
      322        Paper 247 4.63 
      321        Wood Products 91 4.12 
      327        Nonmetallic Mineral Products 147 4.02 
      326        Plastics and Rubber Products 182 2.76 
      325        Chemicals 517 1.52 
      337        Furniture and Related Products 32 1.40 
      311        Food & 312     Beverage and Tobacco Products 281 1.28 
      323        Printing and Related Support 45 1.15 
      332        Fabricated Metal Products 143 1.14 
      335        Electrical Equipment, Appliances, and Components 44 0.88 
      336        Transportation Equipment 195 0.87 
      333        Machinery 111 0.81 
      324        Petroleum and Coal Products 137 0.79 
      315        Apparel & 316      Leather and Allied Products 8 0.77 
      339        Miscellaneous 33 0.40 
      334        Computer and Electronic Products 94 0.38 
    
In addition to the activity and structure effects, the efficiency effect is the factor 
influencing electricity productivity by using less electricity to provide the same energy 
service. The efficiency factor is generally affected by consumer choice of high-efficient 




underpinning effect that drives up state electricity productivity when the activity and 
structure effects get separated.   
Table 5.3 lists the factors that influence the activity, structure and efficiency 
components of electricity productivity. The climate factor is measured by heating degree 
days and cooling degree days; household sizes of owner and renter homes are the 
portraits of residential building occupancy; building age is characterized by the percent of 
houses built after 2000; and electric heating is measured by the percent of homes using 
electric heating equipment.  
Table 5.3 Activity, Structure and Efficiency Effects of Electricity Productivity 
Sector Activity 
Effect 












• EERS,  
• Decoupling 
• Building energy codes 
Financial incentives: 
• Utility EE program 
budget; 
• EE budget as % of 
revenue 
Information programs:  
• State Lead by Example 
program 
Commercial Value added 
(GSP) 
% Financing; 
% Food Service 
and Inpatient 
Health Care 





In the fixed effect models, electricity productivity s the dependent variable, while 
the activity and structural factors serving as the control variables. Table 5.4 summarizes 




are the same as in the Internal Determinants models in Chapter 4. A summary of the 
policy variables can be found in Table 4.3. 
    
Table 5.4 Summary of the Non-policy Variables in the Fixed Effect Models 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Electricity Productivity 357 3.82 1.65 1.55 9.31 
Electricity Price 357 27.93 10.50 14.43 92.78 
Population 357 5,957,746 6,652,279 514,157 37,700,000 
HDD 357 5208.1 2250.7 0 10984 
CDD 357 1192.2 964.4 0 4965 
Per capita Income 357 38,526.4 7,048.9 26,442.6 73,783.4 
% Electric Heating 357 30.2% 19.3% 3.6% 92.7% 
% Post2000 Homes 357 12.3% 5.2% 2.7% 32.7% 
Household Size –Owner 
Homes 357 2.7 0.2 2.2 3.29 
Household Size –Renter 
Homes 357 2.4 0.2 1.81 2.91 
% Financing 357 7.7% 5.1% 2.0% 36.8% 
% Food and Health 357 5.3% 1.1% 2.3% 8.8% 
% Electricity-intensive 
Industries 357 3.4% 2.2% 0.1% 11.6% 
 
5.2 Measurement of Policy Innovation 
This dissertation assumes that the efficiency component of electricity productivity 
is affected by three types of energy policies: regulation, financial incentives, and 
information programs.  
Hypothesis 2: Three types of policy innovations increase state electricity 




Testing this hypothesis faces two challenges: a) isolating the efficiency 
component from the activity and structure effects; and, b) quantifying policy innovation. 
The first challenge can be solved by running controls of the activity and structure factors 
listed in Table 5.3. Secondly, policy innovation is defined as the state behavior of 
adopting a policy that is new to the individual state. Focusing on the state level, policy 
innovation characterizes the adoption behavior, which is different from policy invention 
and diffusion. Policy invention refers to the design and creation of a new policy/program 
that no other state has taken similar actions before. Policy diffusion focuses on the inter-
state behavior of policy adoption. The Hypothesis 2 assumes state policy innovation has 
an impact on electricity productivity. 
The policies selected to test Hypothesis 2 are listd in the last column of Table 5.3. 
Three independent regulations are modeled: Energy Efficiency Resource Standard 
(EERS), state decoupling mechanisms, and building energy codes.  
5.3 Explanatory Models for State Electricity Productivity 
Explanatory models were developed to test Hypothesis 1, in which state 
performance on electricity productivity is regressed on policy innovations by controlling 
for the activity and structure factors. Fixed-effect models are used to eliminate the impact 
of the unobserved factors.  
EP,,- = 	αX,,-
/ + βX,,-
0 + γElecPrice,,- + δPolicy,,- + μ, + ε,,-  
Where, EP,,- is the electricity productivity of state i at time t; 
X,,-





0  is the vector of structure factors of state i at tme t; 
μ, is the time invariant state fixed effect. This is the unobserved effect that is 
specific to individual states and does not vary by time; 
ε,,- is the idiosyncratic error term. ε,,- is iid (0,σ8
*). 
In fixed-effect model, the unobserved factors are represented by the fixed 
parameter μ,. It is also assumed that the explanatory variables ar  independent of the 
idiosyncratic error ε,,-, but not independent of the state fixed effect. 
Taking the difference between the observations and the group average, we have: 




0) + γ(ElecPrice,,- − ElecPrıce,) + δ(Policy,,-
− Polıcy,) + (ε,,- − ε,) 
This “within transformation” helps to eliminate the unobserved state fixed effects, 
and provides estimations of the effect size and direction of the explanatory variables 
based on “first difference”.  
To evaluate state electricity productivity, four different models were developed to 
test the relevance and impact of policy innovations. Each explanatory model controls for 
electricity price, the activity and structure factors ( i.e., population, HDD, CDD, per 
capita income, % electric heating, household size of owner and renter homes, % post-
2000 units; % financing, % food and healthcare, and % electricity intensive industries.)  
More specifically, Model 1 is a fixed-effect model t sting the impact of the 
individual policies. Model 2 is a fixed-effect model to test the differences in impacts of 




Model 3 is a fixed-effect model testing the lagged effects of policy innovations. Model 1-
3 provide estimations of robust standard errors. And lastly, Model 4 is a feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) model accounting for both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. Table 5.5 illustrates the results from the four explanatory models. 
The fixed-effect models can explain about 80% of the within group variance. All 
control variables, except for the % post-2000 homes, household size of renter homes, 
and % electricity-intensive industries, have significant impacts on electricity productivity. 
The directions of effects for the control variables are highly consistent from Model 1-4. 
Higher electricity prices, more population, and higher per capita incomes lead to higher 
productivity. Moderate climate correlate with high electricity productivity and more 
degree days lead to low efficiency. If a state has more electric heated homes, the 
electricity productivity will be low. The bigger the household size for owner homes, the 
lower the productivity. The higher portion of business providing financing, and food and 
health services, the higher the efficiency.  
Model 1 explores the impact of policy innovation of individual policies. Financial 
incentives, represented by the energy efficiency program spending/budget, have 
significant impacts on electricity productivity.  By controlling for the activity and 
structure effect, the state energy efficiency improves when the total budget on energy 
efficiency program grows. But it is irrelevant whetr the utilities spend high portions of 
their revenues on efficiency programs.  The Lead by Example program, an example of 






Table 5.5 Regression Results from Explanatory Models 
Coefficient a Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 

















































Combined Regulation Index   
0.00007 
(0.02272)   



























Electricity Price +*** +*** +***  +*** 
Population +* +* +  +*** 
HDD -*** -*** -***  -*** 
CDD -*** -*** -***  -*** 
Per Capita Income +*** +*** +***  +*** 
% Electric Heating -** -*** -**  -*** 
% Post2000 Homes + + +  -*** 
Household Size-Owner -** -*** -***  +*** 
Household Size-Renter - - -  + 
% Financing +** +** +*  +*** 
% Food and Health +*** +*** +***  +*** 
% Electricity-intensive Industries - - -  -*** 
Number of observations 357 357 306 306 
R2-within 0.8394 0.8375 0.7841 Wald 
chi2(21) = 
8397.06 
R2-between 0.6676 0.6675 0.6382 
R2-overall 0.6715 0.6714 0.6403 
aFor Models 1-3, robust standard error presented in parentheses. 




Regulations, on the other hand, do not have significant impact on state energy 
efficiency. A correlation test suggests that regulations are neither correlated with each 
other, nor correlated with other policy or control factors in the model. See Appendix A, 
Table A.7 for the correlation table of the variables. Thus, the insignificant coefficient is 
not caused by strong correlations of the policy matrix.  
A new single combined index for regulations is develop d to further test the 
impact of adopting regulatory policies in Model 2. The combined index is the sum of the 
normalized percentage scores on the three regulation variables: EERS, decoupling and 
building energy code. Model 2 presents the fixed-effect regression using this combined 
regulation index. Similar to Model 1, total energy efficiency program budget and Lead by 
Example program have significant positive impacts, while regulation is still not directly 
relevant to electricity productivity.  
Although both models return insignificant coefficients for regulations, it is still 
possible that regulations have time-lagged impacts on electricity productivity. 
Information criterion procedure was used to select the lag length for the time-lagged 
effects of the regulatory and information policies. The Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC) suggests that 1-year time lag is the most appro riate lag length.  Model 3 tests for 
the 1-year lagged effects of EERS, decoupling and buil ing energy codes. Results from 
Model 3 suggest that time-lagged effects of regulations have no significant impacts on 
energy efficiency.  
Also note that building energy codes are very different from the other two 
regulatory policy instruments. Building codes focus on buildings by requiring efficiency 




targets imposed on utilities, while decoupling is an enabling policy encouraging utility 
companies to take action in promoting efficiency. Both EERS and decoupling are related 
to the behavior of utility companies, and they are closely relevant to the investment in 
state energy efficiency programs. The coefficients of EERS and decoupling are possibly 
underestimated when EE program budgets also present in the models. It is possible that 
the coefficients of EERS and decoupling only represent the residual effects of utility 
behavior, because the main effect is captured by their investments in energy efficiency 
programs.   
In general, financial incentives and information programs have positive impacts 
on energy efficiency. The estimations of effect size are quite consistent across models: 
approximately 0.0004 for EE program budget and 0.04for Lead by Example program. 
However, policy innovation of regulations does not have immediate and significant 
impacts, but it may lead to positive influences several years after the adoption of the 
regulatory approach.  
5.4 Goodness of Fit and the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Model  
A Hausman test was used to decide whether the random-effect model will be 
more appropriate than the fixed-effect model in dealing with this panel data. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that error terms are not correlated with the regressors.  
If the test result fails to reject the null, the random-effect model will be preferred over the 
fixed effect model.  With this panel data, the Hausman test returns chi2(17) = 85.73, with 
probability equals to 0.0000. This means that we rej ct the null hypothesis and fixed-
effect model is preferred over random-effect model to explain state electricity 




Models 1-3 apply one-way fixed-effect model which assume the time invariant 
fixed effect of the states. Possibilities exist that time-fixed effect should also be taken into 
account for the panel data. Figure 5.2 illustrates th  heterogeneity in electricity 
productivity across years. Time fixed parameter repesents the effect that is same to all 
states but varies by time. The economic recession from 2007-2010 is a good example of 
time fixed effect.  
 
Figure 5.2 Heterogeneity in Electricity Productivity 
 
To test whether time fixed effect is needed, a joint test of all year dummies was 




F(5,50)=3.48 with probability equals to 0.0089, indicating that we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. This test suggests the relevance of the time fixed effect.  
A two-way fixed effect model was applied to this panel data, demonstrating 
similar results to the one-way fixed effect model (Table 5.6). Coefficient estimations 
from the two-way fixed effect model are close to the estimations from the one-way fixed 
effect models. Again, total energy efficiency program budget and building codes have 
positive impacts on electricity productivity, while time lagged effect of regulations have 
no significant correlations with the dependent variable. 
To simplify the model in estimating the impacts of p licy innovations on 
electricity productivity, logarithm transformations of the dependent variable and some of 
the explanatory variables are used in the two-way fixed effect model. Table 5.7 illustrates 
the results from the fixed effect model with logarithm transform. Table 5.7 reports the 
coefficients of the policies and their 1-year lags, using the logarithm of electricity 
productivity as the dependent variable. 
Some of the control variables, the activity and structure factors and electricity 
price, are transformed into logarithms. Population, per capita income, and electricity 
price have large scales and their logged forms are used in the model. The policy variables 
contain many zero values. Transforming policy variables into logarithms will create large 
portions of missing values. The model in Table 5.7 does not have logarithms of the policy 
variables, except for the total budget of energy effici ncy programs. The log form of this 
variable creates 27 missing values. Because of the missing values, the fixed effect model 




Table 5.6 Regression Result from the Two Way fixed-Effect Model 
Coefficient a Electricity Productivity 
Total EE Budget 0.0003* (0.0001) 
EE Budget as % Revenue 1.1222 (2.6586) 




Decoupling -0.0143 (0.0092) 
Building Codes 0.0102** 
(0.0047) 
EERS 1-year-lag -0.6622 
(2.3941) 
Decoupling 1-year-lag 0.0101 
(0.0139) 
Building Codes 1-year-lag 0.0042 (0.0077) 
Constant 4.8258*** 
(1.2596) 




Per Capita Income +*** 
% Electric Heating -*** 
% Post2000 Homes + 
Household Size-Owner -*** 
Household Size-Renter -* 
% Financing + 
% Food and Health + 
% Electricity-intensive Industries - 
Significant year dummies _Iyear2010 
Number of observations 306 
R2 within 0.8011 
R2-between 0.5816 
R2-overall 0.5848 
a Robust standard error presented in parentheses. 




Table 5.7 Regression Results from Fixed Effect Model with Logarithm 
Transformation 
Coefficient a Log_Electricity Productivity 
Log_Total EE Budget 
-0.0013 
(0.0024) 
EE Budget as % Revenue 
0.2628 
(0.3691) 
























Log_Electricity Price +**  
Log_Population - 
HDD -** *  
CDD -** 
Log_Per Capita Income +***  
% Electric Heating -* 
% Post2000 Homes - 
Household Size-Owner - 
Household Size-Renter -**  
% Financing +*** 
% Food and Health - 
% Electricity-intensive Industries + 
Significant year dummies 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 
Number of observations 274 
R2 within 0.8197 
R2-between 0.4862 
R2-overall 0.5015 
a Robust standard error presented in parentheses. 




There are some differences in the estimation of the coefficients of the policy 
variables after the logarithm transformation. A comparison of Table 5.6 and 5.7 reveals 
that the financing and information policies are not significantly correlated with the log 
form of electricity productivity. However, building energy codes remain significantly and 
positively correlated with the log of electricity productivity. None of the time lags of the 
policies have significant correlation with the log f electricity productivity. 
Some of the activity and structure factors lose their significance after the 
logarithm transformation. For example, the logs of % GSP of electricity-intensive 
industries are not significantly correlated with the log of electricity productivity. The log 
of household size of owner homes is not significant, while the log of household size of 
renter homes remains significant. All other activity and structure factors have the same 
impacts on electricity productivity. 
Generally speaking, the change in activity and structure factors is not significant 
after logarithm transformation. The correlations have changed a lot between the log of 
electricity productivity and the policy variables. The financing and information policies 
are irrelevant to the change in electricity productivity. Building codes are positively 
related with the log of electricity productivity, while other regulations and their time lags 
are not significantly correlated with the dependent variable.  
Overall, this panel data belongs to micro panel because it does not have very long 
time serials with 51 groups and 7 years of observations of each group. A test of cross-
sectional independence suggests that this panel to some extent has the problem of 
residuals being correlated across states. A Pasaran CD test was used to test for cross-




no cross-sectional dependence at the 0.05 level, indicating week contemporaneous 
correlation. Model 2 has stronger contemporaneous crrelation with p-value of 0.0089. 
Model 3 is strongly unbalanced and Pasaran CD test is not applicable. Because the 
incorporation of time-lagged effect leads to missing data of some of the years, making the 
panel unbalanced. 
The issue of heteroskedasticity is also tested. Although Models 1-3 uses the 
option “robust” to control for heteroskedasticity, modified Wald tests still suggest strong 
heteroskedasticity of the models. At the same time, serial correlation tests were also 
performed on this micro panel. In general, autocorrelation is not a problem for micro 
panels. However, the Drukker tests suggest strong autocorrelations for Models 1-3. Serial 
correlation biases the standard errors of the coeffici nts to be smaller and higher R-
squared. The standard errors from Models 1-3 are und restimated and the R-squares are 
overestimated due to the autocorrelation issues.  
To account for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the panel data, a 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model was used to test all explanatory factors. 
The advantage of using FGLS model is that GLS models allow flexible variance-
covariance structures of panel data. GLS model can de l with heteroskedasticity across 
panels, correlation across panels and autocorrelation w thin panels. Model 4 in Table 5.5 
shows the results from the FGLS regression. All significant factors in Model 3 remain 
significant, while the energy efficiency budget as percent of utility revenue became 
statistically significant in Model 4. More interestingly, the decoupling and building 




on energy efficiency when states adopt decoupling mechanisms, adopt building energy 
codes or increase their code stringency.   
The coefficient of EERS remains insignificant statistically as suggested by the 
GLS regression of the state data from 2005-2011. However, the time-lagged effects of 
EERS have significantly negative impacts on electricity productivity. This finding is 
counter-intuitive because the policy rationale for EERS is to urge utilities to become 
more energy-efficient when they are required to follow the energy saving target. Again, 
the coefficient of EERS and its lagged effects may reflect merely the residual effects of 
utility efforts, because the major positive impacts are captured by the coefficients of 
energy efficiency program budget and the decoupling policy. Moreover, the time-lagged 
variables may only be indicators of the unobserved factors that are not specified in the 
model (Mckinnish, 2002).   
In general, results from the GLS model confirm the significance and directions of 
the policy variables estimated with the fixed effect models. Financial incentives and 
information programs are estimated to increase effici ncy, while regulations generally 
have time-lagged effects. 
5.5 The Relevance of Policy Innovation 
 The efficiency-gains story in California may lead to questioning the credibility of 
appliance standard (Levinson, In Press). However, generally speaking, policy innovation 
is relevant in promoting electric end-use efficiency. State data on electricity productivity 
from 2005-2011 was used to test the relevance of policy innovation in regulation, 




impact of policy innovation on energy efficiency by controlling for the activity and 
structure factors in electricity productivity.  
The models illustrate significant positive impacts of financial incentives and 
information programs. However, regulations are estimated to have mixed impacts on 
electricity productivity. The models suggest significant time-lagged impacts of 
regulations, but the direction of the effect can be either positive or negative. Two-way 
fixed effect model and generalized least squares model demonstrate similar estimations 
of the financial and information programs. They also e timate more significant positive 
impacts of decoupling and building energy code, while indicating negative time-lagged 
impact of EERS. 
The caveat is that the models are subject to the issues of heteroskedasticity, cross-
sectional dependence, and autocorrelation. The problem can be controlled with robust 
standard errors and the FGLS model. But in general, these biases make the fixed effect 







ASSESSMENT OF THE ACHIEVABLE POTENTIAL 5 
 
The potential for electric end-use efficiency has invoked great interest over the 
past several decades because the cheapest megawatt hour of electricity is often the one 
that is not produced (Croucher, 2011). Advocates of energy efficiency claim that huge 
potentials for future efficiency improvements are yet to be exploited. There is a large 
body of literature assessing the potential in energy fficiency. Comprehensive and 
integrated resource planning also considers the potntial for increases in energy 
efficiency to reduce the requirements for new generation and transmission investments.  
Although energy efficiency improvement has been very helpful in reducing 
energy intensity in the past, the future of energy efficiency still remains uncertain (Figure 
6.1). Some of the economists question the potential i  energy efficiency improvements. 
Allcott and Greenstone (2012) argues that energy efficiency programs are not making 
actual impacts because the estimated savings are too small to be noticeable. Borenstein 
(2014) argues that energy efficiency potential is not big because the market barriers are 
so significant.  
What is the future of energy efficiency? Will the efficiency improvement sustain 
in our future, or it is “tapped out”? The policy question is whether energy efficiency 
policies can continue providing driving forces to improve the energy efficiency of our 
economy. 
                                                      





Figure 6.1 Energy Intensity of the U.S. 
 
Clearly, critical questions still need to be answered for both practical and 
theoretical reasons: what is the magnitude of energy-savings potential that can be 
achieved by deploying energy-efficiency measures? And, what are the cost-effective 
policy instruments available for tapping this potential? A careful examination of the 
policy options for energy efficiency would contribute valuable information to facilitate 
environment protection and climate mitigation by utilities, government agencies, and 
non-governmental organizations.  This estimation of the economically achievable 
potential attempts to update and extend the current lit rature on energy-efficiency, 
demonstrating a novel analytical approach for presenting policy measures in terms of 
relative impact and cost-effectiveness -the policy supply curve. 
Numerous obstacles – including market failures and barriers – contribute to the 
energy efficiency gap (Figure 6.2). Market failures lated to the deployment of energy 

















regulatory policies; (3) unpriced externalities; and (4) information asymmetry. Recent 
literature focuses on information-based market failures including a general lack of 
information, information asymmetries, and price signaling (Brown & Chandler, 2008). 
“Market barriers” include other obstacles that contribute to the slow diffusion and 
adoption of energy-efficient innovations (Hirst & Brown, 1990; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994; 
Levine, et al., 1995). It is important to understand the full range of obstacles to energy-
efficient technologies. These barriers include: (1) high upfront cost of the clean energy 
technologies, (2) behavioral barriers, such as the lack of interest, inattention, and the low 
priority of energy issues among consumers, (3) capital market imperfections, (4) 
incomplete markets for energy-efficient features and products, and (5) prolonged 
infrastructure longevity rooted in the behavioral economics of sunken costs. 
 
 




States apply policy interventions to address the market failures and barriers and to 
leverage drivers for energy efficiency (Brown & Sovacool, 2011; Geller, 2002). One 
succinct typology of policies identifies three ways of exploiting the achievable potential 
for energy efficiency: (1) financial assistance, including subsidies, bulk procurements, 
and loan guarantees; (2) regulatory requirements, such as codes, standards, and cap and 
trade programs; and (3) information programs including labeling, education, R&D 
support, and workforce training (Brown et al., 2011).   
This leads to the critical question whether the energy fficiency policies and 
programs can continue providing energy efficiency gains in the future. To answer this 
question, this chapter examines the hypothesis that energy efficiency policies will 
continue providing motives to improve energy efficiency and there is potential in energy 
savings in the future due to the implementation of energy policies. 
H3. The potential of electric end-use efficiency is achievable with financial, 
regulatory, and information policies.   
The mechanisms for improving energy efficiency vary by policy type because 
financial, regulatory and information instruments exercise different leverages to change 
consumer behavior in energy efficiency adoption. The Hypothesis 3 can be divided into 
three hypotheses based on the three distinct policy mechanisms. More specifically:  
• H3.1 financial incentives improve energy efficiency by providing financing 




• H3.2 information programs improve energy efficiency by offering 
information/training to invoke awareness, educate consumers, and assist adoption 
(Newell & Siikamäki, 2013); 
• H3.3 regulations improve energy efficiency by mandati g efficiency requirements 
to accelerate market penetration (Kelly, 2012) 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by modeling a selected array of energy efficiency policies 
and estimating the potential electricity savings due to the implementation of these 
policies. The chapter focuses on the economically achievable potential for improving the 
energy-efficiency of homes, commercial buildings, and industrial plants from a specific 
set of policies. The approach involves identifying a series of energy-efficiency policies 
and examining their impacts and cost-effectiveness. The levelized cost of policy-driven 
electricity savings are estimated to ensure the effectiveness of the policies. A policy 
supply curve was constructed to characterize policies as opportunities to promote energy 
efficiency from the societal perspective. The impacts of the selected policies were studied 
on electricity rates and the power sector, CO2 emissions and the whole economy. 
The potential energy savings from each type of policies are assessed with the 
energy modeling approach and the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) was calculated by 
policy type. The modeling of policies is strictly based on the policy mechanisms so that 
the model levers are the reflections of the policy assumptions on behavioral changes. In 
doing this estimation, Hypotheses 3.1 -3.3 are tested for the effectiveness of the policy 
mechanisms. If the model predicts no significant electricity savings from policy 




effective. If the levelized costs of the policies are too high, the hypotheses will also be 
rejected because they are not feasible. 
This dissertation focuses on the achievable potential of energy efficiency in the 
U.S., defined as the portion of the energy-efficieny gap that can be narrowed by the 
implementation of policies and programs. The achievable potential is distinguished from 
technical and economic potentials by considering policy efforts in promoting the 
adoption of energy efficiency measures. The achievabl  potential is of particular interest 
because it captures the portion of efficiency improvements with high probability of being 
realized by policy interventions.  
Nevertheless, the achievable potential is difficult to measure due to the complex 
behavioral aspect of efficiency adoption. The litera u e reveals this difficulty with a wide 
range of potential estimations reported by assessment  applying vastly diversified 
methods (Table 6.1). The recent studies estimating the energy-efficiency potential in the 
U.S. clearly demonstrate that estimates of efficiency potential range widely from 8% to 
59% (Table 1.2). These studies focus on different measures of the efficiency gap, with 
the technical and economic potentials usually higher t an the achievable potential 
estimation. These assessments are derived from theory, simulation, and real-world 
practices, and they have been conducted at various geographic scales, covering different 













Focus Sector Residential buildings 
Commercial buildings 
Single/multiple Industries  
Transportation 
Applied Fuel Total energy 
Electricity  
Natural gas 




Direct metering and monitoring 
Cost 
Estimation 
Total cost  
Cost/benefit analysis (CBA) 
Lifetime cost 
Cost of conserved energy (CCE) 
Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) 
 
Some of the energy efficiency potential assessments are coupled with cost 
estimates with widely varying results due to the application of variable cost accounting 
methods.  A review by Gellings, Wikler, & Ghosh (2006) found that the full life-cycle 
cost ranges from 0.8 -22.9 cents/kWh (in 2002$) for energy saved from DSM programs. 
Many studies use modeling tools to forecast and estimate potential energy savings and 
the cost of energy saved. For example, the McKinsey & Co. report estimates the average 
annualized cost for energy efficiency measures to range from $0.4-16 /MMBtu, 




(2009) estimates the levelized costs to be $0.022 - 0.032/kWh associated with utility 
efficiency programs.  
These studies generally suggest high cost-effectiveness for energy efficiency 
while many ex post assessments tend to estimate high r costs than ex ante studies. An ex 
post study estimated the utility cost (excluding private costs) based on utility and state 
evaluations and reports for electricity programs in 14 states. It finds the cost of saved 
energy to be $0.016-0.033/kWh, with an average of $0.025/kWh (Friedrich, et al., 2009).  
Other ex post estimations have reported higher levelized costs for energy efficiency. For 
example, Arimura, et al. (2011) estimate that utility-operated demand-side management 
programs between 1992 and 2006 saved electricity at a program cost averaging 
$0.05/kWh using a 5% discount rate, with a 90% confide ce interval ranging from $0.03 
to $0.98/kWh. Auffhammer, Blumstein and Fowlie (2008) use utility panel data to 
construct weighted average cost estimates for demand-side management programs. Their 
findings suggest low cost-effectiveness for DSM programs, with costs ranging from 
$0.053 to $0.151/kWh. 
Cost estimates can be coupled with potential estimations to draw an energy-
conservation supply curve, also called energy-effici n y supply curve.  The supply curve 
can be used to align energy-efficiency measures, to illustrate achievable potentials, and to 
identify the most cost-effective options (Gellings, Wikler, & Ghosh, 2006; Koopmans & 
te Velde, 2001). Technology supply curves for energy-efficient equipment have been 
evaluated since the early 1980’s (Brown, et al., 1998; Meier, et al., 1982), culminating 




This chapter applies scenario analysis with the Nation l Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS) to estimate the energy efficiency potential and construct a policy supply curve 
for electricity efficiency improvements. With sophisticated analysis of a representative 
suite of policies, we estimate the achievable potential and the levelized cost of electricity 
saved from these policies. The hypotheses 3.1 - 3.3 are tested based this information. At 
the same time, this dissertation attempts to extend the supply curve approach to examine 
energy-efficiency policies with regard to the cost-effectiveness in improving energy 
efficiency.  Rather than aligning energy-efficient technologies by cost and impact, our 
policy supply curves portray the cost and impacts of policies, a focus which should be 
appealing to policy analysts and energy program managers. 
6.1 Energy Modeling and Cost Estimation 
It is difficult to quantify the exact magnitude of the electricity-efficiency potential 
because assumptions have to be made about current efficiency level and the 
achievable/optimal/maximal efficiency level. One bottom-up approach to quantify the 
efficiency potential is through modeling. This typically involves enumerating on a 
technology-by-technology basis the difference betwen current practice and best practice, 
where best practice is defined as the utilization of the most energy-efficient technology 
that is also cost-effective. Keeping in mind the natur l rate of equipment turnover through 
consumer purchases, one can then estimate the amount of energy consumption that can be 
reduced by policy efforts.  
A portfolio of eleven energy-efficiency policies is modeled with the Georgia 
Institute of Technology’s version of National Energy Modeling Systems (GT-NEMS) to 




is used to estimate the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), based on GT-NEMS output 
for each of the financial, regulatory and information policies. Similarly, estimates of 
carbon dioxide emissions and reductions in fuel consumption for all end-use sectors can 
also be extracted from GT-NEMS output.   
6.1.1 National Energy Modeling System 
GT-NEMS is the principal modeling tool used supplemented by spreadsheet 
calculations. Specifically, we employ the version of NEMS that generated Annual Energy 
Outlook (AEO) 2011 by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2012), which 
forecasts energy supply and demand for the nation up to 2035. NEMS models the U.S. 
energy markets and is the principal modeling tool used to forecast future energy supply 
and demand. Twelve modules represent supply (oil and g s, coal, and renewable fuels), 
demand (residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors), energy 
conversion (electricity and petroleum markets), carbon emissions, and macroeconomic 
and international energy market factors. A thirteenh “integrating” module ensures that a 
general market equilibrium is achieved among the otr modules. Beginning with current 
resource supply and price data and making assumptions about future use patterns and 
technological development, NEMS carries through the market interactions represented by 
the thirteen modules and solves for the price and quantity of each energy type that 
balances supply and demand in each sector and region represented (EIA, 2009). Outputs 
are intended as forecasts of general trends rather than precise statements of what will 
happen in the future. As such, NEMS is highly suited to projecting how alternative 
assumptions about resource availability, consumer demand, and policy implementation 




In addition to its high modeling capacity, NEMS is chosen as the tool for 
estimating efficiency potential because it accounts for the naturally occurring adoption of 
energy efficiency. The reference scenario considers the efficiency improvement due to 
the natural rate of technology improvements, and existing codes, standards and demand-
side management programs (EIA, 2011).   
The NEMS reference case projections are based on federal, state, and local laws 
and regulations in effect at the time of the analysis. The baseline projections developed 
by the EIA via NEMS are published annually in the Annual Energy Outlook, which is 
regarded as a reliable reference in the field of energy and climate policy.  The reference 
case forecast has incorporated the impacts of current national-level policies on energy 
consumption. Technology advances are also assumed in the reference case so that 
efficiency improvements can happen when new, high-effici ncy technologies are 
available in the market. Therefore, the naturally occurring adoption of efficiency 
measures is embedded in the baseline forecast.  
We have used GT-NEMS to perform scenario analysis under a consistent 
modeling framework in order to compare policy options to the reference case projections. 
The GT-NEMS is different from the NEMS used by EIA to produce the AEO 2011 
because it applies different assumptions about technology characteristics and customer 
behaviors in its policy scenarios. The GT-NEMS also updates the NEMS assumptions for 
discount rates  in major commercial building to reflect the time preference of private 
investments reported in the literature (Cox, Brown, & Sun, 2013). Further details about 




GT-NEMS also provides estimates of the carbon intensi y of electricity generation 
based on generation resources over time. The benefit of reduced CO2 emissions are 
estimated by subtracting the emissions in the reference case from the policy scenario and 
then multiplying by the “social cost of carbon” (SCC). The SCC is an estimate of the 
monetized damages caused by a metric ton of CO2 emitted in a given year. The social 
cost of carbon used in this analysis is the central value of the U.S. Government 
Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (EPA, 2010), growing from 
$23/metric ton in 2011 to $47/metric ton in 2050 (all v lues are in 2008-$ and account for 
global avoided damages).    
6.1.2 Energy Efficiency Policy Levers 
We define the achievable potential as the portion of energy savings from the 
deployment of cost-effective measures with enabling policies. In this sense, the choice of 
policies to be modeled is critical to our analysis. The U.S. energy market is under 
multiple levels of governance. Energy-efficiency programs are operated by federal, state 
and local governments, utility companies, and non-gvernment organizations such as the 
Alliance to Save Energy and the Southeast Energy Efficiency Alliance (SEEA).  Two 
recent ACEEE reviews summarize the current energy-efficiency policies and programs in 
the U.S. building and industrial sectors.  The first report reviews 21 programs and 
policies for building energy efficiency, with building codes, appliance and equipment 
standards, appliance labeling, Energy Star, financing, and energy efficiency tax credits 
standing out as the programs having long-lasting impacts (Nadel et al., 2013). The second 
report reviews industrial efficiency policies, including seven programs for research and  




standards, and labeling programs such as Energy Star, industrial motor and motor 
systems standard, energy credits for combined heat and power (CHP), etc (Rogers, et al., 
2013).   
In general, these programs can be characterized as regulation-oriented, 
information-oriented, and incentive-oriented. To be representative, we choose a set of 
policies such that each end-use sector has policies in the three categories. It is not the 
goal to model every energy efficiency program and policy. Rather, we use GT-NEMS to 
model a set of policies that have long-lasting impacts geographically and temporally. For 
example, to model the financial support from state, local governments and utilities, we 
characterize two policy scenarios (Appliance Incentives for residential buildings and 
Commercial Financing for commercial buildings) to pr vide incentives for the 
investment in the energy-efficient equipment and appli nces in buildings. Similarly, the 
On-bill Financing scenario describes a program run by utility companies to support 
energy-efficiency penetration with financing options.  
In total, a suite of eleven policies was selected to characterize the achievable 
potential for energy efficiency: four regulatory policies, four financial policies, and three 
information policies (Table 6.2). Note that the elev n selected policies for energy 
modeling have overlap with the policies selected for state level fixed effect model. The 
policies selected in the previous two chapters do not cover financing options, appliance 
standard or motor standard. Also, the information plicies modeled in this chapter are 
more comprehensive and representative than the Lead by Example program modeled in 




 For residential buildings, five policies are designed to accelerate the adoption of 
energy-efficient technologies and to promote the installation of energy-efficient building 
envelopes. For commercial buildings, three policies are designed to expand investments 
in energy-efficiency improvements. In the industrial sector, the policies target motor 
systems and other efficiency improvements in various industrial processes, as well as 
CHP systems to make use of waste heat in industrial processes.  
Financial incentives, such as subsidies, on-bill financing and other financing 
options, are offered to energy-efficient technologies. For residential buildings, 25 energy-
efficient home appliances and equipment were selected from the NEMS technology menu. 
Financial incentives (either a subsidy or zero-interest loan) were then modeled by 
reducing the capital costs of these selected technologies. Similarly, 110 vintages of 
commercial building technologies were selected and offered flexible financing options. 
For industries, combined heat and power systems are consider energy-efficient 
technologies when they utilize waste heat to produce electricity. Incentives are provided 
for the installation of industrial CHP systems for ten years. 
Regulatory policies impose standards and mandates to nhance efficiency 
improvements. Building energy codes were modeled to represent equipment and shell 
efficiency improvements in buildings. As described in detail in the supplemental material, 
we model the gradual replacement of existing codes by an “IECC+” code that is about 30% 




approximating the stringency of the 2012 IECC code, th  national model residential 
code.6  
Table 6.2 Selected Policies for Electric End-Use Efficiency 
Sector Policy 
Type 
Policy Scenario Description 
Residential  Financial Appliance 
Incentives 
Providing a 30% subsidy to cut down 




Offering zero-interest loans for the most 
efficient technologies 
Regulatory Building Codes Adding four new building codes to 




Accelerate market penetration for energy 
efficiency technologies by eliminating the 
least efficient ones from the market 
Information Market Priming Reducing high discount rates (10-50%) to 
7% for private investment in efficient 
technologies  
Commercial Financial Financing Offering flexible financing options to 
lower the up-front costs of highly energy-
efficient equipment 
Regulatory Building Codes Requiring higher building shell efficiency 
and more stringent standards on space 
heating and cooling equipment 
Information Benchmarking Requiring utilities to submit whole 
building energy consumption data to a 
uniform database accessible by building 
owners  
Industrial Regulatory Motor Standard New motor standard in 2017 requiring 
efficiency improvement and 25% more 
savings for motor system 
Financial CHP Incentives Offering a 30% investment tax credit 
(ITC) for industrial CHP systems for 10 
years  
 Information Plant and 
Technology 
Upgrade 
Promoting plant utility upgrades by 
identifying efficiency opportunities with 
cost assessments and estimations of 
potential energy savings.  
 






In the residential building code scenario, policy modeling takes into account the 
effects of both code adoption and compliance due to training, technical support, code 
simplification, and stronger inspection/enforcement activities. Compliance with new 
building codes was assumed to increase with time whn less stringent codes were 
gradually replaced by new codes. 
For commercial buildings, the policy case assumes building codes impact new 
buildings and the retrofit of existing buildings in terms of envelope efficiency 
improvement and heating, ventilation, and air condition ng (HVAC) equipment upgrades. 
The boost in energy savings results from increased code stringency and compliance. We 
assume the entire commercial building stock gradually reaches the efficiency level 
equivalent to the most recent code, ASHRAE 90.1-2010 in 2035. Code compliance 
during retrofit projects is particularly challengin and represents fertile ground for 
developing policy innovations. Appliance standards were applied to remove inefficient 
residential appliance technologies from the market. We also model a new 2017 motor 
standard that raises the minimum efficiency of industrial motors by 5% for small motors 
(50 horsepower or smaller) and by 3% for larger motors. It also requires systems using 
motors to save more energy, for example with variable speed drives, better controls, and 
reduced fluid distribution system losses. 
In addition, a broad set of information instruments was explored in the policy 
scenario. For homes, the Market Priming policy is a combination of several information 
options, including mandated disclosure of home energy consumption or performance at 
the point of sale or lease of a residential unit, home rating, green labeling, and other 




etc. For commercial buildings, the benchmarking policy requires utilities to submit whole 
building energy consumption data to a uniform databse accessible by building owners. 
Studies suggest that providing information can reduc  discount rates used in investment 
decisions from 3% to 22% (Coller & Williams, 1999; Goett, 1983). Thus, adjusting 
discount rates was the NEMS lever used for modeling Market Priming and 
Benchmarking.  
For industries, Plant and Technology Upgrade involves the provision of 
information about efficiency enhancement opportunities along with plant utility upgrades. 
This policy case takes into account efficiency improvement due to technology advances, 
R&D, process improvement, as well as non-energy-saving reasons such as replacing 
failed equipment, facility upgrades, etc. Information about improvement opportunities is 
shared and facility owners can follow the best practices to acquire energy savings when 
plant facilities and technologies get upgraded. In GT-NEMS modeling, the impact of this 
information is based on the potential efficiency improvements from the Industrial 
Assessment Centers (IAC) database.  
We do not model an exhaustive set of energy-efficiency policies. For example, 
our treatment of technological progress from an accelerated R&D policy is limited to 
partial coverage in the industrial sector. We also do not include utility programs (except 
for on-bill financing) and particular policies such as Qualifying Energy Conservation 
Bonds (QECB) and low-income weatherization programs. The target markets and 
technologies addressed by many omitted policies are likely to overlap to some extent 
with other policies that we do include (e.g., on-bill financing and the retrofit feature of 




savings in the U.S. is not complete. But it still provides valuable information about the 
electricity-savings potential and cost-effectiveness of energy-efficiency policies.   
In general, the eleven selected policies are modeled with distinct levers which 
reflect the differences in policy mechanisms (Table 6.3). It is clear that the levers chosen 
for modeling the policies match the three types of policy mechanisms. Testing the 
hypotheses is then based on the prediction of modeling the three types of policies. 
Table 6.3 Modeling Levers by Policy Type 
Policy Type Policy Mechanism Modeling Lever 
Financial  
• Appliance Incentives 
• On-bill Financing 
• Commercial 
Financing 
• CHP Incentives 
Reducing the cost • Providing subsidies to reduce 
upfront cost 
• Reducing the cost of capital 
Regulation 
• Aggressive Appliance 
Policy 
• Residential Building 
Codes 




• Setting performance floor for 
energy-using equipment and 
building envelope 
Information 
• Market Priming 
• Benchmarking 
• Plant and Technology 
Upgrade  
Offering information 
/training to invoke 
awareness, educate 
consumers, and assist 
adoption 
• Lowering the hurdle rate in 
consumer decisions 
• Increasing productivity due to 
learning  
 
The eleven energy-efficiency policies were first modeled in individual policy 
scenarios, with carefully selected NEMS levers to av id overlap. These policies were 
then modeled in a single integrated case to examine the policy dynamics and combined 




for an engineering-economic analysis of the energy-fficiency policies, while it is 
constrained by the pre-defined parameters and variables.  Although this approach may 
shed little light on the underlying psychology of plicy adoption and diffusion, it still 
stands as one of the best tools for evaluating policy impacts on energy demand and 
supply, cost-effectiveness, and carbon dioxide emission . 
6.1.3 Calculation of Levelized Cost of Electricity 
The LCOE of each policy was calculated to estimate the cost of achieving the 
electricity-savings potentials in individual policy scenarios. The calculation of LCOE is 
based on the total resource cost test, where costs include the incremental private 
investment in energy-efficiency measures, program costs for providing incentives, 
information, technical and other assistance, and program administrative costs.  
We estimate the magnitude of technology investment costs differently for the 
three end-use sectors. In the residential sector, costs are defined as the increased 
equipment expenditure extracted directly from GT-NEMS model output. Equipment 
expenditure are calculated separately for new purchases and replacements, as a function 
of the number of units purchased and purchase costsfor a range of technologies. In the 
commercial sector, investment costs are estimated separately for new purchases, 
replacements, and retrofits for approximately 350 technologies uniquely defined by 
technology type, fuel use, purchase price, energy efficiency, and time frame of 
availability in the marketplace. In each case, the calculation is based on GT-NEMS 
estimates of service demand for energy (SD), costs per unit of SD, and capacity factors. 
In industry, costs for CHP investments are based on the installed costs per kW of capacity 




are codified in GT-NEMS. Other costs for plant upgrades are based on multipliers 
derived from audit information produced by DOE’s Industrial Assessment Centers as 
described in Brown, et al. (2011). 
The LCOE is the weighted average cost, calculated by ividing the present value 
of total costs by total electricity savings, following the methodology described by the 
EPRI report (EPRI, 2009). In addition to electricity benefits, natural gas savings also 
result from some of the energy-efficiency policies. For example, the envelope upgrades 
from better building codes would reduce natural gas for home heating in some homes and 
electricity for home heating in others. Reduced air conditioning would occur in most new 
homes. We singled out the part of the cost needed to achieve electricity savings by 
proportioning total cost to the value of electricity versus natural gas savings through 2035. 
Present-value calculations for the levelized cost of electricity use a 3% discount rate from 
a social perspective and 7% discount rate for the private-sector assessment. This is 
consistent with Office of Management and Budget guidelines (OMB, 2002, 2009), which 
recommend the use of 3% and 7% discount rates when evaluating regulatory proposals. 
Our use of a 7% discount rate for evaluating the private perspective is less than the 10% 
value used in some other energy-efficiency studies such as McKinsey & Co.’s analysis 
(2009). Since the social appropriateness of policies is being examined, a sensitivity was 
conducted where all costs were discounted at 3% for LCOE calculations. 
Other main assumptions in the LCOE calculation include:  
• The consumption reduction in delivered electricity does not include 
electricity related losses in transmission and distribu ion. To account for 




part of savings. A multiplier of 1.07 (EIA, 2012) was applied to electricity 
savings to account for the benefit of avoided electricity related losses. 
• Program administrative costs are estimated specifically for five of the 
eleven policies, including the residential and commercial Building Codes, 
Benchmarking, CHP Incentives, and Plant and Technology Upgrade. 
Otherwise, they are estimated to be $0.13 per MMBtu energy saved (see 
the Appendix B and Brown, et al., 2009, for details on these estimates). 
• We assume the eleven policies start from 2012 and end in 2035. Any costs 
stimulated from the policies occur through 2035.  
• These energy-efficiency policies are assumed have residual benefits after 
the policies end. Specifically, electricity savings are modeled to degrade at 
a linear rate of 5% after 2035, such that benefits from the policy have 
ended by 2055. 
In addition to examining each of the eleven energy-efficiency policies 
individually, all eleven energy-efficiency options are modeled in the Integrated Policy 
scenario to explore the combined effects of these policies. By comparing the Integrated 
Policy scenario and the reference case we estimate the achievable potential in electricity 
efficiency and its economic effects. 
6.2 The Achievable Potential 
In the reference case, electricity consumption is forecasted to grow at an average 
rate of 0.8% per year and to rise to 4,481 TWh in 2035. In the Integrated Policy case, 




consumption down to 0.4% per year. U.S. ratepayers could benefit from these policies, 
saving 261 TWh of electricity in 2020, and 457 TWh in 2035 (Figure 6.3).  
The electricity savings potential is forecasted to come largely from the residential 
sector, which is consistent with the fact that we examined more residential policies (5) 
than commercial and industrial policies (3 each). From 2012 to 2035, electricity savings 
can accumulate to 3,713 TWh, 2,085 TWh, and 1,270 TWh for residential, commercial, 
and industrial users, respectively. In addition to the reductions in consumption, electricity 
is also generated by industrial CHP systems to satisfy on-site demands with the excess 
being sold back to the grid. It is estimated that about 322 TWh of electricity are produced 
by CHP systems, 22% of which is sold back to the grid (the rest is consumed at the 
industrial plant) in 2020. 
 





With the selected energy-efficiency policies, GT-NEMS predicts high per capita 
electricity savings, averaging at 763 kWh for the U.S. Analysis of the regional difference 
suggests that the East South Central, West South Central, and South Atlantic divisions 
have higher per capita electricity savings potential th n other regions of the nation.  
Our assessment of the achievable energy-efficiency potential, 10.2% of electricity 
savings in 2035, is comparable to estimates reported by some other studies, but less than 
estimates reported by other studies. Previous studies have used different time frames in 
their analysis, resulting in different estimates. For comparison, we calculated the 
compound annual saving rate to levelize the estimations by study time period. These 
annual saving rates range from 0.36% to 0.88% for achievable potential, while our 
estimation is 0.45% per year. In contrast, the saving rates for estimates of economic and 
technical potentials are generally higher, ranging from 0.36% to 2.26%. This estimation 
of savings potential is above and beyond the magnitude of energy savings to date. 
According to an analysis of electric efficiency prog ams in 2010, existing programs are 
saving the nation about 0.49% per year, while 9 state  re saving more than 1%/year of 
their retail sales (Foster, Chittum, Hayes, Neubauer, Nowak, Vaidyanathan, Farley, 
Schultz, Sullivan, et al., 2012).  
This estimation appears low relative to some of the achievable potential 
assessments. It does not include the naturally occurring adoption of energy-efficiency 
measures due to current policies, such as the Clean Air I terstate Rule, California’s 
Assembly Bill 32, the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, etc., because these policies 
are embedded in the reference projection of NEMS. The reference case also accounts for 




the naturally occurring potential, this estimation articulates a part of energy-efficiency 
potential that can be achieved with a sample of policies.  In the assessments that include 
the endogenous efficiency improvement, detaching the naturally occurring potential 
would result in lower energy savings (EPRI, 2009). 
6.3 Policy Supply Curve for Electricity End-use Efficiency 
Policy impacts on electricity efficiency and leveliz d costs of electricity saved 
were examined in eleven stand-alone scenarios constructed for each policy. The results 
are summarized in Table 6.4. The estimated electricity savings from individual policies 
sum up to reach 364 TWh in 2020, which is higher than the estimation from the 
Integrated Policy case (Figure 6.3). This indicates that part of the policy impacts cancels 
out when all energy efficiency policies are implemented together. Some of the policies 
target the same set of technologies, the same group of consumers, and the same barriers. 
It is quite possible that their ability to promote energy efficiency diminishes when 
multiple incentives co-exist. A related impact is the rebound effect, where energy usage 
increases when customers consume more energy in theI tegrated Policy case because of 
electricity bill reductions.  
The estimations of efficiency potential from individual policy scenarios were 
carefully studied against the estimation from the Int grated Policy case. This approach 
helps determine whether applying multiple policies at once would enhance or reduce the 
achievable energy-savings potential.  GT-NEMS estimates that the integrated energy-
savings potential is 24% less than the sum of the individual policy savings potentials 




addition, the rebound effect causes consumers to buy more energy services in the policy 
case with lower electricity rates.  
Table 6.4 Savings Potential and Levelized Cost of Electric End-Use Efficiency, by 
Policy 
Sector Policy Electricity Savings (TWh) LCOE a 
(cent/kWh) 2020 2035 
Residential  Appliance Incentives 17.6 35.5 6.7-8.0 
On-Bill Financing 20.2 33.4 6.6-7.4 
Building Codes 27.0 51.0 0.5-0.8 
Aggressive Appliance Policy 23.4 59.2 0.6-0.7 
Market Priming 136.9 164.1 2.7-3.6 
Commercial Financing 22.6 82.6  7.8-8.1 
Building Codes 11.1 46.3 3.4-4.6 
Benchmarking 44.3 107.0 0.9-1.4 
Industrial Motor Standard 8.4 12.3 2.4-3.9 
Plant and Technology Upgrade  7.6 21.7 3.0-4.8 
CHP Incentives 33.4 39.3 1.5-2.3 
a. The ranges for levelized costs result from discounting private cost at different rates: 7% 
and 3%. See Appendix B for details of levelized cost alculation. 
 
On the other hand, synergistic policy combinations could produce greater energy-
savings potential. For example, by providing better energy benchmarking data, 
consumers might be more responsive to an opportunity to secure low-cost financing to 
invest in more energy-efficient equipment. Such synergistic pairings have been 
Zrecognized by local policymakers who have matched benchmarking with mandated 
disclosure laws and with financing programs, (Cox, Brown, and Sun, 2013). Similarly, 
learning effects stimulated by a financing policy could reduce technology costs, leading 
to an enhanced response to information programs and accelerating adoption of the 
efficient equipment. While the NEMS tool is somewhat limited in this regard, the results 
from the Integrated Policy scenario can help us understand the dynamics among the 




In particular, by using the integrated macro-economic odule in GT-NEMS, we are able 
to model price effects across sectors, allowing the price suppression impact of energy 
efficiency to be quantified, while also incorporating rebound effects. 
Although the target technologies, barriers, and energy consumers may be common 
to two or more policies, the modeling of policy integration is straightforward since the 
modeling levers for each individual policy have no overlap. The distinct modeling levers 
are the result of diverse policy mechanisms: direct subsidy/financing mechanisms, 
regulatory requirements, or information/technical assistance. By doing this, the eleven 
policies are well represented in GT-NEMS modeling.  In addition, the non-energy 
impacts of these policies were examined with GT-NEMS by incorporating feedback 
loops between multiple segments of the economy. Using the IHS Global Dynamics 
general equilibrium model, the GT-NEMS analysis optimizes energy prices and 
quantities across energy fuels and across sectors of end-use demand. 
A careful reconciliation of the estimates of potential electricity savings from 
individual policies versus the Integrated Policy scenario reveals the dynamics among 
energy-efficiency policies. Together with the leveliz d cost estimations, the reconciled 
electricity-savings potentials produce a policy supply curve (Figure 6.4). Currently, the 
national average electricity price for rate payers is approximately 9.0 cent/kWh. Taking 
this price as a benchmark, all eleven policies are cost-effective (i.e., having LCOEs lower 





Figure 6.4 Supply Curve for Electricity Efficiency Resources in 2020 7
 
All financial policies except for the CHP Incentives have levelized costs higher 
than information-based and regulatory policies. CHP Incentives also represent the 
industrial policy with the largest electricity-savings potential. This policy provides a 10-
year ITC to reduce capital costs for CHP systems to utilize waste heat in industrial 
processes. With the incentives, installed CHP capacity is estimated to increase by 20% in 
2020. This CHP capacity expansion drives up natural gas consumption and therefore 
                                                      
7 The weighted average wholesale price is derived from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) data which 





increases natural gas prices slightly while lowering electricity rates.  A similar 
phenomenon is documented by Kim, Baer, and Brown (2013) .  
The greatest electricity savings in commercial buildings comes from the 
benchmarking policy. This policy mandates the provision of energy performance 
information for U.S. commercial buildings. Utilities are required to submit energy data to 
a uniform database accessible to building owners and te ants. The compliance effort is 
estimated to cost utilities about $2.28 million (present value, discounted at 7%) in 2020. 
Investment in energy-efficient building equipment increases significantly in the policy 
scenario. Taking the total costs to utilities and consumers into account, the policy is 
highly cost-effective with a levelized cost ranging from 0.9 to 1.4 cent/kWh.  
Market Priming is the energy-efficiency policy with t e largest savings potential 
and relatively low levelized cost. Information-based instruments, such as green labeling 
and leasing, home energy audits, etc., when coupled with regulations that mandate the 
disclosure of home energy performance with home ratings, are able to promote inclusion 
of energy efficiency when selling or renting. Efficiency improvements from these 
policies can generate noticeable home equity premiums (Fuerst & McAllister, 2011; 
Zheng, et al., 2012). Because of the potential policy impacts on efficiency improvements 
and equity value, the U.S. Office of Management and Bu get (OMB) suggests that 
regulations designed to alleviate asymmetric information should be given preference over 
other measures, as a general rule-of-thumb (OMB, 2003). 
Overall, the policy supply curve suggests that a potential of roughly 208 TWh of 




the average wholesale price. Typical policy instruments include building energy codes, 
standards, and information policies.  
The policy supply curve is created by accumulating individual measures that are 
applied to specific policy scenarios with savings as essments and cost estimations. It is 
useful to align options to illustrate energy-efficiency opportunities and compare the costs. 
This policy supply curve does not intend to reflect diminishing returns. Rather, it intends 
to encourage in-depth analysis of policy options for energy efficiency. 
The policy supply curve also indicates that regulatory policies have relatively low 
levelized costs and financial policies have relatively high LCOEs (Table 6.5). This is 
consistent with a previous study of energy efficieny in the U.S. South, which found that 
the two least cost-effective policies involved financial subsidies (Brown, et al., 2010). 
The CHP Incentives, as an exception, offers subsidie  for industrial CHP systems with 
low levelized cost because its generation can satisfy most on-site electricity demand, and 
even with excess being sold back to the grid. 
Table 6.5 The LCOE and Electricity Savings by Policy Type 
Policy Type LCOE  
 in cents/kWha 
Electricity Savings 
in 2020 (TWh) 
Electricity Savings 
in 2035 (TWh) 
Financing 6.2-6.4 93.8 (3.3%) 190.8 (5.9%) 
Regulation 1.3-1.8 69.9 (2.4%) 168.8 (5.3%) 
Information  2.1-3.0 188.8 (6.6%) 292.8(9.1%) 
a. The lower bound is calculated based on the 3% discount rate for public and 
private costs. The upper bound is calculated based on the 7% discount rate for 





The weighted average LCOE of all energy efficiency policies ranging from 3.4 - 
3.9 cents/kWh is in the middle range of cost estimates from previous studies. Cost 
estimations of energy efficiency depend on accurate ass ssments of energy savings, 
which can be problematic because of free ridership (Gellings et al., 2006). Alcott and 
Greenstone (2012) also question ex ante estimates of cost-effectiveness by noting that 
programs typically reduce electricity demand by only 1-2%, which does not suggest a 
large energy-efficiency gap. Alternatively, it could be that energy-efficiency programs 
have simply been underfunded and unable to completely address market failures. 
In 2035, the predicted potential of electricity savings for financing policies is 
about 5.9% of electricity demand, 5.3% for regulations, and 9.1% for information 
policies. The estimated levelized costs of electricity for the three types of policies are 
below the retail prices for electricity.  The result  suggest that we do not reject the 
hypotheses 3.1 – 3.3 because the policies are effective in promoting energy efficiency 
with costs acceptable to consumers. 
6.4 Policy Impacts on the Energy Market  
Generally, the energy-efficiency policies are projected to reduce electricity retail 
rates. Although the price decreases are not large,  paired t-test of differences between the 
policy and reference cases, using residential, commercial and industrial rates for each of 
the nine census divisions and the national average in 2020 as observations, suggests that 
the price difference is significant (p-value = 0.002).  
Although the degree of rate decrease is small, savings in energy expenditure is 




about $26.2 billion (2009$) on their energy bills in 2020. Similarly, commercial and 
industrial customers would experience bill savings of $9.3 billion (2009$) and $4.8 
billion (2009$) respectively in 2020. 
Long-term effect suggests that electricity rates drop across the board in the 
Integrated Policy case in comparison with the Reference case after 2025. In addition, low 
consumption levels and low electricity retail rates impact the power sector’s future supply 
investments. Table 6.6 suggests that fewer power plants (6.8% fewer in 2020 and 11.2% 
fewer in 2035) would be built as a result of the enrgy-efficiency policies in the 
Integrated Policy case. Natural gas power plants experience the greatest declines in added 
capacity relative to the reference case (8.8% less g neration in 2020, and 24.7% less 
generation in 2035).  
Table 6.6 Electricity Generation by Source in the U.S. (in TWh) 
Fuel Type 
















Coal 1,812 1,879 1,744 (-7.2%) 2,082 1,914 (-8.1%) 
Petroleum 39 39 37 (-5.8%) 41 40 (-4.1%) 
Natural Gas 779 696 635 (-8.8%) 914 688 (-24.7%) 
Nuclear  803 877 828 (-5.6%) 874 826 (-5.5%) 
Renewables  371 519 497 (-4.4%) 567 510 (-10.1%) 
Total 3,804 4,013 3,741 (-6.8%) 4,483 3,981 (-11.2%) 
 
In the Integrated Policy case, electricity generated from renewable sources does 
not decrease as much as generation from other sources in 2020. By 2035, however 
renewables are reduced proportionately more than col or nuclear (10.1% versus 8.1% 




TWh, when compared with the reference case. If natural gas hydrofracking continues to 
produce low-cost gas in the U.S., coal, nuclear and re ewables might be further reduced 
while combined cycle natural gas plants would likely r tain more of their market share. 
Moreover, most of the eleven energy-efficiency policies have spillover benefits 
that may also cause significant savings in natural gas and other energy sources. In 2020, 
the U.S. could save 0.9 quadrillion Btu of natural g s due to energy-efficiency policies. 
The natural gas savings could grow to 2.3 quadrillion Btu in 2035, accounting for 40% of 
the total energy-savings potential.   
 
6.5 Policy Impacts on Carbon Emissions and Energy Intensity 
These sizable reductions in energy consumption are associated with reductions in 
carbon dioxide emissions. GT-NEMS forecasts that the energy-efficiency policies can 
slow down the growth in carbon dioxide emissions. More specifically, the reference case 
projects CO2 emissions reaching 5,802 million tonnes i  2020, and 6,316 million tonnes 
in 2035. The Integrated Policy case forecasts CO2 emissions reaching 5,584 million 
tonnes in 2020, and 5,990 million tonnes in 2035. This is equivalent to 3.8% of emission 
reduction in 2020, and 5.2% of emission reduction in 2035 (Figure 6.5). Based on the 
social cost of carbon, we estimate the benefit of av ided carbon emissions to be $6.0 
Billion (in 2009$) in 2020 and $12.2 Billion (in 2009$) in 2035. 
Our eleven energy-efficiency policies not only reduce carbon emissions, but also 
decrease the carbon intensity of the economy by targe ing the carbon-intensive electricity 
sector. GT-NEMS output of per capita CO2 emission suggests that energy-efficiency 




economic activities, carbon intensity decreases from 333 mmtCO2/million $GDP in the 
reference case to 321 mmtCO2/million $GDP in the Int grated Policy case in 2020. 
 
Figure 6.5 Projected CO2 Emissions, Reference versus Policy Case 
 
The impact of energy-efficiency policies on different sectors of the economy can 
be compared through energy intensity metrics. Residential building energy intensity is 
measured by primary energy per household, while commercial building energy intensity 
is measured by primary energy use per square footage of floor space. The energy 
intensity of the whole economy is represented by primary energy use per gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
An electricity intensity measures was constructed for the industrial sector. The 
three industrial energy efficiency policies particularly target electricity usages, which 




























impact of these policies on energy intensity cannot be well reflected by the metric, energy 
per dollar of shipment. We constructed an electricity intensity factor, defined as 
electricity per dollar of shipment, to quantify industrial electricity efficiency.  
Figure 6.6 suggests that energy-efficiency policies and programs would reduce 
household energy intensity more than the energy intensity of other end-use sectors. For 
example, in 2020, energy use per household decreases by 10.6%, while energy use per 
square footage of commercial building decreases by 4.8%, and electricity per dollar of 
shipment decreases by 5.3%. For the economy as a whole, energy use per GDP declines 
by only 3.2% in the same year. 
 
Figure 6.6 Decline in Energy Intensity by Economic Sectors 
GT-NEMS incorporates national economic trends. The en rgy-efficiency policies 
have a negligible negative impact on GDP. The natiol GDP is estimated by NEMS to 




hours of delay in GDP growth. In 2035, the GDP is estimated to drop by $52 Billion 
(0.18%), which is equivalent to about 30 hours of delay in GDP growth. 
The higher equipment investments prompted by the eleven policies would divert 
the capital that could have been invested in other economic activities. Results from GT-
NEMS suggest that this reallocation of capital resources would affect the national GDP, 
albeit to a small extent. In addition, the policies would reduce energy consumption and 
production, which also has GDP consequences. As an energy-economic model, GT-
NEMS is capable of modeling the macroeconomic impact of any energy policy by 
incorporating Global Insight’s model of the U.S. economy in its Macroeconomic Activity 
Module (MAM). Both energy demand and supply sides interact with MAM through a 
Cobb-Douglas production function to calculate the national GDP.  However, the IHS 
Global Insights model assumes the U.S. economy has a 0.07 energy elasticity, which 
means that a 1% decrease in energy supply decreases potential GDP by 0.07% (EIA, 
2012), but unlike input-output models the reduction in energy expenditures is not 
recycled back into the economy to reflect re-spending of the energy savings. As a result, 
NEMS tends to produce estimates of decreased GDP when energy-efficiency investments 
increase (Laitner, 2013).  
6.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
With a well-designed sample of policies, we estimate that the U.S. could cost-
effectively achieve significant electricity savings. By 2035, the demand for 457 TWh (or 
10.2% of the reference case forecast by EIA) could be eliminated by investments in more 
efficient technologies. Driven by policy, this achievable potential for greater end-use 




potentials. Our review of the literature, however, indicates that this estimated potential 
for the U.S. is comparable to many estimates of the achievable potential for increased 
electric end-use efficiency at various scales of analysis, ranging from the metropolitan to 
the national.  
The policy supply curve illustrates that each of the eleven policies evaluated here 
are cost-effective with levelized costs lower than the average retail prices for electricity. 
Regulatory and information-based policies are particularly cost-effective, while financing 
policies tend to have higher LCOEs, although there are exceptions to this pattern.  
The estimated efficiency potentials and levelized costs suggest that we do not 
reject the hypotheses of the three types of policies ar  able to generate significant 
electricity savings in the future. 
The electricity savings benefit of energy-efficiency policies is accompanied by 
other benefits, including natural gas savings, savings of other fuel types, and reduced 
carbon emissions. In addition, the eleven energy-effici ncy policies are able to drive 
electricity retail prices down in many regions and produce large energy bill savings for 
consumers. The electric power sector is also affected by these policies, in that generation 
growth is slowed in the Integrated Policy case, reducing the need for capital-intensive 
new generation. Overall, these policies are able to decrease the energy and carbon 
intensity of the U.S. with no significant impact onGDP growth. 
In sum, this dissertation offers a novel assessment of achievable potential and an 
in-depth analysis of the impacts of energy-efficieny policies in the U.S. The policy 




energy efficiency. However, this engineering-economic approach is constrained by our 
choice of policies, which are characterized by pre-defined parameters of the modeling 
tool.  Generalization of our findings to specific markets within the U.S. will require 








State policymakers are facing challenges in population growth, economic 
development, environment protection, and climate change. Many of the issues are related 
to the use of energy, including excessive demand for energy, the depleting reserves of 
fossil fuels, air pollution, energy-water nexus limitations, and CO2 emissions. In dealing 
with the energy related problems, energy efficiency serves as an important solution to 
meet the fast-growing energy demand. As the “low hanging fruit”, energy efficiency has 
been reducing the energy intensity of our economy with low costs, successfully avoiding 
a large amount of energy consumption in the end-use sectors.   The U.S. would consume 
twice as much energy if there had been no improvement in energy efficiency since the 
1970’s. With the long-term concern of energy security and fossil fuel conservation, 
energy efficiency helps alleviate the burdens of many countries for energy consumption 
and energy imports. 
Recently, the energy efficiency market is growing fast. In the U.S., both the 
private and public sectors are paying more attentions t  energy efficiency. Utilities, 
including investor-owned utility companies and utilities operated by rate-payers, started 
to find energy efficiency makes a good business case and started to invest heavily in 
energy efficiency. Federal, state and local governmnts have made various policy 
interventions to promote energy efficiency. Consumers who invest in energy efficient 
products find shortened pay-back times when they receiv  support from government 




According to the Sustainable Energy in the America 2014 Factbook, the energy 
efficiency market attracts $12 billion of investment from the public and private sectors in 
2012 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2014). Energy effici ncy has been a success in 
the past few decades, and probably will continue its success in the future. Energy 
efficiency is not just the reflection of ideology or environmental awareness, but also a 
good business case providing great benefits. Becaus of this, most of the states turn to 
energy efficiency when faced with energy-related problems, as well as problems in 
economic development and climate mitigation.  
7.1 State Drivers of Policy Innovation 
States have adopted distinct approaches to promote energy efficiency with policy 
interventions. The state level panel data is considere  as the quasi-experimental 
treatments for energy efficiency policies. In fact, states adopt distinct strategies in 
promoting energy efficiency, providing sufficient variations in policy treatments across 
states and across years. This dissertation is interested in state behavior of adopting a 
certain type of energy efficiency policy, defined as policy innovation. The quantification 
of policies depends on the specific policies and programs. Five policies were selected and 
classified into three types: financial, regulation, a d information policies.  Policy 
innovation is either quantified in interval variables (EE program budget and EERS targets) 
or coded into ordinal variables (all other policies).  
The dissertation investigates the factors leading to the differences in state policy 
strategies. It assumes that constituent pressure affects state decisions of policy innovation. 
Constituent pressure is measured by the seriousness of problems in electricity 




models with state fixed effects were developed to test the second hypothesis that different 
constituent interests lead to different types of policy innovation. The models also 
examine how policy innovations affect each other, while controlling for state 
socioeconomic factors, state fiscal capacity and ideology.  
The results suggest that financial incentives are co related with electricity 
consumption and unemployment rate. State unemployment rate is positively related to the 
investment in energy efficiency. States with high electricity consumption invest less in 
energy efficiency programs and are less likely to ad pt building energy codes. Other 
constituent interests in electricity price and CO2 emissions have no significant impact on 
policy innovation. In addition, the adoption of EERS, Decoupling and the Lead by 
Example program is not influenced by any of the constituent pressures.  
However, the Internal Determinants models do find that policy innovations are 
affected by other internal state determinants, such as GSP, state fiscal capacity, 
environmental awareness, and state government ideology.    
The dynamics among policy innovations are statistically significant. State 
spending/budget on energy efficiency programs and buil ing codes are positively related 
to EERS targets.  However, EERS targets are negatively related to the adoption of Lead 
by Example programs. This indicates that states tend to choose one policy from EERS 
and Lead by Example, rather than taking a combined approach of adopting both policies. 
7.2 Significant Impacts of Policy Innovation 
States undertake a variety of policy efforts to promote energy efficiency, 




mysteries and misleading arguments cloud the relationship between policy and energy 
efficiency. Controversy exists on whether the energy efficiency programs are effective 
and whether the policies actually improved energy effici ncy. Many studies evaluate the 
savings from energy efficiency programs, but skeptics question the methodology of these 
studies and the credibility of policies.   
The second section of the dissertation investigates th  policy dynamics with 
energy efficiency, trying to examine the policy impacts on energy efficiency. This task 
faces two challenges: a) how to measure energy efficiency; and b) how to quantify policy. 
In measuring energy efficiency, many studies construct and use energy efficiency 
indicators such as energy intensity, per capita energy usage, and total factor efficiency 
index. Unlike the previous studies, this dissertation adopts the concept of index 
decomposition and separates the efficiency effect from the activity and structure effects 
in electricity productivity. It uses electricity productivity in a fixed effect model and 
controls for the activity and structure factors. By doing this, the estimation represents the 
effects of the policy variables on the actual underlining efficiency component of 
electricity productivity. 
The impact of policy innovation was tested with fixed effect models to account 
for the unobserved state fixed effects.  Controlling for the activity and structure effects, 
policy innovation, together with electricity price, is tested with linear regression to 
explain the efficiency effects of electricity productivity. Results suggest that financial 
incentives and building energy codes have significant positive impacts on energy 
efficiency. Building codes also have positive time-lagged effects. Other policies, such as 




efficiency. However, the annualized targets of EERS tend to have negative time-lagged 
impacts. 
The caveat is that the state panel data is biased du  to heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence, although the fixed effect model uses 
robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. The impacts of policy innovation 
estimated by the two-way fixed effect model are confirmed by the fixed effect model 
with log forms and the feasible generalized least squares model which return similar 
results.    
7.3 Achievable Potential of Energy Efficiency 
The third part of the dissertation takes the perspectiv  into the future to explore 
the potential of efficiency improvement. Some economists argue that energy efficiency is 
“tapped out” because the market has already exploited all cost-effective potentials. This 
dissertation questions this claim and tests the hypothesis that financial, regulatory, and 
information policies are able to continue driving energy efficiency improvement in the 
future.  
Energy modeling was applied to eleven selected policies to represent the most 
influential financial incentives, regulations and iformation programs. The achievable 
potential was estimated using predictions of energy consumption assuming the selected 
policies are implemented. Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) was estimated for each of 
the policies. The results suggest that the three typ s of policies are able to save 5.3-9.1% 
of electricity in 2035, with levelized costs lower than the retail prices of electricity. The 




efficiency.   More specifically, information and regulatory policies are more cost-
effective than financial incentives. 
It is recommended that states adopt a combined appro ch of financial incentives, 
regulations, and information programs to improve enrgy efficiency. Financial incentives 
may require significant capital investment, but the benefits in energy savings will exceed 
the costs in the long run. Regulations such as building energy codes, EERS, and 
decoupling, are also recommended because they are en blers and mandates with very low 
costs. However, deliberation and scrutiny is required n the design of regulations.    
In general, the dissertation offers an in-depth investigation of the relationship 
between policy innovation and electric end-use efficiency. It answers three related 
questions: a) what drives policy innovation? b) was policy innovation relevant in the past? 
and, c) will policy innovation be relevant in the future? Findings from the statistical and 
energy models suggest that different constituent cocerns lead to different strategies in 
policy innovation. Financial, regulatory, and information policies have been increasing 
electricity productivity in the past, and they are estimated to continue driving energy 
efficiency improvement in the future.  
This dissertation represents the first attempt to evaluate policy impacts on energy 
efficiency by decomposing electricity productivity. It provides rigorous statistical 
analysis of state panels covering the most important energy efficiency policies. It models 
a relatively comprehensive set of policies to estima e the achievable potential in energy 
efficiency. However, the statistical models and energy models are subject to limitations 




Appendix A. Quantification of the Policy Variables 












(Million $)  
2008 Total 
Budget* 
(Million $)  
2009 Total 
Budget 
(Million $)  
2010 Total 
Budgets 





Alabama $0.44 $0.46 $2.29 $2.73 $9.1 $17.70 10.7 
Alaska $0.10 $0.16 $0.30 $0.36 $0.0 $0.40 0.0 
Arizona $4.00 $16.40 $31.90 $38.03 $49.2 $92.30 126.1 
Arkansas $0.23 $0.00 $1.57 $1.87 $7.7 $13.10 25.2 
California $380.01 $357.00 $755.28 $900.52 $998.3 $1,158.10 1,162.5 
Colorado $13.72 $11.00 $15.29 $18.23 $46.7 $64.70 64.1 
Connecticut $58.10 $69.60 $95.72 $114.12 $73.4 $126.90 138.3 
Delaware $0.00 $0.00 $0.21 $0.25 $0.0 $3.60 3.3 
District of 
Columbia $2.20 $8.50 $0.00 $0.00 $12.5 $9.40 7.7 
Florida $72.01 $67.00 $92.56 $110.36 $132.6 $123.20 188.5 
Georgia $1.36 $10.00 $4.82 $5.75 $21.3 $21.60 21.7 
Hawaii $9.19 $12.90 $16.56 $19.74 $35.5 $19.30 35.6 
Idaho $7.02 $20.42 $16.64 $19.84 $31.5 $36.10 39.9 
Illinois $3.00 $3.22 $0.83 $0.99 $89.9 $165.50 115.7 
Indiana $2.06 $3.73 $4.04 $4.81 $13.6 $16.50 58.2 
Iowa $28.83 $52.24 $56.49 $67.36 $55.6 $67.80 88.8 
Kansas $0.00 $0.34 $6.78 $8.09 $3.7 $5.40 9.1 
Kentucky $4.15 $5.94 $17.87 $21.31 $17.2 $27.10 28.2 
Louisiana $0.32 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $2.3 $0.00 9.0 
Maine $13.12 $11.00 $16.88 $20.13 $20.8 $14.00 22.8 
Maryland $0.05 $0.09 $2.52 $3.01 $38.0 $88.80 156.4 
Massachusetts $133.33 $125.00 $120.16 $143.26 $183.8 $301.90 453.0 
Michigan $8.00 $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $50.1 $91.50 127.6 
Minnesota $55.78 $48.11 $91.24 $108.78 $111.2 $160.20 191.2 
Mississippi $0.50 $0.44 $0.31 $0.37 $9.2 $12.50 4.9 
Missouri $0.93 $2.18 $1.32 $1.57 $22.7 $40.50 47.2 
Montana $8.00 $8.31 $6.66 $7.94 $13.2 $8.90 21.1 
Nebraska $4.35 $0.87 $0.95 $1.13 $7.1 $13.00 16.5 
Nevada $8.47 $24.00 $28.27 $33.71 $41.9 $45.00 47.2 
New 
Hampshire $15.12 $17.54 $18.68 $22.27 $15.2 $26.30 25.6 
New Jersey $92.75 $83.18 $95.91 $114.36 $132.3 $198.10 225.0 
New Mexico $2.00 $1.00 $2.96 $3.53 $14.4 $17.50 26.2 
New York $147.19 $224.90 $241.54 $287.99 $378.3 $583.60 1,073.2 
North 




North Dakota $0.47 $0.51 $0.67 $0.80 $0.1 $1.30 0.0 
Ohio $16.20 $28.76 $28.76 $34.29 $18.6 $152.80 134.4 
Oklahoma $0.32 $0.02 $0.17 $0.21 $3.8 $27.90 39.6 
Oregon $62.89 $63.32 $69.11 $82.40 $84.7 $91.10 171.8 
Pennsylvania $3.45 $3.81 $4.07 $4.85 $96.9 $110.00 225.0 
Rhode Island $13.99 $17.18 $17.94 $21.39 $29.5 $32.10 54.2 
South 
Carolina $4.92 $5.88 $8.93 $10.64 $14.6 $12.30 16.3 
South Dakota $0.54 $0.62 $2.35 $2.80 $2.7 $3.50 4.3 
Tennessee $10.94 $5.48 $9.97 $11.88 $24.2 $48.90 36.7 
Texas $80.00 $57.80 $79.50 $94.79 $98.7 $128.40 144.1 
Utah $16.45 $16.80 $13.95 $16.63 $45.4 $55.50 49.2 
Vermont $14.00 $15.81 $23.69 $28.25 $30.7 $34.00 40.7 
Virginia $0.00 $0.08 $0.00 $0.00 $0.4 $0.20 0.1 
Washington $88.52 $113.29 $126.68 $151.04 $146.5 $184.90 274.9 
West Virginia $0.99 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.0 $0.00 0.0 
Wisconsin $53.73 $73.29 $80.58 $96.08 $101.1 $92.30 92.3 
Wyoming $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $2.6 $4.30 5.4 
*The 2008 budgets are estimations based on the growth ate of 19.23% (data source: 
ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard 2006, 2008, 2 09, 2010, 2011, and 2012) 
 
Table A.2 State Electricity Efficiency Program Budget as Percent of Utility Revenue 
State 2004 2006 2007 2008* 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.06% 0.12% 0.20% 0.13% 
Alaska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 
Arizona 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.60% 0.70% 1.26% 1.74% 
Arkansas 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.12% 0.23% 0.38% 0.70% 
California 1.3% 1.1% 2.2% 2.53% 2.86% 3.42% 3.35% 
Colorado 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.76% 1.11% 1.35% 1.28% 
Connecticut 1.8% 1.5% 2.0% 1.68% 1.36% 2.18% 2.83% 
Delaware 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.22% 0.25% 
District of 
Columbia 0.7% 0.7% 0.0% 0.40% 0.79% 0.57% 0.52% 
Florida 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.46% 0.52% 0.50% 0.77% 
Georgia 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.10% 0.19% 0.16% 0.16% 
Hawaii 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 1.18% 1.65% 0.77% 1.13% 
Idaho 1.8% 1.8% 1.2% 1.67% 2.13% 2.43% 2.67% 
Illinois 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.36% 0.72% 1.23% 0.91% 
Indiana 0.1% 0.1% 0.05% 0.12% 0.18% 0.18% 0.69% 
Iowa 1.1% 1.7% 1.4% 1.59% 1.78% 1.93% 2.55% 
Kansas 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.16% 0.12% 0.14% 0.25% 
Kentucky 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.35% 0.30% 0.43% 0.44% 




Maine 1.1% 0.8% 1.0% 1.15% 1.30% 1.16% 1.59% 
Maryland 0.0% 0.0% 0.06% 0.26% 0.46% 1.07% 2.05% 
Massachusetts 2.2% 1.5% 1.4% 1.80% 2.20% 3.69% 5.77% 
Michigan 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.27% 0.53% 0.88% 1.50% 
Minnesota 1.4% 1.0% 1.7% 1.95% 2.19% 2.80% 3.24% 
Mississippi 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.12% 0.23% 0.29% 0.11% 
Missouri 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.20% 0.39% 0.60% 0.67% 
Montana 1.0% 0.9% 0.5% 0.83% 1.16% 0.82% 1.86% 
Nebraska 0.1% 0.1% 0.05% 0.20% 0.35% 0.58% 0.71% 
Nevada 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.99% 1.18% 1.37% 1.55% 
New 
Hampshire 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 1.13% 0.95% 1.40% 1.60% 
New Jersey 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 1.14% 1.18% 1.63% 2.05% 
New Mexico 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.51% 0.82% 0.94% 1.31% 
New York 1.0% 1.1% 1.6% 1.67% 1.73% 2.47% 4.69% 
North Carolina 0.0% 0.0% 0.06% 0.33% 0.60% 0.38% 0.50% 
North Dakota 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.11% 0.01% 0.12% 0.00% 
Ohio 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.17% 0.14% 1.09% 0.96% 
Oklahoma 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.05% 0.10% 0.64% 0.85% 
Oregon 2.2% 2.0% 2.1% 2.22% 2.34% 2.60% 4.51% 
Pennsylvania 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.35% 0.70% 0.71% 1.44% 
Rhode Island 1.6% 1.6% 1.9% 2.28% 2.66% 2.92% 5.34% 
South Carolina 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.22% 0.23% 0.17% 0.23% 
South Dakota 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.52% 0.34% 0.39% 0.46% 
Tennessee 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.35% 0.29% 0.55% 0.40% 
Texas 0.2% 0.2% 0.9% 0.60% 0.29% 0.39% 0.43% 
Utah 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 1.62% 2.44% 2.86% 3.19% 
Vermont 2.2% 2.4% 3.4% 3.90% 4.40% 4.57% 5.64% 
Virginia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Washington 1.9% 2.2% 2.6% 2.54% 2.48% 3.35% 4.36% 
West Virginia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wisconsin 1.1% 1.3% 1.2% 1.42% 1.64% 1.37% 1.31% 
Wyoming 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.13% 0.26% 0.41% 0.47% 
*The 2008 percentage numbers are the average of 2007 and 2009 percentages (Data 
source: ACEEE State Energy Efficiency Scorecard 2006, 2 08, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 
2012) 
Table A.3 Annualized Energy Saving Target of EERS 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Alaska 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Arizona 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.25% 
Arkansas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 




Colorado 0.00% 0.18% 0.18% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.80% 
Connecticut 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Delaware 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
District of 
Columbia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Florida 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 
Georgia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Hawaii 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.50% 
Idaho 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 
Illinois 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Indiana 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 0.80% 
Iowa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.50% 
Kansas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Kentucky 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Louisiana 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Maine 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 
Maryland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.80% 1.80% 1.80% 1.80% 
Massachusetts 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.40% 1.40% 2.00% 
Michigan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.50% 0.75% 
Minnesota 0.00% 1.00% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 
Mississippi 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Missouri 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Montana 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Nebraska 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Nevada 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 
New Hampshire 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
New Jersey 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
New Mexico 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 0.70% 
New York 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 1.90% 
North Carolina 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.75% 0.75% 0.25% 0.25% 
North Dakota 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Ohio 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.50% 0.70% 
Oklahoma 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Oregon 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.80% 0.87% 
Pennsylvania 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 
Rhode Island 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.25% 1.50% 
South Carolina 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
South Dakota 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Tennessee 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Texas 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.30% 0.30% 0.40% 0.40% 
Utah 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Vermont 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.80% 2.00% 2.25% 2.25% 
Virginia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Washington 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 




Wisconsin 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wyoming 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Table A.4 State Score of Decoupling Mechanisms 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Arkansas 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
California 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Colorado 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
Connecticut 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Delaware 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 
District of 
Columbia 0 0 1 0 3 3 3 
Florida 1 1 1 0 2 2 3 
Georgia 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 
Hawaii 0 0 1 2 3 2 3 
Idaho 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Illinois 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 0 0 3 3 2 2 3 
Iowa 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 
Kentucky 0 0 3 2 3 3 3 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Maine 1 1 1 0 3 3 3 
Maryland 0 0 0 2 2 2 3 
Massachusetts 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Michigan 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
Minnesota 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Mississippi 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 0 0 1 0 2 2 3 
Montana 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
New 
Hampshire 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 
New Jersey 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 
New Mexico 0 0 1 0 3 3 3 
New York 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 
North 
Carolina 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
Oregon 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 
Pennsylvania 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Rhode Island 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 
South 
Carolina 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 
Utah 0 1 1 0 3 3 3 
Vermont 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 
Washington 1 1 1 0 2 2 3 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Note: the scores of state decoupling policy are basd on the three legged stool: the 
recovery of administrative and program costs, decoupling and the recovery of lost 
revenue, and performance incentives.  Each of the three parts has a score of 1. The 
maximum is 3. 
 
Table A.5 State Score on the Stringency of Building E ergy Codes 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Alaska 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 
Arizona 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 
Arkansas 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 
California 8 8 8 10 10 10 12 
Colorado 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 
Connecticut 6 6 6 6 7 7 10 
Delaware 4 4 4 4 10 10 10 
District of 
Columbia 5 6 6 4 10 10 11 
Florida 6 6 6 10 9 9 10 
Georgia 6 6 6 8 7 8 12 
Hawaii 2 2 2 3 3 7 10 
Idaho 6 6 7 8 7 7 10 
Illinois 4 4 6 6 6 10 10 
Indiana 2 2 2 2 3 10 9 
Iowa 6 6 7 8 7 10 10 
Kansas 6 6 6 4 3 3 2 
Kentucky 5 5 6 8 7 7 9 




Maine 3 3 3 4 10 10 10 
Maryland 6 6 7 8 10 10 12 
Massachusetts 3 3 3 5 10 10 12 
Michigan 0 0 0 3 7 8 10 
Minnesota 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
Montana 6 6 7 6 5 10 10 
Nebraska 6 6 6 6 5 5 10 
Nevada 6 6 6 6 7 7 10 
New 
Hampshire 4 4 8 8 10 10 10 
New Jersey 3 3 8 8 7 10 10 
New Mexico 6 6 6 8 7 10 10 
New York 4 4 4 8 7 10 10 
North 
Carolina 5 5 6 6 7 8 10 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 6 6 6 7 7 7 9 
Oklahoma 3 3 3 6 5 2 2 
Oregon 6 6 7 10 8 9 12 
Pennsylvania 6 7 7 8 10 10 10 
Rhode Island 6 6 6 8 10 10 10 
South 
Carolina 6 6 6 8 7 7 8 
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Tennessee 1 1 1 1 2 4 8 
Texas 6 6 6 6 5 5 10 
Utah 6 6 7 8 7 9 9 
Vermont 4 4 4 6 5 5 10 
Virginia 6 6 6 8 7 10 9 
Washington 6 6 8 10 8 8 12 
West Virginia 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Wisconsin 4 4 4 10 7 7 9 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table A.6 State Score on the Lead by Example Program 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Arizona 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 




California 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Colorado 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Connecticut 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Delaware 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 
District of 
Columbia 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Florida 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Hawaii 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Idaho 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Illinois 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indiana 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Iowa 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Kansas 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Kentucky 0 1 0 2 2 1 2 
Louisiana 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Maine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maryland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Massachusetts 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 
Michigan 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Minnesota 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Missouri 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Montana 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nevada 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
New 
Hampshire 0 1 0 1 1 2 2 
New Jersey 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 
New Mexico 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
New York 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 
North 
Carolina 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Oregon 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Pennsylvania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rhode Island 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
South 
Carolina 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Texas 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 




Vermont 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Virginia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Washington 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wisconsin 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: the scoring of the Lead by Example program is ba ed on two parts: the efficiency 
requirement, and the rating/benchmarking requirements. Each of the two parts has the 
















































                  
Population 0.2033 1 
                 Per Capita 
Income 0.605 -0.0745 1 
                Electricity 
Price 0.7731 0.1174 0.2895 1 
% Post2000 
Homes -0.297 -0.0055 -0.1592 -0.1877 1 
Household 
Size-Owner 0.3614 0.3431 -0.1239 0.399 0.1755 1 
Household 
Size-Renter 0.1129 0.369 -0.1092 0.2011 0.5907 0.722 1 
            % Electric 
Heating -0.4013 0.1493 -0.116 -0.171 0.4977 -0.1262 0.3521 1 
           
CDD -0.1294 0.1674 -0.0159 0.2148 0.3399 0.1915 0.4756 0.635 1 
          
HDD 0.0863 -0.3345 0.0366 -0.1776 
-
0.2806 -0.177 -0.5273 -0.6945 
-
0.8711 1 
         
% Financing 0.2782 -0.0207 0.1341 0.1435 0.0001 0.0427 -0.0416 -0.206 
-




Industries -0.4619 0.0582 -0.3524 -0.3332 
-
0.0138 -0.1608 -0.0933 0.1977 0.0452 
-
0.1907 0.0156 1 
% Food and 
Health -0.0379 -0.0402 -0.3094 0.1129 
-
0.2311 -0.3087 -0.4262 -0.1916 
-
0.1735 0.1744 0.0311 0.0928 1 
      Total EE 
Program 
Budget 0.434 0.6776 0.0671 0.2918 
-




0.0828 0.063 -0.1351 
-
0.0121 1 
     EE 
Budget % 
Utility 
Revenue 0.3868 0.1015 0.0367 0.2796 
-
0.0524 0.1522 -0.0142 -0.3203 
-
0.3321 0.2519 0.0762 -0.2418 0.2203 0.5075 1 
EERS 0.3133 0.1966 0.0307 0.2838 0.0431 0.1104 0.0541 -0.1983 
-
0.1356 0.0956 0.1115 -0.2024 0.1667 0.3903 0.6128 1 
   
Decoupling 0.2482 0.1167 0.0556 0.2528 0.2644 0.111 0.158 -0.1334 
-
0.0513 0.0375 0.0829 -0.1256 0.243 0.2985 0.4942 0.4611 1 
  Building 
Code 0.2426 0.2643 0.076 0.0658 
-




0.0551 0.0049 -0.0937 
-
0.0682 0.4287 0.4585 0.2344 0.1854 1 
 Lead By 
Example 0.3896 0.2255 0.1927 0.3766 0.0665 0.2215 0.1903 -0.1115 0.0736 
-
0.1174 0.0533 -0.1802 0.1248 0.3122 0.3579 0.2266 0.429 0.2287 1 
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Appendix B: GT-NEMS Modeling and Cost Estimations of 
Energy Efficiency Policies 
A portfolio of eleven policies was modeled with GT-NEMS to assess the 
achievable potential of electricity efficiency. NEMS outputs from individual policy 
scenarios were used in supplemental spreadsheet analysis to calculate the levelized cost 
of electricity saved. This appendix provides information about modeling details and cost 
estimations policy by policy.  
(1) Appliance Incentives offer a 30% subsidy to reduce the capital cost for the 
most efficient technologies in residential buildings based on the GT-NEMS technology 
menu. This amount of subsidy is chosen because manyst te and federal programs offer 
financial incentives of 30% for clean energy investments. For instance, the American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 renewed the residential energy efficiency tax credit through 
December 31, 2013. Its credit ranges from about 10 to 30% for various envelope retrofits 
and equipment upgrades, including for example $300 for a heat pump water heater or a 
90% efficient gas water heater. The State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program 
offered similar levels of subsidies for appliances from 2009 - 2011. In 2008, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act created a 30% investment tax credit for solar 
energy. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a tax credit for commercial and 
residential PV and solar hot water heaters of 30%, up to $2000 per home. For this reason, 
the other two financial incentives in this analysis, the Commercial Financing policy and 
the CHP Incentives policy, apply the same amount of subsidies to reduce the capital costs 
of energy-efficient technologies. 
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A list of 25 selected technologies from the major end-uses eligible for incentives 
can be found in Table B.1. A subsidy was provided to these technologies to reduce their 
capital costs by 30% in this policy scenario. 
Table B.1 Most Efficient Home Appliances and Equipment a 








Fuel Oil Furnace 3 4,983 0.95 2009-2023 
Fuel Oil Radiator 3 4,513 0.95 2012-2022 
Electric Heat Pump 4 3,567 3.14 2014-2021 
Geothermal Heat Pump 2 6,414 5 2010-2018 
Kerosene Furnace 3 4,983 0.95 2009-2023 
LPG Furnace 5 2,470 0.96 2009-2019 
Natural Gas Furnace 5 2,470 0.96 2009-2020 
Natural Gas Radiator 3 4,513 0.95 2012-2022 
Space Cooling 
Central Air Conditioner 4 5,290 6.504 2011-2019 
Electric Heat Pump 4 3,567 5.325 2014-2021 
Geothermal Heat Pump 2 5,749 30 2011-2021 
Room Air Conditioner 3 900 3.52 2012-2026 
Clothes 
Washing Clothes Washer 3 958 0.114 2008-2022 
Dishwashing Dishwasher 3 1,181 1.1 2010-2020 
Water Heating 
Fuel Oil Water Heater 3 2,400 0.68 2012-2026 
Electric Water Heater 5 1,430 2.4 2009-2023 
LPG Water Heater 4 852 0.746 2014-2022 
Natural Gas Water Heater 
4 852 0.746 2014-2023 
Cooking 
Electric Stove 2 400 601 2006-2050 
LPG Stove 2 500 0.42 2006-2050 
Natural Gas Stove 2 500 0.42 2006-2050 
Clothes 
Drying 
Electric Clothes Dryer 2 500 3.74 2009-2023 
Natural Gas Clothes 
Dryer 2 515 0.931 2007-2028 
Refrigeration Refrigerator 4 1,107 399 2009-2023 
Freezing Freezer 3 626 290 2010-2032 
a.  The costs and performance of these technologies vary by census division. The efficiency for different 




The Appliance Incentives policy would incur two types of costs. The private 
investment which is the expenditure spent by resident al consumers to purchase 
equipment. Table B.2 shows the difference in equipment expenditure between the policy 
case and the reference. The negative private costs suggest that the subsidy can offset the 
incremental cost of purchasing energy-efficient equipment. The cost burden is borne by 
the program with over $3 Billion every year spent by the public sector to provide subsidy.  
The total cost of the policy is the sum of both the private and public costs, and it is 
estimated to be $2.9 billion in 2035. By weighting the cost with electricity savings, the 
levelized cost of electricity saved (LCOE) in this policy case is estimated at 6.7-8.0 
cent/kWh (Table B.2). 
Table B.2 Cost Estimations from Appliance Incentives 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private Cost -1.37 -1.01 -0.73 -0.53 
Subsidy Cost 4.51 4.25 3.83 3.42 
Administration Cost 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total 3.15 3.25 3.11 2.90 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 6.7 b -8.0  
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
(2) In the residential Building Energy Codes case, four new codes were added to 
the building codes profile to force shell efficiency improvements. These codes were 
modeled with relatively high heating and cooling shell efficiency, and relatively high 
shell installation costs, in the attempt to mimic the periodic code updates.  
In the Reference case, new residential buildings are built either to no code, or in 
compliance with four different levels of codes: IECC 2006, Energy Star, FORTY code 
(40% above IECC 2006 code), and PATH code (50% above IECC 2006). We constructed 
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a policy scenario where existing building codes are replaced by new codes to ensure 
efficiency improvements roughly 5% every five years.  The Building Codes scenario was 
set up based on EIA’s Expanded Standards and Codes side case (EIA, 2011), where four  
new codes were added including 'IECC 2006+' (about 30% above IECC 2006), 'IECC 
2006++' (about 5% above IECC 2006 +) , 'IECC 2006+++' (about 5% above IECC 2006 
++), and ‘NEW CODE’ (about 5% above IECC 2006 +++) to mimic gradual code 
improvements. Each newly added code has higher cost associated with efficiency 
improvements. Table B.3 shows the details about the residential building codes in our 
policy case. 











'No IECC' 7 1.21 1.15 
'IECC 2006' 5,251 0.81 1.06 
'Energy Star' 5,508 0.79 1.03 
'FORTY%' 6,797 0.68 0.97 
'PATH' 7,868 0.51 0.93 
'IECC 2006+' 5,580 0.69 0.90 
'IECC 2006++' 6,018 0.65 0.85 
'IECC 2006+++' 6,128 0.61 0.80 
'NEW CODE' 7,392 0.56 0.85 
a.  The cost and efficiency factors for each building shell type vary by census division.  
 
The policy case also accounts for regional differences in code adoption (Figure 
B.1). For example, the Pacific division is the early adopter of the IECC 2006, Energy Star, 
Forty, and IECC 2006+ codes, while the East South Central division is the most lagged 
adopter of these codes. Energy Star, Forty and IECC 2006+ retire five years later than 
IECC 2006 with time variance among census divisions. But the IECC 2006++ retires at 
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2023 for all regions; and the IECC 2006+++ code retires at 2028 for all regions. The 
‘New Code’ and the PATH code, the two most stringent codes, stay available for all 
years and all regions.  
 
Figure B.1 Building Energy Code Retirement Years by Census Division 
 
New houses built in compliance with new codes consume less energy due to 
better insulation and building design. Although under new codes installation costs get 




Figure B.2 Share of New Houses Built in the Policy Case 
The LCOE was calculated based on the difference in private and public costs 
between the policy scenario and the reference. Cost to the private sector is the 
incremental cost of equipment plus the installation c st for better building envelopes. By 
installing more thermally efficient envelopes, HVAC equipment can be down-sized due 
to lower service demand. This phenomenon is reflected by the negative equipment 
expenditure, suggesting less money spent on building equipment in the policy case than 
the reference case (Table B.4). To estimate program ad inistrative costs, we assume cost 
associated with building code enforcement would be represented by the budget of each 
state hiring their building code officials and inspectors. The administrative costs are 
based on each state adding one administrative office run at $150,000 per annum budget 
and one code official at $75,000 salary per annum.  It also includes two additional 
building code inspectors for the verification of every 100 million square feet in the state 
at $75,000 per year (Brown, et al., 2009). The levelized cost is estimated to be 0.5-0.8 
cent/kWh (Table B.4). 
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Table B.4 Cost Estimations from Residential Building Energy Codes 
 Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Equipment Expenditure -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Shell Installation Cost  0.33 0.28 0.39 0.25 
Administration Cost  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total 0.33 0.29 0.40 0.26 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 0.5-0.8b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
(3) The On-bill Financing program offers zero-interest loans to the most efficient 
home appliances and equipment. The technologies eligibl  for zero-interest loans are the 
same technologies that are eligible for appliance subsidies as listed in Table B.1. In GT-
NEMS modeling, consumer choice of energy-using equipment is based on lifecycle cost. 
To model on-bill financing, we changed the equations f lifecycle cost calculation. In the 
reference case, the life-cycle costs for residential technologies are calculated as following: 
 
To bring in financing option with variable interest ra es and payback periods, we 
changed the lifecycle cost equation to: 
 
When interest rate is 0%, we have, 
 




Where, LFCYCLE is the lifecycle costs by equipment class, building type, and 
census division; CAPITAL is the capital costs for appliances; OPCOST is the operational 
costs for appliances; DIST is the discount rate for the operational cost during the life time 
of the appliances; HORIZON is the appliance life time; ANNUALPAY is the annual 
payment for on-bill financing equipment; CAPHOR is payback time; and CAPDIST is 
the interest rate offered by the on-bill financing program. 
In the policy scenario, the 25 selected technologies w re assigned a 0% interest 
rate and 10-year payback time. Other technologies were assigned non-zero interest rate, 
indicating their life-cycle costs were calculated with the original equation.  
With on-bill financing, increased private investment is the increased expenditure 
for purchasing home appliances and equipment. Loan c st is the initial seed money put 
into the program for zero-interest loans. Program ad inistrative cost is estimated as 
$0.13/MMBtu energy saved. The LCOE associated with On-bill Financing is estimated to 
be 6.6-7.4 cent/kWh (Table B.5) 
Table B.5 Cost Estimations from On-Bill Financing 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private cost 0.95 0.64 0.40 0.25 
Loan Cost 1.48 0.02 -0.09 0.01 
Administrative Cost 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total 2.44 0.67 0.32 0.27 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 6.6-7.4 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
  
(4) The Market Priming policy also targets the same set of technologies as shown 
in Table B.1, but was modeled with hurdle rate changes. Providing information is 
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assumed to lower discount rate when consumers make investment decisions. GT-NEMS 
modeling of this policy changed the hurdle rates of the efficient technologies to 7%. 
With Market Priming, private investment increases when consumers purchase 
more of the efficient appliances and equipment. Public cost is represented by program 
administrative cost, estimated as $0.13/MM Btu energy saved. The levelized cost is 
estimated to be 2.7-3.6 cent/kWh for Market Priming (Table B.6). 
Table B.6 Cost Estimations from Market Priming 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private cost 6.91 3.76 2.90 1.44 
Administration Cost 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Total 6.94 3.79 2.92 1.46 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 2.7-3.6 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
  
(5) The Aggressive Appliance Policy forces retiring the least efficient 
technologies from the market place at 2012. In GT-NEMS, the selected technologies 
were made either unavailable after 2012, or assigned a hurdle rate equals to 100%, 
making these technologies never be chosen to meet en rgy service demands. A list of 
forced retired technologies is shown in Table B.7. 
Table B.7 Residential Technologies Forced Early Retirement a 
End-Use Equipment Type 
Average 
Efficiency Available Years 
Space Heating 
Fuel Oil Furnace 1 0.82 2010 - 2032 
Fuel Oil Radiator 1 0.825 2010 - 2031 
Electric Heat Pump 1 2.35 2014 - 2028 
Kerosene Furnace 1 0.82 2010 - 2032 
LPG Furnace 1 0.818 2010 - 2032 
Natural Gas Furnace 1 0.818 2010 - 2032 




Central Air Conditioner1 3.899 2009 - 2039 
Electric Heat Pump 1 4.003 2014 - 2028 
Room Air Conditioner 1 3.103 2013 - 2027 
Clothes 
Washing Clothes Washer 1 0.160 2012 - 2022 
Dish Washing Dishwasher 1 0.587 2010 - 2024 
Water Heating 
Fuel Oil Water Heater 1 0.585 2011 - 2032 
Electric Water Heater 1 0.925 2011 - 2032 
LPG Water Heater 1 0.59 2006 - 2050 
Natural Gas Water Heater 
1 0.605 2011 - 2032 
Refrigeration Refrigerator 1 428. 7 2013 - 2027 
Freezing Freezer 1 347.5 2010 - 2032 
a.  The performances of these technologies vary by census division. The efficiency for different 
equipment types are measured by different metrics. 
Similar to the Market Priming policy, the cost estimation for the Aggressive 
Appliance Policy has private cost from the expenditure for purchasing equipment, and 
public cost from program administrative costs. The levelized cost is estimated to be 0.6-
0.7 cent/kWh (Table B.8). 
Table B.8 Cost Estimations from Aggressive Appliance Policy 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private cost 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.08 
Administration Cost 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.09 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 0.6-0.7 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
Unlike the residential energy-efficiency policies where LCOEs were calculated 
based equipment units, cost estimation for commercial policies was based on service 
demand. We estimate the magnitude of technology investment costs in the commercial 
buildings separately for new purchases, replacements, a d retrofits. In each case, the 
calculation is based on GT-NEMS estimates of servic demand (SD) for energy. 
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For new purchases,   
Investment Cost = SDnew * (Cost/8760) /CF 
where CF is the equipment-specific capacity factor; 
For replacements, 
Investment Cost = SDreplacement * (Cost/8760) /CF  
For retrofits, we assume the average amount of commercial floorspace 
undergoing a retrofit is 2.2%. We use the following equation to proportion the surviving 
service demand to the commercial sector retrofit aver ge:  
Investment Cost = SDsurviving * (Cost/8760) /CF * 0.022/(SDsurviving/SDtotal) 
Where SDtotal = SDnew + SDreplacement + SDsurviving  
 (6) In the Benchmarking policy case, GT-NEMS uses a combination of discount 
rates and the rate for U.S. government ten-year Treasury notes to calculate consumer 
hurdle rates used in making equipment-purchasing decisions. While the macroeconomic 
module of GT-NEMS determines the rate for ten-year Treasury notes endogenously, the 
discount rates are inputs to the model. Modifying these inputs is the primary means of 
estimating the impact of benchmarking for the commercial sector in this analysis. This is 
done in two steps: first, by updating the discount rates to reflect a broader selection of the 
literature; and second, by adjusting the updated discount rates to account for the effects of 
a national benchmarking policy. 
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To illustrate, Table B.9 presents the 2015 hurdle rat s used in GT-NEMS across 
scenarios for two major end-uses in the commercial sector, space heating and lighting 
(these values represent the sum of the Treasury bill rates and the discount rates). 
 
Table B.9 Discount Rates across Scenarios for Space H ating and Lighting in 2015 
% of Population Discount Rate a 




27 14.2 1005.75 40.4 
23 14.3 105.75 19.6 
19 14.3 50.75 15.4 
18.6 14.3 30.75 12.4 
10.7 14.3 20.75 9.8 
1.5 14.3 12.25 7.4 
0.2 14.3 5.75 4.8 
Lighting 
27 14.2 1005.75 57.3 
23 14.3 105.75 40.8 
18.6 14.3 50.75 36.5 
18.6 14.3 30.75 33 
8.8 14.3 20.75 30.4 
1.5 14.3 12.25 26.9 
2.5 14.3 5.75 21.7 
a. Discount rates presented include the projected Treasu y bill rate for 2015. Bold numbers 
represent the median estimate for the specific scenario. 
 
The Benchmarking policy provides energy performance i formation on 
commercial buildings. Equipment expenditure increases with this policy. Program 
administrative cost was estimated as $0.13/MMBtu energy saved. The levelized cost of 




Table B.10 Cost Estimations from Benchmarking 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private Cost 1.27 1.01 0.97 0.92 
Compliance Cost 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Total 1.28 1.01 0.98 0.92 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 0.9-1.4 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
 (7) The commercial Building Code is modeled, in part, by assuming a more rapid 
rate of commercial shell efficiency improvement, as shown in Table B.11. Code 
requirements of efficiency improvements for HVAC equipment is also incorporated in 
GT-NEMS modeling. 
 
Table B.11 Commercial Building Shell Efficiency Improvement a 
 New Construction Existing Buildings 
EIA Reference case 14% 6% 
EIA High Tech Case 17.4% 7.5% 
Building Code Scenario 30% 19% 
a. Improvement of 2035 efficiency over 2003 efficiency  
 
In this policy scenario, private investment is the incremental cost of equipment 
and building envelope expenditures to meet new building codes. This policy assumes 
costs associated with building code enforcement carried out by state building code 
officials and inspectors. The assumptions about code enforcement cost (the cost of 
running an administrative office and hiring inspectors) stay the same as in the residential 
building codes policy. The levelized cost is estimaed to be 3.4-4.6 cent/kWh, with most 
of the cost burden fall on the private sector (Table B.12). 
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Table B.12 Cost Estimations from Building Codes 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private Cost 1.14 0.74 0.39 0.27 
Shell Improvement Cost 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Administration Cost 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Total 1.26 0.84 0.47 0.34 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 3.4-4.6 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
 (8) In the Commercial Financing policy case, a 30% subsidy was provided to 107 
technologies, based on a prior analysis of the impact of implementing a carbon tax 
(Brown, Cox, & Sun, 2012). The subsidized technologies are listed in Table B.13. 
Table B.13 Incentivized Technologies in Financing Policy Case 
End-use / Fuel 
Type Technology (Vintages) 
Space Heating     
Electricity 
Commercial type ground source heat pump (vintages include 2011 high, 
2011 high 10% ITC w MACRS, 2011 typical, 2011 typical 10% ITC w 
MACRS, and 2020-30 typical) 
Rooftop air source heat pump (vintages include 2007 high, and 2030 
high) 
Natural Gas 
Gas boiler (2011 high vintage) 
Gas furnace (2011 high vintage) 




Centrifugal chiller (vintages include 2007 high, 2007 mid range, 2010 
typical, 2020 typical, and ASHRAE 90.1-2004) 
Commercial type ground source heat pump (vintages include 2011 high, 
2011 high 10% ITC w MACRS, 2011 typical, 2011 typical 10% ITC w 
MACRS, and 2020-30 typical) 
Reciprocating chiller (vintages include 2007 high, 2020 high, 2020 
typical, and 2030 high) 
Residential type central AC (vintages include 2003 installed base, 2030 
typical, and NAECA standard-pre-2006) 
Rooftop AC (vintages include 2003 installed base, 2007 typical, 2010 
high, 2011 typical, and 2030 high)  
Rooftop air source heat pump (2030 high vintage) 
Screw chiller (vintages include 2020 high, 2030 high, and 2007 typical) 
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wall-window room AC (vintages include 2011 typical and 2020 typical) 
Water Heating 
Natural Gas Gas water heater (2020 high vintage) 
Electricity 
Heat pump water heater (vintages include 2011 typical, and 2020 
typical) 
Solar water heater (vintages include 2010 typical south, 2011 typical  
30 pct ITC south, 2020 typical south, and 2030 typical south) 
Ventilation  
Electricity 
Constant Air Volume Vent (vintages include 2008 high, 2020 typical, 
and 2030 typical) 
Variable Air Volume Vent 2030 typical 2008 high and 2020 typical) 
Cooking 
Electricity Range, Electric-induction, 4 burner, oven, 11 
Natural Gas Range, Gas, 4 powered burners, convect. oven, 11 
Lighting 
Electricity 
72W Incandescent (Halogena Type HIR) 
F28T5, F32T8 Super, F96T8 High, F96T8HO  LB 




Beverage Merchandiser (vintages include 2008 high, 2008 low, 2011 
typical, 2020 typical, 2030 typical, and installed base) 
Ice machine (vintages include 2011-2020 typical and 2010 EPACT 
standard) 
Reach-in freezer (vintages include 2008 high, 2020 typical, 2030 
typical, and installed base) 
Reach-in refrigerator (vintages include 2008/2010 high, 2011 typical, 
2020 typical, 2030 typical, and installed base) 
Supermarket compressor rack (vintages include 2011 high, 2011 
typical, 2020 high, 2020 typical, 2030 high, and 2030 typical) 
Supermarket condenser (vintages include 2008 high, 2020 typical, and 
installed base) 
Supermarket display case (vintages include 2008 high-2012 standard, 
2011 typical, 2020 high, and installed base) 
Vend Machine (vintages include 2008 low, 2008-10 high-2013 
standard, 2008-10 typical, 2011 high, 2011 typical, 2020 high, and 2030 
high) 
Walk-In freezer (vintages include 2008 high, 2009 EISA stnd-2010 
typical, 2020 typical, 2030 typical, and installed base) 
Walk-In refrigerator  (vintages include 2008 high, 2009 EISA stnd-
2010 typical, 2020 typical, 2030 typical, and installed base) 
 
In the Financing case, total cost was estimated to be the sum of increased 
equipment expenditure (policy caser versus referenc), the cost of subsidizing the most 
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efficient technologies, and program administrative costs. The levelized cost is estimated 
to be 7.8-8.1 cent/kWh (Table B.14). 
Table B.14 Cost Estimations from Financing 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private Cost 0.87 0.79 0.57 0.50 
Subsidy Cost 11.15 10.91 10.43 9.78 
Administration Cost 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Total 12.09 11.78 11.08 10.34 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 7.8-8.1 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
 (9) In various industrial processes, systems using motors, such as compressor, 
pump, and fan systems, are big users of electricity. The Motor Standard policy describes 
a scenario where technology advances are mandated for manufactures to produce higher-
efficiency motors and lower energy-consuming motor systems with improved system 
design and the use of variable-frequency drives. To model the impact of such mandate, 
we assumes new motor systems save 25% more energy i 2017. For new motors, we 
assume there will be 5% efficiency improvement for small motors (50 horsepower or 
lower) and 3% efficiency improvement for larger motors. The modification was made 
effective from 2017 when the new standard is introduced.  
Facility owners have to pay the costs of rewinding a d replacing failed motors. 
The cost associated with the new motor standard is the incremental cost in motor 
expenditures. The private cost listed in Table B.15 suggests that more failed motors are 
replaced with new motors in place of a new motor standard. The public sector pays the 
program administrative cost, which is much lower than the private cost. The LCOE in 
this policy case is estimated to be $-2.4-3.9cent/kWh (Table B.15)  
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Table B.15 Cost Estimations from Motor Standard 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private Cost 0.408 0.224 0.182 0.204 
Administration Cost 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Total 0.410 0.226 0.184 0.207 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 2.4-3.9 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
 
 (10) In the CHP Incentives scenario, subsidies were applied to industrial CHP 
systems to promote efficient usage of waste heat in various industrial processes. A 10-
year subsidy increasing from 15% to 30% was applied to the total installed cost of CHP 
systems. We assume that in the CHP market, retailers ar  able to share the benefits of the 
subsidy with the consumers at the beginning. All benefits gradually go to the consumers. 
To reflect this phenomenon, a 15% subsidy was applied for the first three years, rising by 
5% every year from 2015 and staying at 30% from 2017 to 2021. GT-NEMS represents 
CHP as a combination of eight technology systems, including two internal combustion 
CHP systems (ranging from 1 to 3 MW), five gas turbine CHP systems (3 to 40 MW) and 
one combined cycle system (with two 40 MW gas turbines and a 20 MW steam turbine).  
We account for the increased natural gas consumption and increased equipment 
expenditure as the private cost associated with the CHP Incentives policy. Subsidy cost 
was estimated based on the amount of incremental cost in CHP investments, while 
program administrative cost was estimated as 2% of subsidy cost. The LCOE in this 





Table B.16 Cost Estimations from CHP Incentive 
Cost (Billion $2009) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Increased Natural Gas Expenditure 1.55 1.15 0.62 0.54 
CHP system 0.25 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Subsidy cost 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Administration cost 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 2.37 1.13 0.62 0.54 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 1.5-2.3 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
b. Levelized cost calculated in a sensitivity when all costs were discounted at 3%. 
  
(11) The Plant and Technology Upgrade policy characte izes the voluntary plant 
upgrades by the private sector. It took the estimated electricity and natural gas savings 
from plant utility and technology upgrades reported from 2010 to 2012 in the Industrial 
Assessment Center (IAC) database (Table B.17). The percentage savings were applied to 
change the TPC parameter in the itech.txt input file.
The Plant and Technology Upgrade is a combination of R&D and demonstration 
programs, which aim at identifying the most significant energy-saving opportunities 
associated with new technologies that can be applied to various industrial processes and 
sectors. Information is shared among facility owners about energy savings with plant 
utility upgrades, including non-energy related upgrades. It is assumed that information 
and technical assistance is able to stimulate volunteer upgrades in plants and firms. In 
addition, plant utility can be upgraded for non-energy-saving reasons. For instance, the 
recent trend of price drop for natural gas may motivate some factories to switch from 
electronically operated equipment to fossil fuel equipment. This type of upgrades can 
results in involuntary electricity savings with higer natural gas consumption. 
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The GT-NEMS modeling account for policy impacts on both electricity and 
natural gas. This analysis is unavoidably limited to its data source, while the IAC 
database has small sample size with a majority of small and medium sized firms. The 
extremely large potentials are likely the result of fuel switching and small sample sizes. 
In some cases the large electricity savings are genrally coupled with natural gas (or other 
fuels) penalties. For example, in the chemical industry, an increase of natural gas 
consumption of 65% in the West is skewed by one plant in California producing 
adhesives and sealants. It switched from electronically-operated equipment to fossil fuel 
equipment, resulting in a 200% increase in natural gas consumption with 60% savings in 
electricity. Another instance is the textile industry in the Northeast, where one plant in 
Massachusetts implemented an upgrade in the time period of investigation. This plant 
installed cogeneration equipment, which uses a fossil fuel engine, saving 89% of 
electricity while using 11% more natural gas.  
Table B.17 Electricity and Natural Gas Saving Estimations from IAC Reports 
  
Industry  
Electricity savings Natural Gas 
Northeast Midwest South West Northeast Midwest South West 
311 Food 48% 48% 37% 47% 1% 26% 2% 0% 
322 Paper 29% 31% 15% 12% 5% 16% 11% 0% 
325 Chemicals 63% 13% 52% 26% -33% 25% -4% -65% 
327 Non Metals 10% 20% 46% 37% 5% 29% 0% N/A 
331 Iron and Steel 15% 57% 28% 5% 14% 18% 3% 3% 
332 Fabricated Metals 29% 47% 43% 29% -49% 17% 11% N/A 
333 Machinery 20% 54% 46% 40% 29% 54% 27% N/A 
334 Computers and 
Electronics 
31% 58% 16% 31% 31% 23% 7% N/A 
336 Transportation 
Equipment 
17% 40% 57% 10% 17% 5% N/A N/A 
335 Electrical 9% 12% 24% 36% 22% 22% 4% N/A 
321 Wood 23% 38% 34% 76% 23% 4% 55% N/A 
326 Plastics Others 23% 26% 28% 24% 15% 19% 17% 10% 
313 Textile 5% N/A 24% N/A 5% N/A 9% N/A 
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314 Textile product 89% 11% 13% 13% -11% 95% 24% 29% 
324 Petroleum and 
Coal 
14% 16% 7% 13% 74% 17% 21% 4% 
 
For LCOE calculation, private cost was estimated as the incremental investment 
for plant upgrades in the private sector (policy case versus reference). Following the 
division of industrial plants by Brown et al (2011), this study grouped firms into small, 
medium and large sized firms (Figure B.3). It is asumed that the private investment is 
$14/MMBtu energy saved for large firms and $12.6/MMBtu energy saved for small and 
medium firms (Brown, Jackson, Cox, et al., 2011).  
 
Figure B.3 U.S. Industrial Consumption by Size of Firm (Brown, et al., 2011) 
The levelized cost associated with the Plant and Technology Upgrade is estimated to be 
3.0-4.8 cent/kWh, with investment cost decreasing from $1.34 Billion in 2020 to $2.25 
Billion in 2035 (present value, Table B.18). 
Table B.18 Cost Estimations from Plant and Technology Upgrade  
Cost (2009$Billion) a 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Private Cost 1.34 1.26 0.89 0.94 
Public Cost 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total 1.36 1.29 0.93 0.97 
LCOE (cent/kWh) 3.0-4.8 b 
a. Private cost was discounted at 7%, and public cost wa  discounted at 3%. 
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